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**NEO-COMMUNITARIANISM AND SPECONOMY AS MODELS FOR  
DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

**OLATUNJI AGBOOLA OLATEJU**

**Thesis submitted to *Swansea University* in fulfilment of the requirements for  
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics**

**December 2012**

**Supervisors: Dr Mark Evans  
Dr Krijn Peters**

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# **NEO-COMMUNITARIANISM AND SPECONOMY<sup>1</sup> AS MODELS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

## **ABSTRACT**

Africa's tragedy has at different times been subjected to various paradigm shifts ranging from modernisation to neo-Marxist theories with each paradigm identifying different sources of the tragedy. The tragedy, to some scholars, is rooted to the crisis of development. But to some African scholars, a key aspect to the crisis remains the question of 'which and whose democracy?' The central issue for investigation in this thesis is the efficacy of 'best-practice' political and economic templates prescribed by both liberals and socialists for Africa. These templates appear to be producing hybridised political order that breeds crises of political instability, leadership, economic hardship, violent conflicts etc; with no visible solution in sight. There is therefore a need for the reconstruction of Africa's development strategy with unique models based on a foundation of 'best fit' values nurtured by the indigenous grains of the African societies. The thesis adopts critical theory using textual and contextual analysis as its methodology to engage literature on liberal, popular, social, and socialist democracy. It also engages the Africanist and African debate on democracy to discuss what works contextually in Africa and what does not work. The thesis sets out to establish how neo-communitarianism and speconomy can collectively serve as models for development in the sub-Saharan Africa, that is currently mediated by the alienating role of an incoherent public sphere dominated by representations of foreign ideologies which do not seek to create a common consciousness in all citizens but rather to help maintain and perpetuate a fractured image of the Enlightenment.

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<sup>1</sup>Socialised Partnership Economic System

DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AD: Alliance for Democracy

AG: Action Group

ANPP: All Nigeria Peoples Party

APPER: Africa's Priority Programmes for Economic Recovery

AU: African Union

BDP: Botswana Democratic Party

BNF: Botswana National Front

BPP: Botswana People's Party

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

ECA: Economic Commission for Africa

EGCA: Employment Generation Cooperatives Agency

ESFA: Employment Stabilisation Funds Agency

FRELIMO: Liberation Front of Mozambique

GNP: Gross National Product

GNU: Government of National Unity

IMF: International Monetary Fund

KADU: Kenya African Democratic Union

KANU: Kenya African National Union

KSA: Knowledge, Skill, Ability

LPA: Lagos Plan of Action

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCNC: National Congress of Nigerians and Cameroons

NDI: National Democratic Institute

NEP: New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development.

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

NPC: Northern Peoples Congress

NIMD: National Institute of Multi-party Democracy

MDC: Movement for Democratic Change

OAU: Organisation of African Unity

OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PDP: Peoples Democratic party

RENAMO: National Resistance of Mozambique

RICA: Research Institutes Coordinating Agencies

SAP: Structural Adjustment Programme

Speconomy: Socialised Partnership Economic System

TNC: Transition National Council

UNITA: The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Portuguese: União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola)

UNPAAERD: United Nations Programmes for African Economic Recovery and Development

UN: United Nations

WTO: World Trade Organisation

WAFF: West African Frontier Force

ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

## Chapter 1

### GENERAL INTRODUCTION

#### 1.0 Introduction

The 1950s and 1960s saw most of the sub-Saharan African colonies gaining their independence. But the initial euphoria and high hopes proved to be short-lived for many of the young nations, as they became plagued by political instability, authoritarian leadership, economic hardship, violent conflicts, etc. For the purpose of this thesis I refer to this as 'the Africa's crisis' or as described by Leys (2004), the 'Africa's tragedy'. The crisis, to some scholars, is rooted to the crisis of development (Chabal, 1998). But to some other African scholars, a key aspect to the political crisis remains the question of 'which and whose democracy?' (Beckham, 1989)

This contestation makes a systematic analysis of the protracted political and economic crisis in Africa more imperative. Some African scholars believe that there is nothing that makes Africa ungovernable neither is democracy alien to African cultures. Many studies on Africa's democratisation processes contextualise Africa's political development in one universal model or the other. They thereby wrongly interpret Africa's political instability either as a consequence of ethnic rivalries or the negative consequences of some retrogressive cultural values. This error of judgement [mis]leads the proponents of the universal theorists to by-pass the central issue involved in the genesis of Africa's political crisis. In this thesis, Africa refers to sub-Sahara Africa.

Scholars such as Harrison and Huntington, who stressed "*Culture Matters*" (2002) in Africa's political instability failed to see how the same culture can facilitate autochthonous political and economic models for economic sustainability, political development and democratic consolidation. We may be tempted to concede to the culture interpretation of Africa's political crisis, doing this may misguide us to accept that it was because such cultural

values lack democratic ingredients as Huntington et al aver. Rather, we should be conscious that African socio-political crises are embedded in the social structures of their post-colonial forms. These are the after-effects of the relegation of the African traditional values to the fringes of the political and state building processes; and the disarticulation of African politics, economy and hybridisation of the traditional patrimonial political system by the colonial and the post-colonial forces.

Africa's political instability have at different times been subjected to various interpretations ranging from modernisation to neo-Marxist with each interpretation identifying different sources of the Africa's crisis and which subsequently have impact on the 'best-practice' thinking of each interpretation. Best-practice thinking as explained by Levy (2011) and Booth (2011) is a 'one size-fits all' approach to governance and development. It involves identification in all societies, of uniformity in what drives changes in institutions, governance, development, as well as in society while ignoring feasible entry points that are country-specific for democracy and development. From this approach comes a uniform set of policy prescriptions that are ideologically based irrespective of the peculiarities of each country. This approach, as applied to the interpretations of Africa's crises and subsequent prescriptions of each interpretation, has profound implications for state state-building, democratisation processes and development.

The central issue for consideration in this thesis is the examination of the efficacy of 'best-practice' (Levy, 2011: 60; Booth, 2011: 1) governance templates as prescribed by both liberal and socialist democracies for African politics and economy. This examination is necessitated by the observation of what Boege et al label as 'hybrid political order' (2009: 15-36) in the sub-Saharan Africa; and thereafter as a way of rectification, reconstruct these templates to produce alternative models based on the foundational 'best fit' values (Booth, 2011) that have been nurtured for several decades by the

indigenous ferment of the African societies. The best-fit approach implies building democracy constructively on the existing institutional arrangements. In this wise, the pre-colonial institutions will need to be treated as potential resources for democratisation and state building processes rather than being swept aside regardless their ability to contribute (Booth, 2011).

Analysis of these best-practice grand theories of democracy is situated within both universal and context-specific values. This is done with the mission of underlying the reality that these grand theories have principles that are historically, conjuncturally and culturally mediated in space and time. It is also done to emphasise that the culture of a people defines the nature and specific character and content of their governance within space and time. The universalism of the grand theories of democracy as a democracy that fixes every community into one grand universal model with insufficient attention given to the contextual and cultural peculiarities is argued in the thesis to lack heuristic value and fails the elementary test of scientific method that requires reality to speak for itself. It is a wrong assumption as averred by Clapham, that a universal template will be ideal for the development and sustenance of democratic structures (Clapham, 1997: 31). Should Africa be compelled to mimic what works for the advanced liberal capitalist countries? Booth responds negatively to this assertion and sees this as a fault start of governance but which unfortunately for several years best-practice governance has meant exactly liberal democracy with free market (2011: 1).

Despite the availability of abundant evidence of the failure of liberal democracy in Africa, African governments still tailor their developmental programmes as epitomised by NEPAD<sup>1</sup>, to reflect what the donor countries and

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<sup>1</sup>New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development. The Constitutive Act of the AU did not make provision for NEPAD but the document emerged in July 2001 from the chambers of the AU. It emerged by merging the Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery Programme (MPA) and the Omega Plan, to produce New Africa Initiative (NAI). The NAI was approved in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia by the AU Summit of Heads of States and Governments. The NAI

agencies will support. They are inspired by the ‘general notion of what is right’ grounded in the universal values of liberal democracy and in so doing pay ‘insufficient attention to context, timescales and trade-offs’ (Booth, *ibid*).

This thesis explains what works contextually in Africa and what does not work or borrowing from Schmitter and Karl, “*what democracy is and what is not*” (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 75-88). It is a response to the wrong assumptions of either socialist or free-market liberal capitalist best-practice approach that influences the post-colonial African leaders especially during the post- Cold War period.

Some of the sharpest minds in development policy, as explained by Grindle (2009) and Levy (2011) regard uniformed best practice approach to governance in every society as a wishful thinking. For instance, Levy wonders if the purported best practice is not just a wishful thinking. After a careful consideration he concludes:

But politics makes the equation considerably more complex. Achieving best-practice means working backwards from a predefined end state. But politics—including stakeholders and their power, incentives, skill, and capacity to organize—gets in the way and inevitably shapes the dynamics of reform. A country’s economic, social, and political institutions cannot be re-engineered from scratch. A country starts from where it is, and evolves through search and learning. Changes in one part of the system call for adaptations in other parts, in an ongoing process. Effective policy-making works with rather than against a country’s grain as it nudges forward this often nonlinear process. Moving away from the best-practices model requires a different way of thinking about policy formulation and implementation. The reality is that many countries lack the institutions and capacities to implement otherwise desirable policies; or the policies may threaten the leaders’ power or the

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was edited and its policy framework was finalised by the Heads of State Implementation Committee to become NEPAD. NEPAD whose stated goals include promoting accelerated development, eradicating poverty and halting the marginalisation of Africa in the global process was purely a document developed by the Implementation Committee of the Heads of State without any constitutive act.

political stability. So the craft of policy making is about finding entry points that are feasible and that advance the development agenda, at least to some degree (Levy, 2011: 60).

One cannot agree less with Levy. There are no institutional templates that are valid for everywhere and for all stages in a country's development. This acceptance implies our preparedness to question the ideological forces, vested interests and political pressures that promote institutional mimic at global and country levels (Booth, 2011).

For instance, the 'best-practice' approach of the free-market liberal democratic ideology with the assumption that the way of solving the developmental and political crises in Africa is the provision of more political democracy through the involvement of civil society is yet to prove effective in the sub-Saharan Africa. Democracy was the desirable goal of the pre-colonial African empires and kingdoms as will be revealed in this study. However its global effectiveness in liberal form requires the enjoyment of same social and economic conditions by the people. While liberal democracy has proved to be an effective way of governance in the advanced capitalist countries, available evidence reveals that such brand of democracy have different effects in different kinds of social and economic contexts. It is therefore a mistake to keep assuming that liberal democracy will produce the same results in a situation where the social and economic contexts are not the same. This is where the best-fit approach becomes desirable.

The philosophy upon which most of the post-colonial states rest is traceable to externally-imposed factors. Nearly, all except Ethiopia which was later afflicted by the externalist's influence lacks indigenous philosophical basis of political existence. The implication of this deficiency is that there is no neo-colonial African state with an indigenous worldview to propel or support its own reality (Aseh, 2011). The idea of modern state in the post-colonial Africa emanates from the transformation of the colonial structures into a neo-



colonial political structure for the purpose of continuing foreign economic objective like the original idea of colonialism. One of the ways of perpetuating that desired goal was by dominating the public sphere with ideological expressions that failed to support African reality but which destroyed the foundation of all indigenous political philosophies.

The proposition of this thesis is that for the foreign founding philosophy to be maintained and reproduced in the neo-colonial state there was the need to flood the public sphere with ideological mechanisms of public mediation for effective epistemic control of the societies. The result of the epistemic control is the emergence of a fractured and contested public sphere that selectively 'favours' certain social categories for the success of the project of domination.

This thesis sets out to show how governance is mediated by the alienating role of an incoherent public sphere – dominated by representations of foreign ideologies – which does not seek to create a common consciousness in all citizens but rather to help maintain and perpetuate an incoherent image of the Enlightenment. This is reinforced by a style of governance that thrives on this incoherent public sphere, an understanding of which should illustrate how such public sphere encourages hybridised notions that are critical for foreign interference, meddling, destruction and domination within the overall project of 'nation building'.

At present, Africa has the worst political scenario. The continent is replete with civil wars in countries such as Somalia, Uganda, Burundi and Eritrea, with genocide in places such as Darfur. Other states like Ivory Coast, Zimbabwe and including those outside the sub-Saharan such as Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, all have had one or other type of "illiberal" (Zakaria, 1997) government or military dictatorship in place. The causes of this political

situation are well examined by Lovejoy (1989) and Amin (1972). According to them, slavery and colonialism destroyed traditional African structures, boundaries, states and societies. Colonial rule, followed by decolonisation strategy, neo-patrimonial and authoritarian leadership, neo-colonial policies and neo-liberal economic and political conditions further fragmented the continent. Africans cannot keep peace because the cultural, religious and territorial differences that were once hushed under European rule are now exposed again with no effective mechanism to curb the violence; neither are they able to return to the pre-slavery era because it was destroyed. Therefore, Africa does not have an economic or political base of its own because these were destroyed by the slave trade and colonisation. Africa continues to remain a dependent continent (Amin, *ibid*). For Africa to escape from this quagmire there is need to reconstruct both the state and democratisation processes based on autochthonous values of neo-communitarian democracy and speconomy. Speconomy derived from socialised partnership economic system, serves as a response to the deficiencies of free market capitalism and centralised socialist market. It is an economic system based on cooperative groups in partnership with the state over the social ownership and control of the means of production and distribution.

Neo-communitarian democracy facilitates the understanding of how culturally constructed political processes can inspire and motivate people to participate within the context of social, political and cultural frameworks to improve on the problem solving capacity of both the state and its politics. Its underlying principle is that though states are domestically autonomous (Ashley, 1984: 225-86), they are not institutionally separated from their economies or societies. It is this principle that makes speconomy a compatible economic philosophy of the neo-communitarian state.

### **1.1 Outline of the chapters.**

To address this problem, the thesis is structured in the following order: Chapter one focuses on general introduction, statement of the research problem, the theoretical framework, method of data collection, limitations of

the study and outline of the chapters. This is followed by Chapter Two, where colonialism and its impact on the pre-colonial structures in Africa are examined. Chapter Three is the literature review with emphasis on the debates on democracy in general, liberal democracy and African debate on democracy. Chapter Four examines the rise and effects of post-colonial dictatorship in Africa with focus on one-party system, military rule in Africa, Liberal and Illiberal democracy. In Chapter Five, popular struggles for democracy and crisis of political transitions in Africa were critically examined while Chapter Six discusses communitarianism and communitarian democracy. Illustrative cases were used in Chapter Seven for neo-communitarian democracy and for the theory of speconomy (socialised partnership economic system) at Chapter Eight. This chapter aims at evaluating the commonalities and differences of the existing models in order to push forward a new model for studying economic development and the state in the sub-Saharan Africa. Chapter Nine contains the summary and conclusion to the study.

## **1.2 Statement of Research Problem**

Liberalism and its offshoot, neo-liberalism remain the contemporary dominant ideologies in world politics since the end of the Cold War. Liberal scholars and policy makers wasted no time to proclaim liberal democracy the beginning of a New World Order. For example, George Bush (Snr) sees it as marking the end of an Old World Order and the beginning of a new one (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998). The liberal intellectuals like Fukuyama, became occupied with theoretical justification for the supremacy of liberal ideas over all other competing ideologies. Fukuyama asserts in "*The End of History?*" (1989) that

The twentieth century saw the developed world descend into a paroxysm of ideological violence, as liberalism contended first with the remnants of absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism that threatened to lead to the ultimate apocalypse of nuclear war. But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an "end of ideology" or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism. The

triumph of the West, of the Western *idea*, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism... What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such (Fukuyama, 1989: 1)

For Fukuyama, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the USA as the sole global power with neo-liberal economic ideology as the dominant ideology, have proved liberal democratic states, such as the United States, representing a kind of ideological terminus toward which all states were evolving and at which all states would eventually arrive. Contributing to this assumption of rebirth of history, Samuel Huntington saw the events as the beginning of a new phase of global history in which the fundamental conflicts will not be between nation-states, but rather between civilizations (Huntington, 1993).

However, it must be noted there are many variants of Liberalism but the main themes that run through Liberal thought are that human beings are perfectible and that democracy is necessary for that perfectibility to develop (Baylis et al 2008). The Liberals reject the idea of state being a central actor or a unitary actor but as a set of bureaucracies, each with its own interests. In those issue-areas, such as economy, environment, technology, etc; where the state acts, the Liberals see multinational corporations and transnational actors as more important. Therefore there can be no such thing as a national interest, since it merely represents the result of whatever bureaucratic organisations that dominate the domestic decision-making process. It must be emphasised also that conceptualising and understanding of the liberal concept differ widely. On the one hand, as is widely held in Europe liberalism is associated with a free market-economy, while on other, it is associated with the political principle of pluralism, a view that is predominantly held in other parts of the world especially the USA. But whatever interpretation we adopt, the two perceptions of the ideology share the same commonality of belief in the universality of

liberal individualism, privacy, perfectibility, equality and liberty, which is regarded as rational and universal. These themes and commonalty are key issues that underline the focus of the thesis in its assumptions of the effects of universal liberal individualism on the communal values of the sub-Saharan African societies. This study examines three key issues:

1. The current debate and concerns about democracy in general and its efficacy in explaining the African political crisis.
2. The role of liberal democracy as the grand narrative and its uses in the current political practices in Africa
3. The quest for an alternative model of democracy, using the neo-communitarian model as a veritable option open to African countries

The thrust of the study is how through a critical examination of existing literature on democracy, and through the weight of evidence, a new conception of democracy, state-building and economic development based on the neo-communitarian model can be evolved. The emphasis on market and pluralism as the bedrock of liberal democracy over-exaggerates the heuristic value of liberal democracy in Africa. As opine by Cliffe and Seddon, the appearance of multi party politics is not necessarily the same as democracy (1991). The thesis specifically addresses the following questions as stated below.

### **1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

1. How applicable are the various models of democracy to Africa?
2. How can community political participation be engendered other than through the party system?
3. Are political parties essential for democracy or pose threats to its survival in Africa?
4. Does culture undermine or lubricate democracy?
5. Is there any relationship between culture, party system, political leadership and democracy?
6. How can we explain the recurring democratic crises in Africa?

All these are examined in the context of the utility of liberal democracy in Africa.

There is a skewed analysis of 'Africa's Tragedy' (Leys, 1994) through various interpretations as indicated earlier on the one hand, and the Berg and Bates Reports of 1981 on the other. The incorrect analysis of the crises leads to counterfactual conclusion on the factors responsible for the propensity of the elite, bad policies and bad governance on democracy (Arrighi, 2002). These interpretations need to be corrected. In doing this, the sub-Saharan Africa's experience is located within the broader conundrum from pre-colonialism to post-colonial social structures.

This thesis in part sets out to examine the post-cold war trends of liberalism in its neo-liberal discourse of democracy that tends to 'emasculate democracy of its social and historical dimensions and present it as an ultimate nirvana' (Shivji, 1987: 1; 2002a). This as argued in the study represents a renewed expression of re-colonisation of Africa in a neo-colonial form. The post-Cold War renewal project, though shares anti-democratic posture with colonialism, but appears to be more ferocious in its political agenda than classical colonialism. It is a trend of capital by its nature, driving beyond every spatial barrier, where the creation of the physical conditions of exchange through the means of communication, through annihilation of space by time becomes an extraordinary necessity for it (Marx, 1973: 524). It is a trend that expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents with a rise of a comprehensive supra-territoriality that spans across all aspects of social relations. The trend is led by an unrestrained super-power undermining the very basis of democracy, the right of the peoples to self-determination, that is, their right to think for themselves.

The thesis as part of its goals examines why the 'New World Order' has been eluding the sub-Saharan Africa in spite of proclaiming liberal democracy as the dominant ideology that will usher in new and prosperous order and as successor to the Cold War. The assumed stable democracy and

rapid economic development it engenders are yet to be felt in the sub Saharan Africa.

As a way of conclusion, the thesis hypothesises that the socio-political, including ethno-identity crises which characterise the democratic projects in the entire sub-Saharan Africa cannot be dissociated from the integration of the pre-colonial African societies into the 'conventional process' of democracy which promotes democracy and state building along the model of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development states (OECD) without consideration for the local grains of such societies. African countries could not resist the integration due to the horrendous losses from the over four hundred years of slavery that left the continent prostrating and undermining of their traditional institutions by over one hundred years of colonisation.

It is demonstrated in the thesis that the conventional perception of liberal democracy as the only route to democratic stability for all communities including those that are fundamentally different, as is its corollary to the promotion of state-building along these lines is far too short-sighted, therefore there is a need for alternative models for both the state-building and the democratisation process on the one hand; and the economic development on the other.

The state-building and democratisation process with an OECD blue print has only succeeded in transforming the continent into a terrain of, explosive conflicts between ethnic groups, despotic leadership, market-dominant minorities and illiberal democracy. The relationship between Africa's political crises and the process of its transformation are inextricably bound up with the complications inherent in the free market liberal democracy exported to societies that are fundamentally different from the OECD states. Liberal democracy is expressed in the thesis that being an ideology that is

fuelled by individualism and market serves as an engine of political conflagration in the sub-Sahara African states.

Some African states such as Botswana have been presented by some scholars (Frankel, 2009; Leon, 2010; Knutsen, 2010) such as James Robinson (2009), Van Binsbergen (2002), Somolekae (1998), and Holm and Molutsi, (1989) as classical examples of stable democracy because they present the image of countries where democracy thrives. Moreover they avoided economic stagnation during the 1970 – 1980 economic crises. There is a contrary view in the thesis that Botswana is far from being a convincing case of thriving democracy and that Botswana's democracy manifests 'grave-yard stability' that has been systematically institutionalised by the autocratic leadership of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party which has been in power since independence in 1966, through coercion, co-optation, patronage and cronyism.

The thesis further examines the perennial backlash against democracy in Africa in order to underline the contradictions between pre-independent African communitarian values and the values of liberal democracy which are considered as the aggravating cause for the backlash of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. The 'third wave' of democracy in the sub-Saharan Africa in the 80s and the current Arab Spring upheavals are all explained as indicators of fault-lines in post-colonial Africa's democratisation and state building processes. Many reasons have been advanced for this backlash ranging from corrupt leadership, ethno-religious conflicts, negative cultural values, military rule, and effects of colonialism on the economic and political structures. Also different theoretical perspectives have been used to explain the situation with each theory providing 'what is to be done'. Yet Africa remains in a quagmire. As there are justifications for identifying all or some of these reasons as the factors responsible for the socio-economic and political crises, there are also justifications for the failures of the sub-Saharan African states to yield positively to all the prescriptions for solution.



We cannot ignore the impacts of colonialism on the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. The failures of sub-Saharan Africa to yield positively to some of the prescriptions of the various interpretations of its political and economic crises can be traced largely to the effects of combination of democracy with market within the liberal context. The hybridised democracy witnessed a drastic disarticulation of the African traditional political and social institutions by the liberal values that were imported into the African societies during the transition of the colonies to independent states. How do we explain liberal values and institutions that have become deeply embedded in Europe and North America not only lacking legitimacy in the sub-Saharan Africa but constituting the source of political instability?

The effects of this hybridised democracy on African societies cannot be overlooked in any analysis. Factors such as national question, corrupt leadership, inter-elite conflict, military rule and ethno-religious violent conflicts are effects of a faulty political arrangement which became visible in the history of the sub-Saharan Africa's political development few years after the independence of most of the colonies. They are parts of the colonial legacy that are addressed in Chapter Four. That African Kingdoms covered and ruled over some parts of sub-Saharan Africa during the pre-colonial period is well documented. Apart from Ethiopia, the general traditional form of administration was essentially patrimonial with power comparatively diffused in either chiefly or centralised kingdoms. According to Ajayi, 'most people pursued their economic, social and cultural lives with little interference from government' while access to their means of subsistence 'was effectively managed by the authorities within the lineage' (Ajayi, 2000: 28).

Sectors that suffer the greatest impact of this new process include the group membership of African societies and the property right. Glendon and

Yanes declare membership in groups as playing important role for many indigenous people (1991). The pre-Colonial Africans never conceptualised man as an individual *per se* but essentially as a part of the collectivity in spite of his unique and characteristic idiosyncrasies (Onwuachi, 2007). There is a sense of belongingness in kin-centred social processes. The family patterns are extended families, and members consequently function collectively towards the fulfilment of existence and survival.

In spite of their cultural variations, the pre-colonial African societies had well defined ideas of nature, human life, existence and social relations that were suitable for their environments. Colonial authorities ignored this peculiar interpretation of existence during the transformation of the indigenous societies from colonies to post-colonial liberal democratic states. Consequently, there was a suppression of the communal values by the individualistic values of liberalism. For example the responsibility of providing for individuals basic security needs was allocated to ethnic groups and other forms of kinship (Ekeh, 2004: 27) and not left for individuals as in the liberal arrangement or the state as in socialism. Africans rarely revert to the state for their basic physiological needs rather they revert to their families or community members for such needs “due to strong bonds of moral sentiments binding individuals who share a common ethnicity” (*ibid*: 36).

As stated earlier, free market liberal values have devastating effects on property rights. The ideology ignores the basic fact that the relationship of Africans to land is central to their cultures. Sometimes Africans take covenant or oath of allegiance using land as their spiritual witness. For many African societies the concept of land goes beyond the physical soil or geographical space but the philosophical and the spiritual realms that make land to stand as a living entity. This explains why land is regarded as a collective property of the community or family. Land belongs to the living, unborn and the ancestors.

Jomo Kenyatta in his book titled “*Facing Mount Kenya, The Tribal Life of the Kikuyu*” (1965) clearly illustrates this with the Kikuyu culture.

Africans’ relationship to the land completely differs from liberal individualism and whose application to the African societies clearly challenges the underbelly of liberal democracy. Given this unique perception of land by Africans, it is therefore not surprising seeing communal clashes over land that have been legally acquired by the constitutional governments and redistributed to individuals. Suffice it to mention here that there were inter-communal and inter-tribal clashes, but land ownership had hardly constituted the source of such clashes. Where it does, there was a mechanism for its resolution at the elders’ council meeting or such other meeting for dialogue and consensus-building.

There is history behind the ownership of land and such history is respected by every individual and groups. This however does not preclude the expansionist agenda of some powerful rulers over the weaker ones but still at that, what was actually expropriated from the conquered territories were the farm produce and labour, not land ownership. Land clashes where and when they occur, are manifestations of how the social-life of Africans is governed by traditions, customs and history, not laws or decrees that focus solely on individual equality.

The liberal concept of individuality, access and equality fails to consider the primary importance of groups or group rights in relation to political power and economic activities in sub-Saharan Africa. That view only provides two extreme perspectives – the state and the citizen-thereby subordinating the group. The group, be it age-grade, sex-group or elders council, or even trades groups are critical to the analysis of the political processes in this part of the continent. The assumption that indigenous group

rights as opposed to individual rights become irrelevant and do not constitute any relevant portion of an individual's life to make any meaningful difference appears to be a wrong assumption of liberalism in sub-Saharan Africa.

The persistence of ruptures and crises in the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa's polity cannot easily be explained within the rubric of liberal democratic theory. Any attempt at ignoring the effects of liberalism on the social, political and economic structures of Africa will miss out the genesis of the sub-Saharan Africa's political and economic crises. For example, Walter Rodney states thus:

Colonial Africa fell within that part of international capitalist economy from which surplus was drawn to feed the metropolitan sector.... Colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation but one whose essential purpose was to repatriate the surplus to the so called 'mother-country'. From an African viewpoint, that amounted to consistent expatriation of surplus produced by African labour out of African resources. It meant the development of Europe as part of some dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped (Rodney, 1972: 162-3)

Colonialism served as a process to forcefully incorporate Africa into liberal political economy which subsequently undermined its traditional political institutions, resulting in its underdevelopment, marginalisation and protracted political crisis. Understanding the historical context of these processes is essential for an appreciation of Africa's protracted political crisis and also very critical to the articulation of an appropriate strategy to deal with the crisis.

#### **1.4 Research Methodology**

Without carefully designed research methods, serious political science will be impossible (Burharm et al,: 1). Political Science being a social science, requires a systematic assembly of evidence and subjecting such to various forms of tests to ensure its reliability and validity, but this does not imply that

there is a regimented or deterministic approach to its research like its natural science counterpart, rather it is enriched by a variety of approaches (Marsh and Stoker, 2002: 4) without losing its characteristics of debate, controversy and disagreement that lie at its heart (Marsh and Stoker, 1995: 4).

Though different 'approaches' (Leftwich, 1984; Zuckerman, 1991) emphasise different methods of data gathering but this thesis is primarily a theoretical and conceptual study. In such a situation, as elucidated by Marsh and Stoker (1995: 4), arguments are grounded in textual analysis. Taking into consideration that politics is the melting-point of all the social sciences especially with its drawing on the insights of sociology and economics, the thesis cannot but take into consideration, that issue of political crisis in the sub-Saharan Africa occurs within 'social and economic contexts' (Dearlove and Saunders, 1984). Any analysis of this crisis must be guided by appropriate paradigm and corresponding methodology. This understanding is achieved by subjecting the thesis to the following interrogations.

1. What is the nature or essence of the research topic?
2. Is this social phenomenon objective in nature or idealised by the human mind?
3. How can knowledge be acquired and disseminated?
4. What is the relationship of an individual to his or her environment?
5. Is the individual conditioned by the environment or is the environment created by the individual?

Unravelling the above posers provides the opportunity to fashion a compass for the thesis to navigate with a suitable methodology. The thesis engages literature on liberal, popular, social, and socialist democracy to peruse the foregoing questions. It also engages the Africanist and African debate on democracy. It critiques all these in the context of democratic praxis in post-cold war Africa. In doing this, the thesis sought to examine why Africa has had enduring and fractious democratic outcomes, beginning with highly flawed elections

Based on the above perusal, it becomes compelling for the thesis to rely on textual and contextual analysis as its methodology. This approach becomes more suitable as it provides the opportunity to peruse the historical forces that do not only restrict the traditional process of democratisation and state-building in the sub-Saharan Africa but also to question the colonial transition strategies of the sub-Saharan African colonies to independent states.

At the heart of the analysis of political crisis in the sub-Saharan Africa is the significance of culture, values and history in a democracy. Moreover this thesis is primarily a study of the effects of non-African values on the sub-Saharan Africa's politics and economy; and how this has created seasons of political and economic crises that have transformed the continent into a theatre of conflicts and genocides with little or no hope for stability.

### **1.5 Research Design**

Research design normally serves as the structure or plan of the research investigation. It is usually used to obtain answers to research questions. The research questions and hypotheses are stated in this section along with the design used to obtain the answers. The key concepts that constitute the focus of the research are also clarified. These are liberalism, democracy, communitarianism and political crisis. Being a theoretical study, secondary data and library materials, books, journals and other periodicals were thoroughly perused

### **1.6 Theoretical Framework**

The thesis rejects the pessimism which sees Africa as politically doomed and also rejects the liberal scholars' optimism which celebrates free market democracy as the rational and universal prescription for every nation's political and economic perils. This analysis is situated within the post-modernity theoretical framework taking into consideration the problem

national question partly arising from the greed of the leaders, grievance of the followers and struggle for ethnic identity. This framework is considered to be broader than economic determinism that concentrates on economic relationship to explain the social processes that shape society and history.

The theoretical framework makes allowance for the historical analysis of the interplay of social forces that combine with economic relationship to propel the national question and socio-economic processes that shape society and history. The approach being principally about the people and their historical, social and cultural relationships makes it more appropriate for the focus of study.

It is argued in the thesis that we can correctly capture the genesis of Africa's political crisis through the history, identity, economy and degree of independence of the African nations in relation to other continents in the world, and the prospect of what they produce in the global market. It is argued further that the root of any social situation or conflict does not only lie, as identified by Marx and Engels in the economic relationship but when such relationship combines with other social forces such as acute deprivation of some groups or a class within the state, oppression of the people and opposition, religious intolerance or 'clash of cultures'. Acute deprivation breeds more grievances against the state and leaders. When the deprived groups are displeased with their economic situation or compare their level of political inclusion in governance with other group(s) within the same state and if relatively they found themselves much worse off, empty and frustrated, this will automatically serve as a frame of reference to define themselves as moral beings that have something worthwhile to fight for. They are therefore bound to seek reasons for why they are not equally treated as others.

If this feeling of inequality is great enough, civil war and conflict can be the outcome. In this type of situation, it is possible that a leader of a conflict may be acting out of greed, but the people fighting may have justified grievances. While we need to agree that greed begets grievance, we need to understand as well that people's reasons for fighting can be as numerous as root causes of the conflict itself. Where we fail to dissect the situation correctly by examining all possible options to determine whose greed and whose grievance, we may end up forcing the root causes of every conflict into one category.

In essence, the chosen theoretical framework guides the examination of the behaviour of the economic agents and institutions, the cultural, political and environmental processes that shape African societies and their histories in both colonial and post-colonial forms. The approach is principally based on social ontology that argues for the significance of social and natural processes in the determination of the need to problematise the legacy of colonialism, global political economy and the disarticulation of African cultural values by colonialism and impact of such disarticulation in Africa. This study examines three key issues:

- I. The current debate and concerns about democracy in general and its efficacy in explaining the African political crisis.
- II. The role of liberal democracy as the grand narrative and its uses in the current political practices in Africa
- III. The quest for an alternative model of democracy, using neo-communitarianism as a veritable option open to African countries

The thrust of the study is how, through a critical examination of existing literature on democracy, and through the weight of evidence, a new conception of democracy, state-building and economic development based on the neo-communitarian model and speconomy can be evolved. The emphasis on market and pluralism in liberal democracy over-exaggerates its heuristic value in Africa. As argued by Cliffe and Seddon, the appearance of multi party



politics does not necessarily mean appearance of democracy (1991).

### **1.7 Conceptualising the Context of the Post-colonial developments**

The argument that the genesis of African political crisis lies primarily with the elites and governments is a common argument of the World Bank. Berg Report of 1981 being the most influential of such interpretations. The report which was highly '*Internalist*' singled out the African elites, bad governance with 'bad policies' and excessive state intervention as not only undermining development processes but also most responsible for the African crisis (Arrighi, 2002). As a way out, currency devaluations, substitution of private for public enterprises in both industry and provision of social services, dismantling the protective policies of local industries, price incentives for agricultural production and exports etc were given as 'good policies' that could rescue African states from their woes.

Robert Bates in his 1981 follow-up Report also singled out the African state officials who were part of the elites pinpointed by Berg as the responsible factor for Africa's growth tragedy (Easterly and Levine, 1997). Bates systematically alleged the state officials as major anti-growth syndrome that stultifies Africa's development. In Roberts Bate's view state officials in the newly independent African countries used the powerful instruments of economic control that they had inherited from colonial regimes to benefit urban elites and, first and foremost, themselves. He therefore suggested state minimalist policies and leaving the peasantry free to take advantage of market opportunities.

However, the cooperative experiments with the cocoa farmers by government of the Western Nigeria from 1954 to 1966 proved Bates suggestion to be a very weak argument. The government was fully involved in organising the farmers into cooperative groups, supported their farming with farming technique trainings, supervision from the Ministry of Agriculture, provision of fertilizers and insecticides, taking storage burden off the farmers, immediate purchase from the farmers in local currencies and government

exporting to foreign market. It was a win-win situation for both the farmers and the government. The proceeds from the exports were used by the government to provide free education, construct the first stadium (Liberty stadium) in Africa, to establish the first television station in Africa, establish University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), construct durable roads, to build the first sky scraper- Cocoa House, in Western Nigeria with office accommodations for businesses etc. If the state had not intervened, these achievements that are yet to be surpassed by any successive government in the region could have been missed. Bate's interpretation of the crisis was both more pessimistic and more radically anti-statist than that of the World Bank.

Never the less Bates' Report was celebrated as the 'new' political economy and the demise of state intervention in underdeveloped countries. Berg's Report also opines that solutions to Africa's crisis lie in the dismantling state power and leaving the peasantry free to take advantage of market opportunities. This suggestion bed rocked World Bank's subsequent reports on Africa (World Bank, 1984; 1986). Bate's anti-state posture not only canvassed to set the market free from governmental control and regulations, it also aimed at check-mating the grip of the post-colonial leaders on their economies who were largely seen as committed to bad policies.

It is therefore not surprising to see all the anti-growth syndromes identified by the World Bank, Berg and Bates Reports having their origins to a significant extent, in serious governance problems. These problems are identified by Ndulu and O'Connell (2006) as:

1. regulatory regimes that severely distort productive activity and reward rent-seeking
2. regimes of ethno-regional redistribution that compromise efficiency through resource transfers to sub-national political interests
3. regimes of inter-temporal redistribution that transfers resources from the future to the present, and

4. State breakdown, which refers to civil or marked political instability.

Both the internalist and minimalist state views did not go unchallenged. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in its Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) signed in 1981 at Lagos, Nigeria, reacted by tracing the origin of Africa's crisis to a series of external shocks which include deteriorating terms of trade for primary products, growing debt service commitments, soaring interest rates, growing protectionism among the developed countries.

The LPA which implicitly reflected the influence of Dependency theory canvasses for energising the African states' capacity to mobilise their natural resources and foster national economic integration and cooperation rather than relying on the world-market mechanisms as way out of the crisis.

The vision ensconced in the LPA could not last long because shortly after its promulgation, the unabating deterioration of the socio-economic situation forced the African Leaders back to the drawing table in 1982 to develop Africa's Priority Programmes for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER) for consideration by the UN General Assembly.

APPER clearly states: "While reiterating our full commitment to the principles and objectives of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos which are more valid today than ever, we have focussed... on a five year programme which consists of:

- i. measures for an accelerated implementation of the LPA and the Final Act of Lagos;
- ii. special action for improvement of the food situation and rehabilitation of agriculture;
- iii. measures to alleviate Africa's external debt;

- iv. measures for a common platform for action at sub-regional, regional, continental and international levels; and
- v. measures for action against the effects of the destabilisation policy of South Africa on the economies of Southern African States.

The document points at the external factors responsible for the genesis of Africa's woes including the shape of the debt burden. The document asserts:

The dramatic increase in the volume of Africa's external debt and the heavy debt burden is another source of our profound concern .... "We are aware of the fact that shortcomings in development policies have contributed to the present debt crises. However, it is evident that the major causes of our country's debt servicing problems are external ones and such causes are unfortunately beyond our control. These include, inter alia, the deteriorating terms of trade and the consequent reduction in export earnings for debt servicing, the unprecedented rise in interest rates, sharp exchange rate fluctuations, deteriorating terms of borrowing and the reduction in the flow of concessional resources, the combined effects of which resulted in net capital outflow from most of our member states. In this regard the 26 African LDCs have been most seriously affected (OAU, 1985: 5).

APPER, while pointing at external factors also endorses Berg's Report (Fantu Cheru, 1999). The African leaders accepted responsibilities for the economic crisis and social disorders in their respective states and the limitations of actions taken by them to resolve the crisis. They therefore agreed to implement all the policy reforms as outlined in the World Bank Report while at the same time expected the international community to take action that could ease the crushing effects of Africa's external debts, stabilise and increase the prices paid for their products. APPER invariably prepared the foundation for United Nations Programmes for African Economic Recovery and Development 1986-1990 (UNPAAERD) which was a compact between African states and the international community (Sawyerr, 1990).

The greatest defect of UNPAAERD was the side-tracking of the character of inter-elite competition that characterises the post-colonial leadership thrown up by colonialism as part of the problem than the solution to it<sup>2</sup>. It was on the shoulders of these same elites that the responsibility to revamp Africa's social disorders was placed. The elite-leaders continued to deepen the clientele's relationships between their states and the global capitalist leaders through the rentier economic arrangement (Bush and Szeftel, 1999: 168). As argued by Arrighi (2002)

...the most central of these problems was a pattern of surplus absorption that fostered the conspicuous consumption of urban elites and sub-elites in bureaucratic employment, the relatively high mass consumption of labour aristocracies and the transfer abroad of profits, interests.... By restraining the growth of agricultural productivity and domestic markets this pattern perpetuated the dependence of African economies on the growth of world demand for primary products. Unless the pattern changed ...an acceleration of economic growth in tropical Africa within the existing political economic frame work is highly unlikely and as the phase of easy import substitution is superseded, a slowdown may actually be expected (Arrighi, 2002: 11).

Africa's collective experience in the global political economy could be situated in four different phases. These are:

- (i) contact with international community in the pre-colonial era,
- (ii) forced integration into the world capitalist economy during the colonial period,

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<sup>2</sup>Two cover stories of the *Economist* provide good insight into the character of sub-Saharan Africa's leadership. Just three years after claiming in a cover story that 'Sub-Saharan Africa is in better shape than it has been in a generation', on the cover of its May 13-19, 2000 issue the *Economist* declared Africa to be 'The Hopeless Continent'. In excoriating Africa's 'poor crop of leaders', who by 'personalizing power' have 'undermined rather than boosted national institutions' and turned their countries into 'shell states', with the trappings of modernity but a hollow core, the magazine asked: 'Does Africa have some inherent character flaw that keeps it backward and incapable of development?' Noting the contrast between the two cover stories, Johannesburg's business magazine *Financial Mail* retorted: 'Do the editors of the *Economist* have a character flaw that makes them incapable of consistent judgement?': see 'The Hopeless Continent', *World Press Review*, October 2000, pp. 24-25

- (iii) import substitution and unequal trade in the neo-colonial era up to 1980 and
- (iv) the era of systematic marginalisation since 1980 (Jaffe, 1980).

Explanations of these phases are situated in Chapters Two and Three. There is a need to clarify the concern for liberal democracy in the social disorder in post-colonial Africa. The fundamental issue that requires further clarification is whether liberal democracy plays any role in the disarticulation of the economy that underpins political crisis in post-independent Africa. In clarifying this issue it is apposite to point out here that the period of 1950s to 60s was very significant for the sub-Saharan Africa. This was the period when most of the colonies were granted independence and also the period that witnessed the prominence and dominance of modernisation theory that drew its theoretical inspiration from John Maynard Keynes and practical insights from the success of the Marshall Plan, as the road map for development (Olowu, eds; 1999: 11). It was an era in Africa that witnessed the imposition of the capitalist ideology of the ruling colonialists. The influence of finance capital grew by leap and bound with the emergence of budding capitalists, professional groups and intellectuals who were wedded to the capitalist ideology and the bourgeoisie conception of democracy.

From 1960s to the late 80s, most of the literature on African political developments drew inspiration from the modernisation theory but the discourse only took a different dimension with the African critique of the 90s which highlighted the exceptional nature of African states and politics. African and Africanist scholars started to reconceptualise the African reality, which according to Keet, (2002) partly as a result of sub-optimal results of policies based on the modernization theories, as well as their conclusion that imperialism in general "has actively underdeveloped the peripheral societies" (Martinussen, 1997: 86).

The free market democracy theorists perceived these newly independent African states as poor due to lack of capital, technology, professional skills, rational administration, finance, etc and could only catch up with the advanced nations notably the west by allowing human and private capitals from the west. This was the dominant view of economic and political development between 1960s and late 80s.

Beneath this suggestion was the breaking of barriers to ease penetration of capital without restraint. This penetration was accompanied by the promotion of liberal values in the guise of multi-party democracy. Africa was further saddled with the implementation of the 'design development' (Tinbergen, 1962) comprehensively planned by the liberal west to 'strengthen' the newly independent states for the reception and implementation of the imported ideas and capital. The level of each state's receptiveness to the imported ideas and capital determines the categorisation of her democracy as liberal or not.

The fault-line of this approach is the neglect of the history of the African societies. The grafted political institutions of Europe and the corresponding capitalist ideology further strengthened the dependency relationship through acquisition of western consumption patterns without accompanying local production techniques and skills. Unlike the pre-colonial period and as discussed elsewhere, neo-patrimonial leadership as practiced in many post-colonial African states, which encourages personalisation of power by the new political elites who capitalised on the multi-party democracy to float interest-based political parties, is an extension of the kind of autocratic and alien tyrant rule that the colonial master's initiated (Alemazung, 2010).

There is therefore a need to explain the process through which colonialism affected the social and political structures of African societies.

This need is compelled, if only to underline how political rights value of liberalism was introduced into the sub-Saharan Africa, and how the political elites personalised power at the expense of the democratic majorities. The process which has been severally stressed by many social scientists who studied sub-Saharan Africa in historical perspective is the outcome of new political arrangements employed by the colonial powers to destabilise the traditional political institutions. As Platteau (2007) posits, the colonial rulers generally reinforced the power of new local-level authorities over communities at the expense of pre-existing political institutions such as kinship. Typical examples of this destabilisation strategy were the deliberate attempts by the French colonial rulers to weaken the authority of the Mogo Naba in Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) in order to foster divisions among the lower level authorities within the ancient Mossi kingdom, or its move to break up old political units in the highly centralised political system of Guinea's Fouta Djallon (Boone, 1994: 114; Tordoff, 1997: 32).

The reinforcement also carried along with it, discretionary authoritarian powers given to the new 'henchmen', to maintain law and order on behalf of the colonial state, including powers to fine, conscript, imprison and banish any offender or perceived enemy, and to advance colonial economic agenda with accountability only to the colonial authorities.

The local 'henchmen' were also vested with powers in allocating resources distributed by the colonial state as well as in coercive labour resources mobilisation and tax collection (Bayart, 1999: 99-101; Boone, 1994: 115-119; Skinner, 1989). This development led to a situation where the local chiefs quickly learned that 'political power was absolutely crucial for economic advance' (Kennedy, 1988: 55). They perfected a strategy that whenever the colonial authorities requested for labour resource, they would arrange for more than the numbers requested so that they can convert the excess labour to their own personal use such as in farming (Bayart, 1999).



The crucial point is that with the discretionary powers given to the local chiefs who were directly accountable to the colonial authorities rather than their own people, the traditional checks and balances on chiefly powers were seriously undermined, giving rise to a form of 'decentralised despotism' (Mamdani, 1996; Kennedy, *ibid*: 52-55; Berman; Eyoh and Kymlicka, 2004: 3)

Attempt to under-estimate the character of relationship between Africa and the developed countries in the analysis of African tragedy was radically challenged by Andre Gunder Frank and his colleagues. They pointed out that the poverty of the African nations arises from their dependence on the wealthier nations. Frank in particular stressed Rodney's argument that integration of the peripheral states into a global political economy dominated by the imperialists, trapped the poorer nations at the bottom of global economy for capitalism to produce wealth and further development in the "core" countries while it creates poverty in the satellites (Roberts and Hite (eds;) 2002: 60). The 'core' countries needed access to cheap raw materials, large markets, cheap labour and compliance government to increase its wealth and sustain development at home.

With the access to the local economy usually in an unequal relationship, there emerged what Alain de Javry and Carlos Garramon referred to as "disarticulation" of the local economies and societies (Javry and Garramon, 1977). It is this disarticulation that provides a fertile foundation for socio-political crisis in the post-colonial African states. The disarticulation as earlier indicated promotes mutually exclusive goals of market and democracy to put the sub-Saharan Africa on fire. Democracy adopts a different meaning in capitalism where majority of the people are hardly involved in political decisions, that is, 'decisions affecting the whole collectivity' (Bobbio, 1978: 17).

The central question that arises from the simultaneous promotion of goals of market and democracy is which decision affects the generality of the population more than the economic decision of what to produce, how to produce, where to produce and sell. These decisions are unfortunately made by private capital powers that are outside the political domain thereby undermining the sovereignty of the people. Two antithetical forces are consequently bound to emerge in the liberal market democracy. These are the democratic majority and the market dominant minority which are today mostly transnational. It is the collision of these two opposing groups that produces a backlash against democracy because the will, as to be revealed later, of the democratic majority never prevails in any electoral contest. Chua (2003) aptly explains:

...often the anti-democracy backlash takes the form of “crony capitalism”; corrupt, symbolic alliances between indigenous leaders and a market dominant minority..... The indigenous regime protects the market-dominant minority’s wealth and businesses. In turn, the World Bank and IMF supply loans.....the result is a boom in foreign investment, economic growth, and riches for the rulers and their cronies.....At the same time, however the country’s inner furies begin to boil.....and it is usually sooner – the situation explodes (Chua, 2003: 147).

A deep look at both APPER and UNPAAERD confirms Chua’s observation of the genesis and perpetuation of political crisis in Africa through the integration of sub-Saharan Africa into global political economy.

### **1.8 Limitations of the study**

Research of this nature is bound to encounter some challenges. These include synthesising ideas from economics, philosophy and politics to explain state, power and cooperation, social, economic and political institutions within cultural explanations. The researcher being an African, by implication a victim of dependent economy and underdevelopment, expressed views are bound to experience a challenge of objectivity while reconciling the values of African traditional communalism with the reality of post-colonial liberal universalism.

However, with pungent supervisory guide all the challenges were surmounted leaving an insignificant effect on both the internal and external validity of the thesis. Also, the scope of the study requires more time and space but due to space limit and time frame to conclude, it took extra efforts and energy to meet the deadline.

## **Chapter 2**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

This chapter reviews existing literature on African traditional political structures, states, democracy and economy in Africa. Interpretations of African state crisis from various perspectives, notably modernisation, neo-Marxist, and post-modernist theorists are thoroughly examined with their effects on our understanding on the genesis of the crisis in the sub-Saharan Africa. Why the prescriptions of these interpretations were unable to address the political and economic crisis are also given sufficient consideration in this review. Debates on democracy with special focus on liberal democracy being the ‘end of history’ and African debate on democracy in its various forms are also engaged. This is done in order to show the relative weight of each in the understanding of the nature and genesis of the state and economic crises in the sub-Saharan Africa or the solution to such crises.

It is demonstrated in this chapter that because the post-colonial sub-Saharan African states as pointed out by Hall (1996: 246) are not post-colonial in the same way, does not mean that they are not post-colonial in any way. The ghost of colonialism still looms over all the post-colonial states irrespective of their colonial path to independence, Colonialism reconfigured the colonial societies. Colonial legacies combining with the pre-colonial heritage and the post-colonial experiences remain a major influence on politics and economy in the sub-Saharan African states.

The impact of colonialism was more of transformative than transitory as it reshaped the economic and political forms and institutions which subsequently transformed the way people, especially the educated urban elites, came to perceive the world. It is further demonstrated in the review that the

political and economic crises that engulfed African states emanate from their integration into designed templates of grand theories that failed to take the indigenous grains of African political-economy into consideration. The bigger challenge posed by all these, is whether these grand templates can or should be rejected wholesomely or whether they should be modified to accommodate the specificity of the political, cultural and historical circumstances of African states. Will such accommodation reduce the historically-derived liberal democratic blame-game? What does civic political participation confer on citizens as entitlements, and what broader political rights are a transcendental approach to politics, democracy and group rights likely to confer? The review also takes into consideration the type of leadership thrown up by the colonial legacies. In so doing it examines the rise and effects of post-colonial dictatorship in Africa by focusing on one-party model, military rule and how liberal and illiberal democracy were used as proxies in the cold war and post-cold war development of such regimes in post-colonial Africa.

Reactions to these dictatorial styles of leadership are examined under the popular struggles for democracy and crisis of transitions in Africa that followed the dictatorial regimes in the sub-Saharan Africa. These struggles and transition crisis are critically engaged with a concentration on illuminating the blind spot in the contemporary discourse of democracy in Africa for three main reasons. Firstly, the need to show that popular struggles for democracy in Africa did not commence with the post-cold war multi-party struggles or end with the attainment of independence by the colonial African states. 'They continued, albeit in different forms' (Shivji, 1987). The popular resistance of the African peoples against the IMF and the World Bank's SAP economic strategies, the rise in ethnic and religious identity struggles, violence reactions to the results of general elections etc are identified in the review as various forms of struggles for democracy that failed to attract recognition because they hardly take the forms of modern struggles of civil society, hence they are condemned as 'primordial, illegitimate, or backward (fundamentalist, tribalist etc) (Shivji, 2002b: 8).

This condemnation not only prevents us from understanding the forms and ideologies of the peoples' resistance to their daily oppression and marginalisation and how this resistance affects the politics of the state but also deprives us 'of an important piece of locally generated knowledge, values and cultures' (ibid). The boomerang effect of this neglect is well represented by the crisis upsurge in the North Africa starting from Algeria and spreading to Egypt and Libya.

Secondly, the attempt was also informed by the need to halt the post-cold war trend in neo-liberal discourse of democracy which tends to 'emasculate democracy of its social and historical dimensions and present it as an ultimate nirvana' (ibid) using civil society as the propeller of the democratisation drive in Africa. The civil society in the forms of the modern NGOs, workers' unions, students' associations etc provided the platforms for the articulation of the peoples' resentment but the main drive of the struggles for democracy lies in the spirit and determination of the people to reject all forms of oppression and enforce their inalienable rights to control the decisions that determine their daily lives and future prospects. As a corollary to this view, how liberal democracy lubricates the involvement of the civil society groups is also considered.

Thirdly, the need to show the contributions of African scholars and why they failed to address the issue of democratisation earlier than the post-cold war period also informed the attempt.

## **2.1 African Traditional Political structures and evidence of Modern state Institutions**

There is demonstrable evidence of sophistication in the African pre-colonial political institutions with defined separation of powers before colonialism. These institutions were propelled by the values of traditional social life that was nurturing a system of government suitable for the African political ecology. More importantly, these pre-colonial institutions shared some salient

features of modern government with, for example, British liberal democracy. Features such as British system of legislative council, dialogue and representative principles existed in the pre-colonial Africa's political institutions. In other words, the parliamentary principle of decision-making, debate and discussion of different points of views expressed by duly accredited representatives of the people were prominent features of African traditional politics.

Williams (1994) and Tötemeyer (1978) record the Owambo peoples of north-central Namibia as consisting of seven related communities: the Ondonga, Uukwanyama, Ongandjera, Uukwambi, Ombalantu, Uukwaluudhi and Uukolonkadhi. All of these except the Uukolonkadhi were politically organised into kingdoms (Keulder, ed; 2010: 155). In early times, the King was selected from the royal clan, and during his reign he was assisted by a number of Councillors. These were appointed by him, not strictly from the clan structures, but from his age group<sup>3</sup>. The highest authority (after the King) was the King's Council. The Council consisted of six senior Councillors appointed by the King after consultation with the elders (Williams, 1994: 6). This Council acted as the chief executive, as well as the judicial and legislative body, and all its decisions were kept secret. One member of this Council acted as the King's closest advisor, his Chief Minister. Usually, the kingdom was subdivided into a number of wards (often as many as 57 wards existed). These were headed by Under-councillors appointed by the King.

They, in turn, formed the District Council, a second-tier authority that presided over ward affairs and made inputs to the King's Council. A number of less significant bureaucratic positions existed in the kingdom, most of which were allocated to the running of the royal court. Among these were the courtiers, the bodyguards, attendants, messengers, herdsmen and cooks.

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<sup>3</sup> This was done during his young days, when a prospective King would observe his playmates for certain special qualities such as bravery, diligence and hard work. It was the custom of those times that a newly appointed King would "inherit" his predecessor's Councillors.

If the pre-colonial African kingdoms and empires showed evidence of modern government, what was therefore responsible for the failure of the post-colonial Africa's states to operate modern institutions of liberal constitutional government such as parties, parliaments and civil services immediately after the colonial enterprise? Tordoff, (2002), wrestles with this poser only to portray the post-colonial African leaders as lacking in the pre-requisite experience to operate a national scale governmental system.

This argument, on its face value seems appropriate but its sufficiency becomes dubious if we consider that most of the post colonial African leaders were involved in the governance of their various states through some constitutional developments before the final political disengagement of the colonial administrations on independence. For example in Nigeria, regional governments headed by Nigerians, and with Nigerians in the legislatures, were put in place in 1954, six years before independence. Before 1954, Nigerians were involved in the legislative functions of the colonial Nigeria as far back as 1922 with the establishment of the Clifford Constitution. The period 1946 to 1951 saw phenomenal increase in the involvement of Nigerians in the administration of the colony, and in the politicking of the political parties. Moreover deliberative principles that were very prominent in the pre-colonial governance were also put into use during these constitutional periods. Rather than putting the entire blame on the post-colonial leaders, perhaps the need to have a deep look at the foundations of the post-colonial states towards a reconfiguration deserves attention.

Ake in 'Democracy and Development in Africa' (1996) traces the root cause of the problem to the authoritarian political structure of the African states derived from the previous colonial entities. He provides alternatives that may configure a new paradigm for Africa's development. These are economic development based on traditional agriculture, political development based on the decentralisation of power, and reliance on indigenous communities that readily



provide some measure of refuge from the coercive power of the central state. To Ake, development in Africa has not failed as it was not really on the agenda of the colonialists or the neo-colonialists. He forcefully asserts Africa's political conditions as the greatest impediments to Africa's development.

Going by Ake's observations, the reconfiguration becomes apparent in the face of the prevalent socio-political crises that characterise the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa states which have created doubts over the ability of these states to either serve as instrument of coercion or platform to reconcile the divergent views. Political upheavals in Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Cote D'voire, Benin Republic, Togo, Sierra Leone, Egypt, Algeria, Libya etc could not be suppressed by the state in spite of its monopoly of instruments of coercion. The failure has further lent credence to the same agitating question of whether the state in any sense of it actually exists in the sub-Saharan Africa.

Joining Ake to boldly challenge the dominant paradigm of democracy and development in the post-colonial sub-Saharan African states, Rita Abrahamsen in her '*Disciplining Democracy, Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa*' (2000), launched attacks on the conventional explanations of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa and the 'good governance' discourse which she argues to have legitimised the right of the North to develop and control the South. She dismissed the inherent assumptions in the good governance discourse adopted by the IMF and the World Bank to wrongly gauge the mood of popular struggles for democracy in Africa as struggles for multi-party liberal democracy. In her view, those popular struggles were actually for better standard of living of the people, and an end to poverty and suffering as against the misconception of the neo-liberal institutions that fuses democracy and economic liberalism together. This wrong notion according to Abrahamsen illiberalises alternative conceptualisations of democracy that could have reconfigured governance and development based on popular participation and promotion of social and economic rights of the poor.

The post-Cold War emergence of 'New World Order' that heralded the unipolar dominance of neo-liberalism in the political sphere (Adelman, 1998: 75) was accompanied by some economic and political conditions dubbed liberalisation policies which imprisoned democracy within the capitalist ideology. The institutional home of this trend is the World Bank, IMF and the WTO hiring significant number of African economists to operationalise the liberalisation, marketisation, privatization policies and de-statisation of African countries' economies taking the form of either imported or home-grown Structural Adjustment Programmes (Shivji, 2002b).

Liberalisation, according to Adelman and Paliwala (1993) is often a cipher for the imposition of modernisation in contemporary form, and the manner in which it robs Africans of genuine choice and control over their own lives, is but a new form of imperialism. The liberalisation programmes forced many African countries to move away from one party state towards a system of multi-party-ism in the late 1980s. Though this was initially resisted in most countries by one-party and dictatorial leaders, but hailed by the majority of the populations as the new wave of "revolution of rising expectations" (Gentili, 2005: 3). Going by Gentili's records (*ibid*: 6), between 1990 and 1994 the first multiparty elections took place in 29 countries. Between 1985 and 1989 only nine countries had had multiparty suffrages, but between 1990 and 1998, 42 countries had such elections. Between 1998 and 2001 there were 55 elections and 8 referenda. Everywhere electoral laws, the redrawing of constitutions, and elections became a terrain of confrontation, but all these have not always resulted in the establishment of true democracy. Many scholars and commentators in the west regarded these changes as the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy in the Cold War. Fukuyama in particular wasted no time to assert that what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War but the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Fukuyama, 1989).

In '*Constitutionalism, Pluralism and Democracy in Africa*', Sammy Adelman's veils response to the hegemonic posture of Fukuyama thus: "that more than ever before, there is a widespread tendency to equate democracy with liberal capitalism in a way that reinforces cultural imperialism to which the developing world has long been subjected" (Adelman, 1998: 75). He explains further that individualism thus takes the precedence of the more communal histories of African societies, with civil and political rights accorded priority over social, economic and cultural rights (Adelman, *ibid*). Perhaps it is germane to posit that the concept of individual rights in particular, springs from the liberal perspective that is at odds with the history of Africa.

Moreover the insistence of the West on 'good governance' and SAP as conditionality for granting aid and loans; and the persistence of structural inequalities in the global political economy did not only aggravate the political instability in the post- colonial Africa but also as reported by Adelman (*ibid*) diverts attention from the intransigent problems concerning Africa, such as class inequalities, the legitimacy of the liberal state, the role of external agencies in economic and social policy, and the continuing colonial heritage in ethnic and tribal conflict. The Republic of Benin presents a classic example of a multi-party democracy achieved on the heels of popular struggle between 1989 and 1990. The new regime was severely limited in its policy choices by debt and liberalisation programmes, and rapidly distanced itself from the workers and students who brought it to power (Allen 1992).

The role of external agencies in the post-colonial Africa cannot be ignored in any discourse of the popular political struggles because liberal democracy and its associated enormous levels of indebtedness (Adelman and Espiritu, 1993) of the new African states prepared the ground for imposition of neo-liberalism that is 'asserted to be the basis for democracy in Western eyes'

(ibid). Rather than deepening democracy, it merely perpetuates the history of top down autocratic rule instituted by the colonial powers. Adelman avers:

Those powers corrupted and destroyed local customs and traditions while reinforcing cleavages between rural and urban Africans, leaving vacuums that their clients and compradors sought to fill by transplanting the contradictions of liberal democracy or the illusions of Marxism-Leninism into fertile soil. They violently disrupted prevailing social relations and reconstructed them as a customary law that bore little relation to African history (Adelman, 1998: 76).

The central element of neo-liberal discourse of democracy in Africa has been the dichotomy between the state and the market. This characterises the post-Cold War finance manifesting in the growth of Western capitalism and modernisation dubbed globalisation which is ensconced in neo-liberal jargon. Critical perspectives on this discourse according to Mafeje (1995) could be classified between those which are explicitly political and constructed around the ideologies of resistance and those who are of a more scholarly kind with their genesis in the theoretical frameworks of neo-Marxism.

The attempts in these critical perspectives are geared towards highlighting the sharp 'polarisation, inequalities and inequities generated by the process of globalisation and the ruinous effect it has on the livelihoods, environment and ecology of the planet' (Bercher and Costello, 1994; Korten, 1995). The salient point in globalisation is the demonstration of concentration of wealth, power and control over the political processes, production and communication in the hands of a few urbanised elites while the popular votes rest with the majority but marginalised poor and groups. Globalisation, in the process of capital accumulation, accentuated the marginalisation of the wide majority of the people from any productive activity and subsequently created not only reserve army of adults and children but 'disposable population of street children' (Marcos, 1997) and 'totally unemployed human wreckages' (Bercher and Costello, 1994).

Liberal scholars such as Fukuyama were unable to explain why liberal values and certain kinds of democratic institutions which have become deeply embedded in North America and Europe failed to be embedded in post-colonial African and Asian states. Firstly as explained by Macey and Miller, (1992) there is need to accept that democracy and liberalism are separate concepts. Liberalism is a rights-bound concept that recognises that human beings, as autonomous creatures, are entitled to certain rights especially property rights, religious rights and political rights. So long as people confine their activities within this sphere of rights, they are entitled to act as they choose and to be free from governmental interference. Democracy on the other hand, refers to a system of government under which citizens may participate in governmental decision-making either directly or through representatives. But, Liberals are prompt to viewing democracy as a manifestation of liberalism in the sense that political rights like property and religious rights are among the basic rights that most conceptions of liberalism embrace. All liberals like Fukuyama fail to appreciate the tension between liberalism and democracy. There is a basic tension that exists between liberalism and democracy. The 'liberal conception of the primacy of rights inevitably comes into conflict with the democratic conception that majorities be able to control policy' (Macey and Miller, *ibid*).

Liberals are yet to accept that there is a relationship between democracy and culture which prevents Western democratic institutions including political parties from taking roots in cultures that do not share the same material, social, or psychological conditions with Western-type democratic states. The liberal values failed to be domesticated in sub-Saharan African societies due to different contexts that provide resistance to such domestication.

There is nothing more that provides the greatest challenge to liberal democracy in the sub-Saharan Africa than the failed post-colonial states with

failed liberal values and institutions arising from the 'best practice' approach adopted by the departing colonial powers to construct democratic state with free market within the context of liberalism. To invoke Hoffmann's famous phrase 'international affairs have been the nemesis of Liberalism' (Hoffmann, 1988: 396). In spite of the impossible task of domesticating liberal ideas and institutions in the sub-Sahara Africa, those who believe in the liberal project still remain convinced that power politics is a product of ideas, and crucially ideas can change, therefore if the world is inhospitable to liberalism, this does not mean liberalism cannot be re-made in its image (Dunne, 2008: 110). We concede to the fact that power politics is a product of ideas and ideas do change. The challenge arising from this assumption is which ideas are preventing liberal democracy from being re-made successfully in its own image in the sub-Saharan Africa? Importing liberal project into countries that are fundamentally different in terms of culture and social structures from the Western European countries remains a daunting task for the proponents of the ideology.

It is compelling to highlight Michael Doyle's four dimensional definition of liberalism (1997). This becomes necessary to highlight the core values of liberalism. Doyle declares that the principles of liberalism are firstly; all citizens are juridistically equal and possess equal basic rights, equal access to opportunities and religious toleration. Secondly, the legislative assembly must be established on the mandate of the people and whose rights it is not permitted to abuse. Thirdly, there should be a guarantee and protection of the liberty of individuals including the right to own property which includes the productive forces. Fourthly, the most effective economic exchange system is the one that is largely driven by the market and devoid of any subordination to bureaucratic regulations and control. As earlier argued when the values of the market and democracy are taken together we see a stark contradiction inherent in liberal democracy.

Combining democracy with liberalism can hardly hybridise with each other without breeding crisis. Niger-Delta crisis in Nigeria, land crisis in Zimbabwe, etc; are contemporary examples. In both situations the market dominant minority protected by the principle of liberalism found themselves in conflict with the numerically powerful impoverished majority who are at the receiving ends of the economic activities of economically powerful minority to produce a backlash against liberal democracy. The idea of seeing democracy and Liberalism as natural counterparts remains one of the fatal errors of liberal democracy. It is this misconception that leads Fukuyama to 'survey the world and reach the bizarre, counterfactual conclusion that liberal democracies are bursting out all over' (Macey and Miller, 1992: 281).

Although many liberals tend to treat liberalism as a theory of government but what is becoming increasingly apparent is the glaring failed connection between liberal democracy and the market on the one hand, and replacement of issue-area interests with ethnic-issue interests on the other. The thesis therefore examines the underlying universal assumptions of liberal democracy and argues that nothing further exposes the divergent fortunes of liberal democracy with its values and institutions in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa than ethnic violence rooted in a deeply entrenched culture that constantly prevents the emergence of non-indigenous bureaucratic liberal state.

Every ethnic group wants to protect its interests and where possible, use the state institutions to ensure and sustain such protection. Where this fails, they employ violence to repress marginalisation by other ethnic groups. Every ethnic group in the sub-Saharan Africa sees political self-determination as a right that should not be tampered with by other groups. Tampering with such right by the post-colonial leaders partly accounts for democratic paralysis in the sub-Sahara Africa. All regions in the sub-Sahara Africa have witnessed mass struggles for political reforms demanding a return to democracy which Liberals like Fukuyama erroneously identified as requiring liberal democracy

with the assumption that number of choices that countries face in determining how they will organize themselves politically and economically has been diminishing over time.

Ayitey (1992) offers an insight into part of the reasons responsible for the inability of the sub-Saharan Africa to successfully operate the institutions of liberal democracy. He posits that after independence most African states assumed an interventionist role in economic development, though their degrees of intervention varied from weak intervention as in Botswana, Cameroon, and Mauritius, to massive intervention as witnessed in Algeria, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zambia. In the spirit of state interventionism, a principal factor that could have accounted for their failure was the ideological posture of the post-colonial leaders which in itself was a product of the misconceptions that emerged from the national liberation struggles against colonialism. Colonialism was exploitative but its abhorrence was transformed into an ideological aversion to its economic philosophy – capitalism on the premise that if the colonialists were exploitative, capitalism, too, must be (Ayitey, *ibid*).

Abrahmsen (2000) offers a clear reason for the state intervention. She argues that the inability of the post-colonial governments to successfully fulfil the independence electoral promises was based on the fact that they were confronted with two fundamentally conflicting challenges. These she asserts to be allegiance from the state leaders to the external donors and creditors in order to continue enjoying access to funds and support for their sustenance in power; and the second is, drawing democratic support from the poor domestic populace. This conflicting situation compels Chua (2003) to aver that

...when a poor democratic majority collides with a market dominant minority, the majority does not always prevail. Instead of backlash against the market, there is backlash against democracy” (Chua, 2003: 147)



Avoidance of the effects of this conflicting situation dominates the actions and pronouncements of some African leaders like Nkrumah of Ghana, Modibo Keita of Mali, Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia, and Mugabe of Zimbabwe. In the views of these anti-capitalist leaders, free markets, free trade, private enterprise, and the parliamentary system of democracy were all Western capitalist institutions that should be rejected by Africa. For example, Nkrumah warned Africa against the assertion of the colonialists that states 'Western democracy and parliamentary system are the only valid ways of governing; that they constitute the only worthwhile model for the training of indigenous elite by the colonial power" (Nkrumah, 1980). In place of capitalism, highly centralised and interventionist socialist systems were established by Nkrumah and other African leaders to spur development. This in itself was another error that failed to take the traditional values into consideration. Capitalism was rejected mainly on the basis of colonialism without looking at the possibility of altering its process to suit the traditional African economic system which was not socialist but a mixture of state and private capitalism as illustrated by Ayittey in "*Indigenous African Philosophy: concepts of wealth in traditional Africa*"(2008). The idea of jettisoning capitalism or embracing socialism by the post-colonial leaders is just a manifestation of their ideological orientations and nothing to do with African culture.

## **2.2 Traditional Leadership**

Traditional leadership in Africa as reported by Khoza (2007) is driven by the spirit of 'ubuntu', that is, tenets of consultation, persuasion, accommodation and cohabitation devoid of coercion and domination (Khoza, 2007). These principles are deeply imbedded in African humanism and are part of the pre-colonial governance system of sub-Saharan Africa. African humanism promotes social cohesion through sufficient consensus that leads to a process of social arbitrage in the settling of differences.

Though public offices are sometimes held for life but this is subject to good conduct and behaviour of the office holders as they are expected to be transparent, honest and upright, have integrity and the ability to serve the basic needs of the people. This traditional model in Ghana and Uganda as observed by Jeffries, provided some promising experiments in effective governance (Jeffries, 1993). Mamdani called our attention to the nature of the traditional model as not in consonance with the periodic elections of liberal democracy where the political parties and groups are orientated with the narrow conception of political rights regarding the essence of democracy, as a multiparty system with free and fair elections (Mamdani, 1987). Succession to political offices according to him was done according to the established traditional rules that always produced acceptable results to all. Dissents were amicably resolved through consensus. The omission of this vital feature of governance during colonial state-building partly accounts for the broken linkages between the people and the state on the one hand and the reduction of liberal democracy to multi-party elections.

The failure of these post-colonial states to successfully operate modern institutions of liberal democracy justifies Ake's identification of their inherited political institutions as responsible for such failure. This also brings to attention the bankruptcy of the 'universal best practice' political institution employed by the colonial mentors of the post-colonial states. The local political and economic grains of the pre-colonial communities jeopardised the entrenchment of the universal institutional templates of liberal democracy. Booth, in affirming Ake's argument for alternative model asserts that the right approach to governance is 'best fit', not 'best practice' (Booth, 2011). The urge for 'best fit' naturally elicits curiosity over the 'ideological forces, vested interests and political pressures that promote institutional mimicry' (*ibid*) in the colonies.

The failure of the colonial authorities to firstly rely on 'the grains' of the pre-colonial society while building the post-colonial states and their sole reliance on western ideas which Turner refers to as "notion of individualism",

contributed to the recurring political crisis (Turner (ed;) 2006: 81-3) in the sub-Saharan Africa. Mazrui had earlier called attention to the effects of the notion of individualism. He observes that the values of living together in kin-centred social processes with patterned extended families system, the values and collective responsibilities of traditional social life that prevailed in the pre-colonial period were all replaced by the 'notion of individualism' imported from Europe (Mazrui, 1986: 7). The general consequence of Mazrui's observation was that the ethnic groups that were originally relating and maintaining friendly relationships in trades, communal support and social contacts suddenly hardened indigeneity into exclusiveness. Bush (2007) articulates this consequence with a submission that the traditional political system that once combined with other traditional institutions to serve as bastion of justice and equity in the state was replaced by neo-patrimonial system. This combination according to him, produced a dependent economy that dissolved the self-reliant nature of pre-colonial system and created a disarticulated structure of production geared towards the need of the colonial home countries (Bush, *ibid*).

The effect of the disarticulation was that as in colonial period, the succeeding neo-patrimonial leaders perceive people as mere disposable objects of governance that could be used and discarded. The neo-patrimonial arrangement created a system where the leaders demonstrate lack of affection and insincerity towards the people and the people in turn see themselves as outside the government but for which they contributed to its sustenance. A major consequence of adulterated patrimonial political arrangement was the personalisation of power by the elites. This development encouraged politics of divide and rule where the power elites employ nepotism and religion to sustain the neo-patrimonial system geared towards liberal philosophy. Access to power now became a major source of social strife as those in power determine the distribution of resources and who gets what.

Driven by the desire to sustain their grip on the power levers, the post

colonial leaders were unable to unify the people for nation-building. They were unable to create favourable environment for the articulation of contending interests to unify the state. They subjected the traditional chieftaincy institution to the control of the modern political authority, and sometimes turn chieftaincy titles into reward for political loyalty with little or no regard to the traditional procedures. The neo-patrimonial genesis of this strategy has hardly been given a deep scientific consideration. It was the adoption of the chieftaincy institutions by the colonial rulers that those institutions acquired new orientations and became distanced, sometimes alienated from their peoples with their values and aspirations. Their legitimacy derived more from the colonial state authority. The post-colonial leaders just continued with the strategy of not letting the traditional institutions remain unguarded by the state and also ensured that the institution continue to derive their legitimacy from the state authority.

In general, Adedeji (1999) explains, 'Africa experienced the phenomenon of alienation between state and society' – a social reality that was described by him as 'cohabitation without marriage' (*ibid*). The gap between indigenous cultures and the new forms of government has its destructive consequences on the governance, peoples and search for political stability and development. The rulers vainly try to operate institutions and processes that were built by the colonial authorities to serve foreign interests and values. While they continue moulding their populations and making them develop as their foreign models, they also manipulate the new political system to serve and protect their personal desires and interests.

### **2.3. Paradigm interpretations of post-colonial crisis**

At the peak of decolonisation, both the departing colonisers and the anti-colonial nationalists were disposed to strike a positive note (Chiriyankandath, 2007). This was evident in the submissions of the colonial historian Margery Perham that 'Britain on the whole was the most humane and considerate of modern colonial nations and did most to prepare her subjects for self-government' (1963: 99). This view was corroborated by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first

leader, after power was handed over by the British last governor of the Gold Coast. Nkrumah declared confidently, 'We have won independence and founded a modern state' (Nkrumah, 1965) only for the realities of the independent facade dawned on Nkrumah few years after.

On the eve of his losing power, Nkrumah's summed up his misgivings about the reality of independence in "*Neo-Colonialism*", 'The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside' (Nkrumah 1965: ix). Jackson, an international relation theorist came several years after Nkrumah with a coinage of 'quasi-states' to describe the majority of the post-colonial states (Jackson, 1993). More recently, as observed by some scholars such as Ferguson, Cooper, and Lal, there has been a resurgence of interest in the West in the idea of a liberal empire, if not the actual restoration of formal empire, as a solution to the continuing political and economic crises that many post-colonial states, especially in Africa and the Middle East, appear to face (Cooper 2004; Lal, 2004)

As explained earlier, from 1960s to the late 80s, most of the literature on African political developments drew inspiration from the modernisation theory but the discourse only took a new dimension in the 90s when African and Africanists scholars started highlighting the exceptional nature of supposedly African states and politics as well as reconceptualising the African reality.

#### **2.4. Debates on African Democracy**

This section examines the discourses on African democracy focusing on the type of leadership such debate has thrown up in an attempt at resuscitating the African states. The engagement is done in the context of democratic praxis in post-cold war Africa. The section seeks to explain why Africa has had enduring and fractious democratic outcomes, beginning with highly flawed elections. If we

really want to understand the morphology and basis of democratic crisis in Africa we must be interested in the political economy of the African states. Inherent in this logic as have been severally mentioned, is the colonial inheritance. The discourse on African democracy and states as earlier indicated, took a different dimension when the Africanist literature of the post-80s started highlighting the exceptional nature of African states and politics.

African scholars particularly started to develop their own theories, which according to Keet, (2002) was partly due to 'sub-optimal' results of policies based on the grand theories, as well as their conclusion that imperialism in general "has actively underdeveloped the peripheral societies" (Martinussen, 1997: 86). This conclusion influenced by the post-colonial reality reinforced the passionate desires of anti-colonial idealists such as Fanon that Africa should not just for modernisation rush; imitate Europe (1967: 252). The reality revealed to them as well that colonialism actually provided the template for state-building and governance which determined the path of the post-colonial transformation of the colonies into independent nations and dependent economies. According to Cooper, it became glaring to the anti-colonialists demanding independence that they had little choice but to buy into colonial state-building strategy, since it was the only option that was imaginable to their rulers (2003: 67). It was this strategy of co-habitation that ensured that pan-African dreams remained unrealised and at the same time guaranteed the sustenance of the liberal values in the post-colonial states.

These new states in the view of Clapham, faced unprecedented challenge of fashioning 'a peculiarly modern form of statehood', modelled not on pre-colonial patrimonialism but on the elaborate modern Western state model that had been developed in Europe over centuries (2000: 6–7) for no other reason but to facilitate a colonial objective of extracting raw materials from Africa to Europe. So right from the colonial days, the sub-Saharan African colonies and their post-colonial states were fashioned as instruments designed by the colonial authorities

for the realisation of the colonial objectives. In his submission, Lonsdale pointed out the involvement of violent construction of liberal structures that ruptured the pre-colonial political dynamics and patterns and elongated the colonial control of both the politics and economies of the colonising territories (1986: 145).

Though Africa is not a monolithic entity but a geo-political space made up of peoples and countries of distinctive histories, endowments, and political systems. There were evidences that African societies were on different trajectories towards statehood from their unique forms of governance that predate both the liberal and the socialist democracies before the interruptions by colonialism. While the African peoples agitated and fought for independence with the spirit of genuine notion of democracy, they, especially the countryside, never contemplated abandoning their communal values for the notion of individualism. Equality, consensus and communitarian values were traditionally rated higher in African societies than individual gain and competition.

The theology of extreme individualised market or political competition or extreme socialisation of the means of production and wealth distribution is an unnatural idea to Africans because most of the African societies relish their religious, ethnic or tribal affiliations that are anti-liberal and anti-coercion, therefore there was no traditional base for liberal or socialist democracy to flourish in the colonial Africa talk-less of consolidating in the post-independent state forms. As a result, the basis for the emergence of a system that allows multi-party competition for political power or a single dominant party with an overriding sense of national community was glaringly absent in the traditional African political space either during or after independence (ECA, 2007).

Though we may assume that ideas and theories of scientific values have no territorial limitations but new ideas that arise out of the assessment of the old ones always bear the birth marks of the different epochs and cultures of the

concerned society. This is why it is vital for every society to search into the experiences of her human history to develop ideas that have answers to her specific situations rather than been coerced into what Boege et al (2009) refer to as hybrid political order. This hybrid is a mismatch between indigenous cultural values and the Euro-centric liberal or socialist model of a state that hardly exists outside the Europe but which both West and East according to Schmeid and Kaokhail, forcefully sold to the African territories with 'prêt-a-porter mentality' (Schmeid and Kaokhail, 2009).

The Cold War theorists, the ideological and the National Interest schools, fail to accept that individual's actions in politics as in everyday life, is governed by their assumptions and beliefs. The most natural action resulting from their constant practice of these assumptions and beliefs constitutes their ideology. So what we refer to as liberal democracy today is a democracy that was liberalised by the western liberal states. The import of this is that before democracy was accepted as a form of government, it was transformed into a suitable ideology that would conform to the liberal values. Every ideology claims to subscribe to the fact that rights and opportunities remain useless if not transformed into concrete realities for individuals. The means of transforming, assuring and protecting such rights and opportunities constitute the ideological pathways for various brands of democracy with all claiming maximum guarantee of rights, justice, freedom and equality contents within their brands of democracy. This perhaps informed Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992, eds) to emphasise that democracy must always take due cognisance of our lived reality and whatever structures and institutions that would sustain democratic practice must also reflect the peculiarities of our environment. This posture dominates the Africanist view of democracy.

To discuss democracy implies discussing people or a political community constituting itself into self-governing society. In essence democracy represents what Oloruntimehin describes as an open, public realm, to which citizens in general have free access and in which they can contribute to the well-



being of the polity through the school of experience (2007: 22). As Tocqueville remarks:

...democracy describes ‘...the slow and quiet action of society upon itself. It is a regular state of things really founded upon the enlightened will of the people....Representatives acquire its meaning as it interrelates processes of collective choice and collective action....In a “democratic society”, citizens learn the rudiments of democracy by their direct participation in the governance of their own local community as essentially an open realm public...(Tocqueville, 1980)

Most grand theorists of democracy fail to take into considerable accounts this unique nature of democracy before integrating sub-Saharan Africa – into the world of liberal or socialist democracy. Any description of democracy within the domains of grand theories remains a weak description because democracy has no meaning for an aggregate of the people without taking into accounts two key elements of the people which are ‘relationships’ and ‘institutions’. It is these two key elements that bind the people and the state together, hence any description of democracy must give sufficient attention not only to the people but their relationships and the institutions that sustain such relationships. The political crisis in Africa must therefore be related to the social formation or mode of production of which Bangura (1988) identifies three co-existing modes:

Monopolistic production, the primitive accumulation of capital and petty commodity activities (which) encourage the growth of authoritarian values, political malpractice and patron-client relations (Bangura, 1988)

Bangura asserts that this kind of social formation is conducive for accumulation in the neo-colonial economy. The role of the state is to unleash authoritarianism which would guarantee law and order such that it would facilitate the accumulation of capital. The development of a new mode of capitalism opened the gateway for the penetration of imperialism which completely transformed the political and economic structures of the continent into the very structures of the developed capitalist economies (*ibid*: 34). With

the structural dependence, the state apparatus was fully adapted to serve the monopoly-capitalist system. This subsequently laid the foundation for what Leys refers to as "African Tragedy" (1994). Ahluwalia (2001) sheds more light on African tragedy with an explanation that the continent got entrapped within a discourse of power play whereby foreign institutions and agencies such as IMF, World Bank and several other non-governmental organizations now determine and dictate policies that map out her future (Ahluwalia, 2001: 54). Bayart had initially pointed out the futility in liberal experiment in Africa. He argues that all efforts to combine the requirements of market economy with the demands of popular sovereignty ended in failure (Bayart et al, 1999).

In an attempt at addressing the problem, there emerged a group of scholars led by Sandbrook who engaged in schematic development of democracy (1998) or better still the celebration of democracy. The argument of the group is that liberal democracy never existed in Africa. Though the popular agitation for democratic reforms by the African people shows a clear predilection for democratic governance but the pattern and the modalities of such reforms did not produce any significant result that meets the expectations of reforms to transform the social sphere. Bratton and va de Walle (1992) gave an account of the desires of the African peoples for democracy. They counted between 1985 and 1990, no less than 20 authoritarian regimes were forced to liberalise the political arena, while multi-party elections were held in eight countries (Bratton and va de Walle, 1992). By 1997, about three-quarter of African countries were under "democratic rule" (*ibid*). The liberal democratic project in Africa for which the people were mobilised through the civil societies remains wobbly and qualitatively stunted. In countries like Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Togo, Gabon and Kenya one could at best, according to Luckham (1995), talk of a "facade" democracy in which massaged elections were grudgingly arranged, with the perpetuation of civil political autocracy under the guise of democratic rule (Luckham, 1995: 49-50).

Facade democracy was also noticed in Ghana, Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, and Gambia, where according to Momoh and Adejumobi (1992)

yesterday's military dictators suddenly became "born again" democrats, re-institutionalising their power mostly through a corrupted electoral process. In Nigeria and Algeria, the duo explained the authoritarian rulers that were reluctant at disengaging from power deliberately subverted credible electoral processes through election annulment.

The Sandbrook group offers a valid explanation that liberal democracy is not simply about majoritarianism but it has a class basis and economic connotation. They see the liberal definition of democracy as too formal, too legalistic too mechanical and above all too restrictive. Turok (1991) had earlier opined that there is a correlation between development and democracy or at least a strong base which facilitates the achievement of democracy and conversely a weak base which accentuates the crisis of accumulation and hence authoritarianism. Other radical scholars like Samir Amin (1990) had before Sandbrook attempted to relate the concept of democracy to the level and nature of development of civil society. In this school was Beckman (1989) who was more concerned with the correlation between democracy and the nature and character of the state following Mkandawire (1988) that had previously asserted that democracy could only be justified and pursued for its purpose.

In fairness to the Sandbrook and his group, they have been more preoccupied with people's mass participation or popular democracy but unfortunately very little have been done to focus on the role of the social forces, their struggles in the attempt to construct democratic systems and the effects of such struggles on the stability and order in the existing democracies. The Africanist and radical perspectives on the debate of democracy in Africa have therefore left big void for us to fill within the context of the state in relation to pursuit of democracy.

The argument of whether Africans lack democratic traits or not

(Ekwe-Ekwe, 1985) or whether their pre-colonial social and political institutions are incapable of sustaining democracy, if juxtaposed with the features of modern democratic states, can hardly be justified by any empirical test. The argument of the modernisers that Africa lacks the prerequisites for the emergence and sustenance of democracy may be regarded as weak postulate because the departing colonial authorities seem not to have interest in creating a stable democratic state at independence, rather they were more concerned about their economic interests, hence their desire to hand over power to elites that would defend such interests (Mohmoh and Adejumobi, 1999).

Catephores sees these elites as those with entrenched business interests (Catephores, 1994) but which Diamond et al describe as vulnerable to the whims and caprices of their metropolitan counterparts (Diamond et al, 1998). Babu and Ngugi separately observed that in many colonised territories, the process of decolonisation ensured that the leaders of the post-colonial states will be collaborators of imperialism (Babu, 1981; Ngugi, 1983). Consequently, Olorode (2001) following the arguments of Ake and Fanon, explains that the contradictions between the interests of the indigenous class which inherited the colonial state and the interests of the oppressed who bore the brunt of colonial exploitation created strong revolutionary pressures against the maintenance of the existing exploitative class relationship. (Ake, 1978: 77; Fanon, 1990)

The ideals of genuine democracy and rule of law which were the political outcry during the struggles for independence were truncated by fraudulent elections. One-party arguments whose legitimacy was supported by new 'patriotic history' (Ranger, 2010) propagated by the African leaders portraying the multi-ethnic African colonies as where people lived harmoniously as one nation before the disruption by colonialism emerged in the African political history.

The new public history underpinned the independence speeches of African leaders portraying the decolonising states as nation-states whose roots of homogeneity lays in their pre-colonial history. This development according to Mafeje (1995: 31) was led by Nkrumah -1957, Nyerere, Sekou Toure and Tom Mboya -1963 but subsequent experience of Africa shows the undemocratic character of one party system. Macpherson (1977) however used this assumption to conclude that Africa belongs to 'non-liberal democracy' but 'developmental authoritarianism'. Perhaps this assumption prompted Ayang Nyang'O (1987) to pose a fundamental question of whether there is an African version of democracy.

## **2.5 Emergence of post-colonial dictatorships in Africa**

Classical sociologists such as Herbert Spencer predicted that every society will progress along one path towards a state where political restraint, peace and lack of internal conflict would be the order of the day were proved wrong by the implosions that took place in post-colonial African states. The “colonial situation” thesis, as propounded by Thomas Hodgkin (1957) is an apt methodology of political sociology of colonial Africa. The assumption of the modernisation theorists that taking Africa along the development path of the western model will rapidly develop her turned out to be a mirage and an impossible desideratum. Little attention was paid to the wide differences between the traditional African institutions and the process by which they could accommodate external and internal pressures for both stability and change.

The political crises in the post-colonial states became more pronounced in Africa just as the toll on human lives and misery soared. As the pre-colonial African societies were reconstructed along what Otite refers to as the “habits of the heart of the western nations” (Otite and Oginowo, 1981), African traditional values and institutions were either manipulated or suppressed in the foundation of the new states’ structures. This perhaps informs Peter Ekeh in his magisterial and well-celebrated article entitled “Colonialism and *The Two Publics in Africa*” (Ekeh, 1975), to define a new social structure in Africa predicated on a primordial civil realm and a public civil realm, and Mamdani’s conclusion that the

crises in Africa are manifestations of the legacy of late colonialism which is now hunting the post colonial state. Key to this conclusion is the construction and reconstruction of the “settler” and the “native” in both colonial and post colonial situations.

In the pre-colonial societies, the traditional institutions played prominent role in the religious, political and economic aspects of life, but with the amalgamation of the various societies into a single political entity, various specialised institutions attained separate existence and new social relationships. Peil observed this development to have aided many governmental, religious and economic institutions to now have a greater or lesser interdependent (Peil, 1978). A significant aspect of the new social relationship was that each of the amalgamating societies and their various groups came into the new social relationship with specific interests which sometimes bordered on extracting from the centre. A major consequence of the extractive tendency was highlighted by Cliffe and Seddon. According to them, many of the new political groups, in an attempt at maintaining effective control over the new state resorted to deriving their strength from their appeals to ethnic, national or religious identities which were hitherto non-existent in the pre-colonial societies but have now become veritable vehicles for political mobilisation and contests (Cliffe and Seddon, 1991: 5).

Archie Mafeje had before Cliffe and Seddon pointed out that there is no cultural or linguistic group in Africa that has an equivalent definition or translation for tribe or tribalism (Mafeje, 1971). Hence, to write about ethnicity in Africa is to examine a political construction with roots in colonialism. This is a historical and factual claim and not myth-making.

Ahluwalia sheds more light on the impact of the colonial transformation of the African societies into liberal states. He explains the

continent as becoming entrapped within a discourse of power play whereby foreign institutions and agencies such as IMF, World Bank and several other non-governmental organisations now determine and dictate policies that map out her future (Ahluwalia, 2001: 54). Ahluwalia's view could hardly be faulted because the functions of both the leaders and the state were actually taken over especially in the 1980s by these agencies and NGOs and carried out in a manner that was uncomfortable to the people. For example, as reported by Ahluwalia, IMF and World Bank, in their efforts at 'revamping' Africa's economy for Africa and introducing 'good governance' to the people, recommended an agenda that included devaluation of the local currency, budget cuts, removal of state barriers, trimming the state sector, liberalising the economy and a complete erosion of the state power (*ibid*).

The mass reaction to the hardships generated by this agenda pushed the leadership to dictatorship. Absolute power of the colonial period was reemployed to become a standard bearer of violent phenomenon thereby compelling Fanon to see no difference between colonial and the post-colonial periods but simply a replacement of one 'species' of men by other 'species' of men (Fanon, 1990: 27). Efforts by the IMF and World Bank to combine the requirements of market economy with the demands of popular sovereignty, according to Bayart, ended in failure (Bayart et al, 1999). As stated earlier, when faced with the massive protests that tended to break the state from capital, the post colonial leaders as observed by Szeftel, quickly sought refuge in state repression and coercion (Szeftel, 1989: 8) which eventually became a norm that characterised leadership of the post-colonial Africa.

As severally pointed above the post-colonial leaders simply inherited dictatorial leadership styles from their colonial leaders. They found the oppressive style suitable for the protection of their personal interests and that of the western monopoly capital. It also according to Olorode, allows power to be constantly retained within the hegemonic factions of the ruling class (Olorode, 2001). Brown

pointedly argues the culpability of the western powers in the sustenance of these dictatorial regimes. He asserts:

The arming of African (dictatorial) regimes by the industrial powers has had both a strategic and economic rationale... For the same mix of reasons the hideous regime of Mobutu was established and sustained by the United States in Zaire (Brown, 1995: 111)

As Torddoff (2002), rightly observes, at independence, the post colonial-state rested on weak economic foundation that could not match the demands and expectations of the populace. The post-colonial leaders were faced with the problems of poor technology and limited manpower, trade imbalances and marketing opportunities while at the same time grappling with the problems of democratisation. Whereas in the industrialised west, Tordoff argues that:

...industrialisation took place before full democratic practices were introduced into the political process, and this meant that resources were available to meet the most pressing demands of the workers as they became enfranchised... In Africa, as in Asia and the Caribbean, there was no such time-lag: universal franchise was granted just before, at, or immediately after independence, before economic policies could even be formulated (Tordoff, 2002: 5).

The post colonial states invariably inherited economic institutions that subsequently produced unsettled political culture. Gentili (2005) highlights a major effect of the absence of the time-lag by averring that the structural deficiencies of the states and the weight of negative inheritances, made worse by hostile international environment, as the Cold War on Africa, one of its main field of hot confrontation has been the underlining cause of one-party states "failure" in Africa.



It must be understood that the process of state building in the western world since both the *Magna Carta*<sup>4</sup> and the Treaty of Westphalia<sup>5</sup>, took centuries but in the case of Africa, the liberal constitutional model of democracy was mechanically foisted within the limited time of decolonisation process in a guided manner that reflected the western nation model. The decolonisation process itself was influenced by other factors apart from the colonial struggle for independence. These were the selective inclusion of the nationalist elites and the fatigue of the colonial powers due to prolonged World Wars I and II. These factors accelerated decolonisation within a limited time frame.

Critically viewed, history of pre-colonial rule is as not uniformed as is being presented by the post-colonial leaders in their desires to rule their territories as a nation-state immediately after independence. The people are not known to have common cultural identity. This has effect on the distinction between nation-state and modern state in Africa. Nzongola-Ntalaja graphically illustrates this point in his seminal book titled, *“Revolution and Counter-revolution in Africa:*

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<sup>4</sup> Magna Carta is document which contains a series of laws establishing the rights of English barons and major landowners thereby limiting the authority of the King. The document was accepted by King John of England on June 15, 1215. The Latin word which means 'great charter' is now used as a synonyms of all written citizen's rights and as foundation stones of statutes and laws. It serves as the basis of individual rights and considered as a part of the English Constitution.

<sup>5</sup> Treaty of Westphalia also known as Peace Treaty of Westphalia is a collective name referring to the two separate Treaties of Munster and Osnabruck signed on the 24<sup>th</sup> of October 1648 and 15<sup>th</sup> of May 1648 by the Westphalia Empire with France at Munster and with Sweden and the Protestant estates of the Empire at Osnabruck respectively to bring the Thirty Years and Eight Years Wars to an end. The Treaty of the Pyrenees, signed in 1659, ending the war between France and Spain, is also often considered part of the treaty. The Treaty as a whole is often used by historians to mark the beginning of the modern era where each ruler would have the right to determine their state's religion. This therefore made the growing Protestantism and the Catholicism to be equal in law. The Treaty generally dealt with the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire. The Treaty continues to be of importance today, with many academics asserting that the international system that exists today began at Westphalia. Both the basis and the result of this view have been attacked by revisionist academics and politicians alike, with revisionists questioning the significance of the Treaty, and commentators and politicians attacking the "Westphalian System" of sovereign nation-states. The concept of each nation-state, regardless of size, as of equal legal value informed the founding of the United Nations, where all member states have one vote in the General Assembly.

*essays on contemporary Africa*” (1987). Most of the elites that took over the state administration often confused formal independence with modern-state building with limited knowledge in state building and state administration.

While one may agree with Nzogola’s observation, it is however stressed in this thesis that the desires of the nationalist leaders to develop nation-state akin to European nation-state or the United States of America blurs their sights of the dividing lines between the indigenous nation-states that characterise the pre-colonial territories and modern nation-state that developed in Europe and the United States of America out of the modern-sovereign states. Hence there was generally little preparation for sustainable modern-statehood as the new states lacked roots in the traditional societies. The basis for its sustenance and efficient operation which are national citizenship and national identity were undermined by cultural identity.

Indeed, post-colonial citizenship was reduced to subject hood. Hence citizenship in the post colonial era was reconstructed in such a way that the native became the native-citizen with all the privileges enjoyed by the settler citizens, while non-natives became subjects. Because citizenship was tied to land and indigeneity; hence belonging was defined as ethnic belonging. Hence exclusion was also tied to this. Belongingness was politically constructed to the date of independence, in many cases those who did not settle in a place before independence were seen as aliens, and those who were segregated before independence such as in settler communities of migrant workers such as the *Sabon Gari* (urban township) were also seen as settlers and non-natives. Hence they were alienated (Mamdani, 1996).

Suffice it to mention that at independence, African states searching for a new identity as nation-states were daunted with the task of wielding into a nation, the multi-lingua societies that were at different stages of socio-political development (Nzongola, 1987; Tordoff, 2002: 5). Ethnic groups with their

different political orientations were brought together under one dominant state that rarely corresponded to pre-colonial social, cultural or geographical identity; or guided by the values and precepts of the indigenous societies (Clapham, 1997; Tordoff, 2002). The colonisers established the kind of territorial structures which they assumed to be a necessary or indispensable element of government (Clapham, 1997: 31). This had dire consequences for the future political directions, leadership and development of post-colonial African states including one-party systems, military regimes and adulterated liberal democracy as discussed below.

## **2.6 One Party system in Africa**

Liberal democracy as discussed by Almond, Huntington Powell Jr; etc; assumes survival of democracy to depend on strong and sustainable political parties with the capacity to represent citizens and provide policy choices that demonstrate the ability to govern for the public good (Almond, 1960; Huntington, 1968; NDI, 2005). The party system, according to Powell Jr. (1992) shapes citizen participation through the electoral activities. Some of the essences of political parties in a democracy according to Powell include building of political and civic organisations, safeguarding elections, and promoting citizen participation, openness, and accountability in government. Political parties' dynamics in the view of Powell either inhibit or exacerbate turmoil and violence (*ibid*). In essence activities of political parties are portrayed as constituting major factors that shape the internal democratic processes including the violent political eruptions that plague Africa since the 'third wave of democracy'.

In its observation of the liberal assumption of the political parties, National Democratic Institute (2005) reports that such assumption becomes questionable going by the increasing disconnect between citizens and their elected representatives on the one hand and between party members and their leaders on the other, a decline in political activism, a growing sophistication of anti-democratic forces and continuous challenge of political parties by individuals and groups. This view was initially expressed by Clark when he posited that citizens,

appeared to be engaged in political activities, but they are mere spectators as they only have few engagement opportunities in the political structures to communicate with national decision makers (Clark, 2004: 35-45).

In spite of these observed negative roles of political parties in a democracy; most of the literatures on the roles of political parties still anoint them as harbingers of stable democracy without taking into consideration that political context will shape the characters of the political institutions including political parties. Political parties in Africa, as argued in Chapter Six under “*The Need for Neo-communitarian Government without Political Parties*” are far from deepening democracy due to their autocratic leadership style, ownership, lack of internal democracy and sometimes their desperations of not only winning elections at all costs but to be involved in post-election government in an alliance arrangement. The idea of multi-party system was replaced by single party system either in a *de facto* or *de jure* forms. Political parties in Africa are observed to largely mean to serve the interests of state leaders while internal democracy and accountability remain alien to political parties and governance.

A strong factor often advanced by the protagonists for the justification of single party system is rooted in histories of African countries as continually shaping the political orientation of Africans and their capacity to manage their own democracy in a unique manner differently from the European assumptions. This, by implication means different from liberal democracy. Clarke nourishes this view by opining that most African societies continue to express collective cultural and religious identities to which majority of their citizens grant allegiance to (ibid: 8).

Clark ignores the fact the allegiance was elicited by the introduction of market economy and liberal democracy by the colonial authorities which compelled most African countries to galvanise their long standing ethnic, cultural

and religious identities to confront the effects of the market economy and the entire colonialism. Members of these identity expressions readily grant strong allegiance to their ethnic and religious groups irrespective of their trades or professions. The common factor to all these groups was their political activism for independence and against indignity of the colonial rule. They constituted the bedrocks of the nationalist movements and political parties during the colonial era. After independence as reported by Gentili, the nationalist movements and political parties that derived their strengths from these groups substituted them with fresh mobilisation through bureaucratized and dogmatic cadres thereby closing opportunities for continuous grassroots mobilisation and effective participation' through the ethno-religious groups (Gentili, 2005).

Going by Golder (2004), that there are two types of single party systems that developed in Africa. These are de jure single party states and the de facto single party states. The former were the countries that changed their constitutions so that only one political party was allowed in the country such as Moamah Gaddafi's Libya. The latter are the countries that constitutionally allowed multi-party system but in reality there are dominant ruling parties that monopolise power and dominate all branches of government since independence. Though there are opposition parties but they are too fragmented and weak to pose any serious challenge to the ruling parties. In essence this category of countries maintains a pseudo-multi party arrangement. Botswana stands out in this wise.

Unfortunately the one-party systems leaders like Mobutu Sese Setko of Congo and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe were unable to assert their legitimacy on the structure of power of the state due to what Fritz and Rocha opine to be their inability to enforce policy throughout the state (Fritz and Rocha, 2007). Their governments according to Mann, lack the infrastructure power to penetrate the various ethnic nationality groups within their territories (Mann, 1986). The obvious fact here is that these leaders like their erstwhile colonial leaders ignored the history of their societies and continued the state-building project on the

foundation laid by the colonial authorities. This in effect disconnected them from the masses thereby depriving them of a strong base of support. With the one-party state arrangement, the state – building project in most of the post colonial African states became frayed.

It is pertinent to add that the single party posture of some of the post-colonial African leaders could be traced to the fact that during the struggles for independence, single dominant political parties or movements were the vanguard of the struggles. Whereas, this posture was accepted by the people in order to have a united programme of action against colonialism. This exigency of the time was misconstrued as a favourable factor for the socialist single party by some nationalist leaders. This wrong assumption prompted some of the leaders who immediately after independence became patriarchs to start moulding paternalistic states from the post-independence societies. This was done by uniting the various pre-independence ethnic and religious movements behind the banner of a single party. Mamdani argues that such efforts disintegrated the groups and subordinated them to state ideology (1988).

The subordination was to ensure that no opposition is brooked and nobody could question the leader. Either de jure or de facto, single parties were proclaimed as the only legitimate representative institutions, derived from the struggle, able to dismantle the inheritance of colonial divide and rule institutions and policies. Political plurality and ethnic diversity were instantly defined as obstacles to nation building and national unity (Gentili, 2005). Kenneth Kaunda (1974), a leading advocate of single party system advanced three reasons for its justification for Africa. These include, struggles for independence were carried out by the peoples with a common overriding will to throw off the yoke of colonial and oppressive foreign domination of their territories; the peoples of these various societies were not divided along class lines and the urgent desire to derive the promised dividends of independence, of “life more abundant”, development, economic self reliance and decent human life. Kaunda could

hardly be faulted because the overriding will of deriving dividends of independence no doubt required a strong leader that could be trusted by the people.

The leadership of the independence vanguard parties or movements proved to be reliable in this direction, therefore the idea of multi-party competition immediately after the euphoria of independence was inconceivable. Kaunda in his Independence speech buttresses this perception by declaring that:

The people, through their Party, have wrested political power and control from foreign exploiters and are consolidating this major achievement in their hands. . . . Having attained independence, the people, through their Party, have proclaimed one-party participatory democracy as the only political system that could safeguard it (Kaunda, 1974: 9-11)

Contrary to Kaunda's proclamation, single-party was observed to have failed in promoting democratic regimes. Democracy remained an unfulfilled promise, because the mode of power remained basically authoritarian and functioned on the basis of a hierarchy of networks and alliances with local tribal, ethnic constituencies, or top-down absolute sovereignty of institutions which helped to suffocate precisely the grassroots communities that had been the backbone of the process of national liberation.

For example, in spite of calls for unity, forgiveness and inclusion of all shades of opinions and colours by Mugabe in the new Zimbabwe, hardly two years into independence, the Korean-trained Fifth Brigade of the Zimbabwean National Army invaded Matebeleland whose inhabitants were denounced as anti-government dissidents who had to be crushed at all costs and in the process an estimated 20 000 people were killed. Two decades later, Zimbabwean President Mugabe denounced white Zimbabweans as enemies of the state who should be punished. He lent his support for the violent farm invasions that drove white

farmers and farm labourers off the land. The same government also vilified Black Zimbabweans who were members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) an opposition Party formed in 1999. They were labelled by the government as 'sell outs', 'traitors' and 'puppets of the West'. Effective accountability and representation through popular democratic participation gave way to personal rule and eventually to single party dictatorships on the one hand, and to reliance on bureaucratic controls that fell victim to corruption, itself not unrelated to single party domination. At the risk of repetition, in the first thirty years of the post-colonial era, more than half of African countries experienced military rule except Botswana that maintained a pseudo-multiparty system.

## **2.7 Emergence of military rule in Africa**

The military in Africa was never a part of anti-colonial movement but the colonial vestiges created by colonialists as machinery meant for suppressing popular anti-colonial resistance and to fight imperialist wars. The military as a patriotic national institution could have been an institution that can kick-start the reconfiguration of the state and the economic development due to the nature of the institution characterised by precise and timely response to situation and zero-level tolerance for indolence. However, as explained by Morris Janowitz (cited in Ikoku, 1985), and Huntington (cited in Adekanye, 1992) military intervention in Africa's politics arises largely from the military social structures and politicisation of the military by the power elites thereby rendering its intervention as an aberration.

The newly independent African nations took over what were essentially colonial armies. The colonial legacy left the military as an institution that was not fully accepted by the African peoples because during the colonial struggles for independence, the general public and indigenous political leaders 'had developed an almost allergic fear and mistrust for soldiers' (Wangome, 1985). W.F. Gutteridge records that:

...nationalist politicians saw them as agents of imperial rule  
suppressing political demonstrations and protecting European



property. Though they had won glory by serving overseas in the two world wars, their imperial activities caused them to be regarded in some quarters as armies of occupation or at best as mercenaries in the service of a foreign power (Gutteridge, 1975: 6).

Momoh and Adejumobi expanded Gutteridge's submission that from the onset, the African military was 'intrinsically reactionary and pro-status quo' (1999: 8). They averred that the military was treated with disdain and contempt and was never accorded any special consideration in the Africanisation process of the various services in the newly independent states. A visible evidence of this neglect reflected in the preference for Africanisation of the civil service while the leadership core and sometimes Officer Corps of the military were left for the expatriate officers. The initial disregard for the military institution later turned out to be the source of military's consternation and attitude to the civil society and grievances against the state.

As Wangome (1965), observes in the entire tropical Africa, it was only the Sudan that, as at the time of independence, had a fair number of indigenous commissioned officers. This was due to the conscious efforts of the British in training local officers since 1918. Further illustrations show that as at the time of independence in March 1957, Ghana had the highest standard of education in the entire black Africa. In spite of this impressive position, however, only 10% of the commissioned officers were Ghanaians. The Belgian Congo had a total force well in excess of 24,000 men at independence. Yet there was not a single Congolese officer in the entire force. This state of imbalance or rather inequality was to contribute towards inciting a mutiny after independence. The army mutinies in Tanganyika and Uganda in 1964 were provoked by similar situations, besides there was the issue of salaries which Momoh and Adejumobi (ibid) reported to be paltry when compared with university and other professionals.

Soon, many post-colonial governments found out that the military which had been despised and treated with contempt during the pre-independence and thereafter constituted a vital factor in their national unification agenda. They realised that the same military could be used to suppress political opposition and for projecting personal power. Though there were few occasions when the leadership of the military disliked the tendency by political leaders to use the military for personal political gains. This posture sometimes bordered on clash of personal or class interests of the military's high command. Some scholars pointed to the period when President Nkrumah sent Ghanaian army to the Congo in 1960 as part of the UN Peace Keeping Force. On several occasions Nkrumah was reported to have issued his own instructions to the Ghanaian contingent, and in the process contradicting what had already been issued by the United Nations Command. This practice was claimed to have frustrated the Ghanaian soldiers who saw it as an unnecessary intrusion of their professional responsibilities. This forced Nkrumah to withdraw his peacekeepers in Congo. His arguments are elaborately captured in his book titled "*The Challenge of the Congo*" (1967).

The military as a colonial legacy, harbours tribal imbalances in its recruitment and command structure, due to the colonialists' belief in 'martial tribes' or natural warriors. This imbalance was hardly corrected in some post-colonial states such Nigeria where the Army started as what was known as the "Northern Constabulary" or better still the "Hausa Constabulary" and this was the nucleus of the British West African Frontier Force (WAFF). Some states compounded the situation by recruiting family members, kinsmen and party supporters into the military. Nepotism was so much embedded in the military to the point of becoming a potentially explosive political phenomenon that was later to cause a thirty-month civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970. It also facilitated military coups and authoritarian rules in some of the post-colonial African states.

The dreams of freedom and hope that greeted the independence of most of African countries in the late 50's and early 60's became shattered as many of the post-colonial civilian governments fell victims of military coups that swept across the continent within a decade of independence. Between January 1956 and the end of 1985, Hutchful recorded sixty successful coups in Africa, that is, an average of two every year (Hutchful, 1991: 183).

In 1966 alone there were eight military coup d'états and by 1986, out of some 50 African states, only 18 were under civilian rule (Nyong'O, 1998: 78). By 1975, as reported by Samuel Decalo in "Coups and Army Rule in Africa" (1976: 6) 'approximately half of the continent's states were led by military or civil-military governments'. The period became the season of coup d'état in African continent. Indeed, scholars such as Samuel Decalo refer to the first two to three decades after independence of most of the African countries as decades of coups in Africa because of the alarming spread of military putsch in the continent without any restraint.

Military coups became the order of the day in the '60s and '70s. The targets were nationalist regimes, which wanted to carve out an independent space and give their sovereignty a modicum of reality. Bloom emphatically stressed the manipulation and involvement of the USA and Belgium in the assassination of Patrice Lumumba (Blum, 1986: 174). A surrogate regime of Mobutu was put in place. The Congo, and its people, including, neighbouring states in Central Africa have since seen no peace. The government of Dr. Milton Obote in Uganda was overthrown by General Idi Amin Dada in January 1971. The reign of Emperor Haile Selassie in Ethiopia was halted by the military in September 1974. Kwame Nkrumah, who early realized the importance of continental unity and the curse of imperial exploitation through multinationals, was overthrown in a CIA engineered coup (Blum, 1986: 223). The regimes, as in Botswana, which for various reasons, escaped the fate of military take-over inevitably turned authoritarian one-party states under some or the other form of developmentalist rhetoric (Shivji 1986).

From the second decade of independence it was clear that dissent and governments' falling legitimacy were not only described by a wave of military *coups d'état*, but also by various forms of social and political struggles that could not be understood only in term of grievances rooted in the colonial past or in neo-colonialism. By the end of that decade most of the African countries strangled by various political, economic and environmental crisis had no other option that to negotiate, from a position of weakness, stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes inspired by the primacy of market over state led growth.

The new military rulers often accused the political leaders of corruption, incompetence and mismanagement of the national economy leading to runaway inflation, geometrical increase in unemployment, crime rates and unaffordable prices of basic necessities of life. They make promises of returning the state to civil rule as if they 'have something to teach the civilians about democracy and transition to civil rule' (Momoh and Adejumobi, 1999: 5). The political leaders themselves also provided veritable opportunities for military coups as some of them were self-seeking, power-hungry and ambitious.

The get-rich-quick politicians continue to get richer while poverty keeps staring at the generality of the populace reducing the social structure of the society into haves and have not's. Others were out experimenting on new and foreign ideologies in the name of African socialism. These were ideologies that had no bearing or relevance to the improvement of the lives of the ordinary man. Some of these governments started openly courting the Eastern bloc for advice and guidance to the irritation of the Western bloc of the Cold War. These were the kind of situations to be found in Ghana, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and other countries when their governments fell to the military.

These coups were justified by their leaders and apologists as the custodian responsibilities of the institution to prevent the state from disintegration. The 'custodians of law and order' argument became a familiar thesis for the soldiers to arrogate to themselves the role of watchdog of democracy and good governance. They quickly cash on political crisis, instability, simmering discontent or perceived malfeasance of the politicians to topple the government. In his subtle reaction to growing criticisms against military rule in Africa and justification for such rule, Olusegun Obasanjo an African officer and ex-military ruler in Nigeria, in "*Africa Embattled*" (1988) claims military rule is an inevitable and necessary condition for progress and development in Africa. He argues:

We in Africa and the world we live in have to reconcile ourselves to the reality of the military as a factor of our nation-building process in the foreseeable future. Although our population is comparatively high, our utilizable skilled, experienced and trained manpower is severely limited...In a situation of inherent or recurrent instability, the advent of military government may be inevitable no matter what one wished in principle (Obasanjo, 1988: 7).

Even when there is no political crisis or instability, opines Obasanjo, the military must still be saddled with the administration of the state, nation building and development. His reason:

There may be an advantage in singleness of purpose of a good military administration in the formulation and execution of development programmes but, I do see a substantial advantage in the cohesive and integrative force generated from the interaction and interplay in active and healthy political activities which a military administration may not engender (*ibid*).

Although Obasanjo paints picture of the military as patriotic and required by Africans for progress and development. Unfortunately every available record on military government shows that more often than not, every military regime in Africa or elsewhere turned out to be more corrupt, oppressive and inefficient than the civilian governments they deposed. His misleading reasoning therefore tends to border on either historical ignorance or calculated attempt at

shielding the true character of every military regime including his military administration in Nigeria between 1976 and 1979.

Awolowo, the first Premier of Western Nigeria and Presidential candidate of the Unity Party of Nigeria in 1979 and 1982 general elections had initially denounced progress and development's justification of the military rule. He sees military regimes as oligarchs that derive their power not from the wish of the people but from an imposition of their own will on the people backed with force. He opines that some Aristocrats or Oligarchs may be dynamic quick and precise in taking decisions, and equally swift and thorough in implementing them, but what they gained through personal initiatives is completely negated by the basis and essence of the very system they operate. Awolowo explains further in his castigation of the military regimes that they may start well, but their selfish, nepotistic, elitist and corrupt nature will inevitably overshadow them until they lose their original mission and degenerate. Jimmi Wangome argues Awolowo's contention of the military further:

...experience in Africa has shown that the military are no better than civilians when it comes to running governments. Rather than solve African contemporary political and socio-economic problems, military coups d'état in Africa have tended to drive the continent into even further suffering and turmoil. This has been the case in Uganda, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Congo and several other African states (Wangome, 1985)

Obasanjo ruled Nigeria as a military leader between 1976 and 1979. His justification of the military rule therefore came as no surprise.

All the military regimes have brought about greater political instability which inevitably compounds any existing problem within the political environment. Having intervened in the political process, the military always fail to resolve the crisis of legitimacy and development which they have always accused the civilian regimes of. In fact, some of these problems were further compounded

by the military leaders and this has most cases, led to fierce agitation for military disengagement from governance.

Also military regimes, as reported of the CIA engineered coup in Ghana (Blum, 1986: 223) and the ouster of Patrice Lumumba in Congo, are sometimes encouraged by the international capitalist powers as they are found suitable for responding to the demands of external interests and that they easily comply with the neo-liberal conditionality (Szeftel, 1989: 3). It is germane to explain that the same international community provides the military regimes in Africa with financial help even though such help is given with pressure for political and economic reforms. Shivji notes:

Behind virtually every coup was the hand of one or the other imperial power, and, more often than not, the US. Overthrowing nationalist regimes and installing tyrannical dictatorships was, then, a “fair game” for today’s champions of democracy and “good governance” (Shivji, 2002b)

The irony of the help is that most of the donors and other international partners seemingly feel reluctant to criticise the totalitarian postures of the same regimes and always willing to go along with them and as such rendering their pressure for reforms fake. It is where and when their economic interests are threatened by the policies of such regimes that economic and other measures such as support for the civil societies and NGOs are applied.

## **2.8 Liberal and Illiberal democracy in Africa**

Understanding of how liberal democracy breeds illiberal government in Africa requires an understanding of the dual nature of liberalism. Democracy is though riddled with ‘a long and convoluted history’ (Plattner, 2010) but it is also a highly contested concept in the contemporary world. Democracy in its etymological term means government by the rule of the people which translates into government of the majority through free and fair elections in contemporary usage. That majoritarianism does not guarantee democracy is an incontestable

valid statement put forward by Leszek Kolakowski. In his words:

...the principle of majority rule does not by itself constitute democracy; we know of tyrannical regimes that enjoyed support of a majority... and the Iranian theocracy. We do not call democratic a regime in which 51 percent of the population may slaughter the remaining 49 percent with impunity (Kolakowski, 1990: 6)

In modern democracy, a government is considered democratic if only it could guarantee the protection of individual and minorities' rights and liberty. This guarantee is often stated in the constitution alongside the checks and balances mechanism that prevents arbitrary use of power, and ensures compliance with the rule of law. Democracy of this form is referred to as either liberal or constitutional democracy. The dual nature of liberal democracy lies in its protection of individual rights and compliance with majority rule. The feasibility of this in practice remains a daunting task especially in the contemporary world where 'majority rule and the protection of individual rights almost always appear in tandem' (Plattner, *ibid*). Pre-colonial African societies were not liberal in the sense of the OECD model, but democratic with checks and balances, and there was no evidence to show that they were evolving towards the OECD model of democracy with regular multi-party elections.

OECD model of democracy is a liberal constitutional democracy that negates the principle of government of the people but a hybrid arrangement where majoritarianism is modified by protection of minority and individual rights. This implies that liberal democracy while seeking to ensure the government of the people, also simultaneously limits the activities of such government through constitutional restraints from infringing on the rights of minorities and individuals. In essence, liberal democracy in its dual nature simultaneously pursues two separate goals that compete with each other and thereby putting it in perpetual tension. Plattner argues that 'the nature of this tension was clearly understood at the founding moment of modern democracy' (2010).



Liberal democracy had a brief breath in Africa in 1980s when the multi-party democratic wave blowing across Eastern Europe and Latin America also emerged on the continent. The indigenous authoritarian regimes were forced by the popular demands in forms of civil societies supported by the West and donor agencies to concede some space for opposition in the political process. Unfortunately, the euphoria that accompanied the Africa's search for 'second independence' (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 1987) was short-lived because it was donor-driven. This recession was partly due to the absence of global fiscal munificence which made most of African states to slide back into political strife, dictatorship and military rule (Samuel Decalo, 1994). Western donors attributed this failure to leadership and therefore diverted their attention to the NGOs viewing such as catalyst for liberal democracy. They failed as argued by Bayart and his group, to accept that their efforts to combine the requirements of market economy with demands of popular sovereignty have been producing the noticed failures in spite of the substantial achievements in freedom of association and that of the press (Bayart et al, 1999).

Even in countries where there were regime change through popular movements such as Mali, Benin Republic, Congo and Zambia, once the new government was put in place, the element of continuity between the old and new regimes resurfaced. The new leaders, in the current system of international affairs, as further stressed by Bayart et al (1999), obliged to adhere to existing methods of economic accumulation and political control by the donor nations.

The stabilisation and structural adjustment reforms, inspired by the conviction that the root problem of African economies was excessive intervention of the state, were introduced. Starting at the beginning of the '80s, measures of import liberalisation, privatisation, budget stabilisation and financial regulations, all prerequisites to increase trade and capital flows. After a decade of structural

adjustment it became evident that market liberalisation could neither improve the economic situation of the African countries but rather widen the gap of inequality in the African states. With the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the '90s economic liberalisation was to be supported and reshaped by democratisation processes and the promotion of institution building, "good governance" and rules and norms and capacity building.

Liberalism is thus fuelled by a combination of the requisites of the market economy and the conditions for mass governance. But unfortunately the market democracy that liberalism propagates, introduces complications in its concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of the few elites, while democracy on the other hand advocates for the mass involvement of the people in the governance of the state. The backlash of this development is the emergence of market-dominant elite and their foreign partners controlling the economy and numerically powerful but impoverished majority holding the key to political leadership. The relationship between the two groups sometimes in an antagonistic manner has always been detrimental to the survival of democracy and contributively to the political instability in Africa.

Africa has witnessed series of ethno-religious political crisis where the political elite have appealed to the ethnic or religious sentiments of the impoverished people of their regions to unleash attacks on the state or to subdue opposition from the 'outsiders' within the same state. The general antagonistic posture of the people irrespective of social background to the harsh effects of the SAP and IMF programmes has led to the collapse of governments and emergence of multi-party democracy in some post-colonial African states.

A prominent feature of democracy in liberalism is the periodic election on multi-party basis. Unfortunately the multi-party elections in Africa are based on the survival of political parties whose leaders have access to tremendous

amount of material wealth and social influence. This therefore signals the fact that the appearance of multi party politics is not necessarily the same as democracy, but rather what Shivji refers to as 'party-state' (2002). Political parties are only concerned with securing victories at elections through unorthodox methods. The actual mobilisation of the citizen for specific demands is done primarily by social movements.

The integration of Africa into liberal political philosophy by the colonial administrations and later sustained by neo-colonialism, was perhaps for the breaking of the empire/kingdom power and opening of the economy and the societies for capitalist development. The neo-colonial sustenance of this intention was reinforced by Cliffe and Seddon's submission that what the colonial administration really had in mind was that:

when western 'donors', the IMF and the World Bank, demand political pluralism and 'good governance' along with economic liberalism as conditions for assistance, as they are now doing, they have in mind the breaking of the state power and 'opening up' of the economy and society for capitalist development... what is required for the kind of capitalist development envisaged, however, is political stability rather than democracy (Cliffe and Seddon, 1991: 10).

Achieving political stability in the post colonial states was of paramount concern to the neo-liberal leaders, rather than democracy. This will require some force backed up by capital resources and an administrative capacity that also requires some deals with the local elites whose major preoccupation is primitive accumulation of capital in order to bolster their positions in the state. The two groups through this process established what Clapham (1997: 32) refers to as clientelistic relationship with each other with the local elites becoming the eyes of the neoliberal operators in the post colonial states thereby deepening the reliance of local political authority on external resources.

The term illiberal democracy first appeared in the political lexicon  
[80]

through Fareed Zakaria in his "*The rise of Illiberal Democracy*" (1997) to describe the rise of a disturbing phenomenon where the 'elected' governments around the world are observed to be routinely ignoring the limits on their constitutional powers and depriving their citizens of basic freedoms. Characteristics of this phenomenon include shielding the activities of the ruling elite from the knowledge of the citizens either due to lack of civil liberties, deliberate ignorance of the constitutional provisions or lack or insufficient of legal constitutional frameworks to prevent such violation. Illiberal democratic societies are not societies where accountability is considered necessary or where deliberative policy is adopted for public issues. Even though regular elections are held to choose the political leaders but restriction on freedoms of speech, assembly and centralisation of powers in the hands of the leader and controlled media are all features of illiberal democracies. Illiberal regimes use economic pressure, red tape or violence to suppress opposition.

Holding of regular, free and fair elections remain the major benchmark by the west to determine whether a regime is liberal or illiberal democracy but there are situations where parties that were not pro-west won elections and the winners were prevented from ruling. Nigeria, Algeria and Afghanistan remain typical examples. There are also situations where pro-west political parties won elections whose results were sharply contested, and such regimes were judged to be democratic. Mobutu Seseseko's regime in Congo clearly exemplified this. So what makes a regime liberal or illiberal goes beyond winning elections, it largely has to do with the degree of the fulfilment of all conditions set by the OECD model of democracy.

The pro-west condition heralds the second wave of illiberal democracy in the post-colonial African states where obsession for free and fair elections in a multiparty democracy, separation of powers and protection of freedom of speech, religion, assembly and property has ended up to produce low density democracy, failed states, professional civil societies, and political crisis.

Halperin et al (2005: 10) raised a vital objection to the classification of regimes as illiberal democracy by stating that a democracy that lacks or stifles opposition could not be judged illiberal but non-democratic. Levitsky and Way (2002) wrestled with such classification and registered an objection. They emphasise that classifying some states as illiberal is faulty because it gives the impression that these states desire to be democratic but something went wrong with the process. Most post-colonial African states that could be classified as illiberal democracy are never truly democratic and not developing towards such because they are force-based and always employ series of strategies including use of the state repressive apparatuses to destabilise, suppress or hack opposition in spite of conducting regular elections. Nigeria serves as a veritable example of a 'democratic' state where democracy has been replaced with 'competitive authoritarianism' (Levitsky and Way, *ibid*).

Africa being a weaker actor in the global political economy but considered by the superpowers to be of strategic importance to the cold-war bipolar competition between USA and USSR, made the continent to be subjected to various external influences that shape the leadership orientation and direction. The two superpower blocs sought to establish monopolising spheres of influence within Africa in a manner that will prevent their opponents from doing so. As argued by Wiseman, 'in pursuit of this aim, both superpowers were willing to reward compliant regimes with economic support, and military hardware even those regime chose to act in oppressive manner towards their domestic population' (Wiseman, ed; 1995: 3).

The exit of the USSR from the international arena created a post-cold war trend of unipolar dominance of neo-liberalism with an unrestrained super-power that undermines the very basis of democracy. This trend represents the renewal of colonisation of Africa in a neo-colonial form. It is a trend accompanied

by some economic and political conditions that imprison democracy within the ultra capitalist ideological paradigm. While colonialism installs autocracy in Africa, the neo-colonial project consolidates such rule by maintaining the economic relationship that preserves unrestrained flow of wealth from Africa to the West. The post-Cold War unipolar World Order, though shares anti-democracy posture with, but more ferocious in its political agenda than, classical colonialism.

The emergence of dictatorship regimes in post-colonial Africa summarised above appeared to have resulted from the conjunction of wide range of factors which combined to promote such leadership style. On a critical look, it becomes clearer that the global political economy in which the struggle for democracy in Africa has taken place remains the underlying factor for the rise and sustenance of the post-colonial dictatorships in Africa

### **2.9.0 Popular struggles for democracy and crisis of transitions in Africa**

This section concentrates on illuminating the blind spot in the contemporary discourse of democracy in Africa for three main reasons. The section brings to focus the mis-presentation of the civil society groups' struggles for multi-party democracy in Africa as the only entry point into understanding of struggles for democracy by the African peoples. The popular protests against undemocratic policies, ethnic militia or religious insurgencies, violence reactions to election results etc are yet to be seen as worthy entry points to discourse of popular struggles for democracy in Africa. They are rather condemned as 'primordial, illegitimate, or backward (fundamentalist, tribalist etc) (Shivji, 2002: 8). This condemnation not only prevents us from understanding the forms and ideologies of the peoples' resistance to their daily oppression and marginalisation and how this resistance affects the politics of the state but also deprives us 'of an important piece of locally generated knowledge, values and cultures' (ibid).

The boomerang effect of this neglect is well represented by the crisis upsurge in the North Africa starting from Algeria and later spread to Egypt and Libya. This error of misconception is a product of post-Cold War neo-liberal discourse of democracy, which of course tends to 'emasculate democracy of its social and historical dimensions; and presents it as an ultimate nirvana'. The section corrects the wrong impression by arguing for a consideration of the current trends of religious riots, violence reactions to electoral injustice, emergence of ethnic militia demanding for equitable distribution of national resources and services to the neglected areas of the state etc as forms of popular struggles for democracy. This correction is followed by an explanation of how the wrong perception contributes to crises of transitions. The central argument here is that although democratic transitions remained endangered in Africa, there is nothing that makes democracy un-African or that makes Africans ungovernable as long democracy is allowed to germinate from the grains of best-practice as against the imported 'best-fit' principles of the grand theories.

The civil society in the forms of the modern NGOs, workers' unions, students' associations etc provided the platforms for the articulation of the peoples' resentment but the main drive of the struggles for democracy lies in the spirit and determination of the people to reject all forms of oppression and enforce their inalienable right to control the decisions that determine their daily lives and future prospects. As a corollary to this view, how liberal democracy lubricates the involvement of the civil society groups is considered. Contributions of African scholars and why they failed to address the issue of democratisation earlier than the post-cold war period also constitute a major part of the section. Finally, the section explains the crisis of transitions and the challenges of the African states in their attempt at coping with these crises.

There is need for us to appreciate that the battle for people to have control over their own lives, destiny, and information has been in an ongoing collision course with authoritarian instruction in human history. The popular

struggles for democracy in Africa are no exceptions to this collision course. They are emancipatory political struggles aim at state reconstitution, participation and self determination that never terminated in the struggles for independence or the 'second wave' of democracy. These struggles represent emancipatory demands that arise from the spirit of nationalism through which every identity group demands for equal economic, social and political opportunities and active promotion of the welfare of their people.

As argued about two hundred years ago by Mancini (1851: 65) that the nationalities which do not have the opportunity to determine how they are to be governed but are subjected to laws imposed upon them from outside have become means for the purposes of others and, therefore mere objects. Mancini's argument remains relevant in our contemporary world as every nation strives to attain self determination, i.e. the right that constitutes a consistent expression of struggle against all forms of oppression and exploitation. The popular struggles for democracy in the African states are in line with Mancini's position as they reflect the spirit of the innermost life in man, which according to Post (1991: 36) is to enjoy the ineffable right without distinction of gender, race, nation or class and to control the decisions that determine their daily lives and future prospects.

In the light of the above and going by the colonial heritage, it is apparent that the democratic deficits in the colonial and post-colonial African states provide the determinate conditions for these popular struggles in the first instance. As discussed somewhere else, African traditional societies were gradually evolving into modern states in the forms of empires and kingdoms during pre-colonial period, the post-colonial African states did not result from the sequence of these 'historical developments and cumulative experiences' (Nyong'O, 1987: 17) rather they are "a 'hand-me-down' phenomenon in many respects" (*ibid*). In essence, the post-colonial states being artificially created by the colonial rulers, sustained the institutions and apparatuses used by the preceding colonial regimes to exercise political powers and the kind of social



relationships required for the daily reproduction of liberal capitalism which has been equated with democracy in the neo-liberal discourse.

The post-colonial states could hardly stand up to their own traditional historical analyses because their structures are mostly heirs of liberal capitalist democracy that has nothing to do with communal values of African traditions. Their political realms as recorded by Gentili, (2005) witnessed the promotion of the rules of plurality in the form of liberal democracy through multiparty elections and building of the “appropriate” institutions such as the adoption of the rule of law and promotion of civil society as sine-qua-non for the democratisation processes. This approach was regarded as the ‘best practice’ of democracy.

Mundy and Murphy (2006) nourished the argument of ‘best practice’ further with a submission that democracy requires more than formal establishment of certain rights, institutions and procedures - important as these are - but also the consolidation of the social relations which support these. Such support according to Mundy and Murphy includes the development of an educated middle class and a framework of civil institutions. The best practice assumption of liberal democracy however seems to ignore that to be different in democracy does not necessarily mean to be right or wrong. Democracy is very flexible and it is this flexibility that makes it highly complex.

Every system develops the mechanism to manage context with knowledge in a peculiar manner. The idea of developing educated middle class and a framework of civil institutions for the purpose of establishing democracy cannot be assumed out of context. The process of developing this class and its usage is determined by the context which may not necessarily be uniform. Any popular struggle for democracy that adopts the ‘best practice’ approach outside the context of the community even when the people think that ‘this is not the way we do it here’ will end up disconnecting the people from their peculiar context.

This is where the free market institutions becomes inappropriate by forcing the idea of liberal democracy on African states with a compliance strategy of the IMF and World Bank using civil societies to orchestrate the process. The states are therefore left with the feelings that their opinions and thought do not matter. And they are right to feel that way. The problem of liberal democracy lays in its global exchange of best practice ideas to determine the brand of democracy relevant to the collective 'us'.

Development of educated middle class may be relevant in some contexts and it may be irrelevant in others. There should be collaboration, which is the flow and placement of our knowledge within the context of our community. This is where 'best fit' surpasses the 'best practice' assumption of liberal democracy. It is also the best-fit that accounts for different strategies and outcomes of popular struggles for democracy in Algeria, Egypt and Libya. The Libyans unlike the Egyptians and Tunisians completely dismantled the former regime's apparatus through a six month bitter fighting and popular struggle that gave the rebels control of the country having defeated Col. Gaddafi's security and military forces with the support of NATO. The destruction of the regime's security and military forces, capturing of the weaponry and military equipment and the total takeover of the country rather than the toppling of its head as in Algeria and Egypt makes the Libyan struggle a revolution as opposed to the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt. This view is further reinforced by the fact that the country's new leadership have opportunity to control the nation's economic assets and be able to shape economic policies unlike Egypt and Tunisia where the former economic players remain in place and retain their operations while protesters struggle to ensure that their dream of political freedom and enhanced economic opportunity becomes reality.

The toppling of Messrs. Zine El Abedine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak respectively was relatively quick and peaceful compared to the drawn out and bloody battle that ensued between the forces of the TNC and Col. Gaddafi's. The struggles in Algeria and Egypt left the infrastructure of the former regimes in place and in the case of Egypt put the military which has been part of the country's political power structure for the past six decades in charge of its transition to democracy. As a result, both Egypt and Tunisia are still struggling with limited success to limit, if not block, elements of the former regimes and political forces that operated under it from playing dominant roles in their country's future.

### **2.9.1 African scholars and popular struggles for democracy in Africa**

Political crises in African states have proved wrong the assumption of liberal democracy that having regular multi-party elections will guarantee the establishment of a democratic state. In the liberal democracy parlance, no state can be said to be democratic if it does not hold these regular elections according to a set of rules that are regarded as fair, especially by the 'international observers' to the political parties involved.

Even when these rules, processes and institutions of the elections are manipulated to advantage of the ruling party and the elections are fraught with fraudulence. Once the elections are conducted as and when due by the state regardless of these deformities, multi-party democracy satisfactorily endorses the results with pomp and pageantry. African scholars are not favourably disposed to this view. Mafeje in his submission in "*Democracy, Civil Society and Governance in Africa*" (1999) roundly debunked the assumption of equating multi-party elections with democracy in Africa. He based this submission on the fact that popular struggles for democracy in Africa have been subjected to the 'perversion or appropriation by more articulate interlocutors who ranged from imperialist

agents, liberals of all sorts to intellectual opportunists'. In his words, he explains that

...it is important to note that the ordinary citizens who were responsible for what became known as "the popular movement for democracy in Africa" knew exactly what they were objecting to, but they did not know with the same clarity what they wanted. Thus their popular slogans were open to conflicting interpretations, depending on who the interlocutors were. For instance, objection to one party autocracy got interpreted as "multi-party democracy" democratic pluralism got construed as "liberal democracy", and local autonomy as "participatory democracy", which got associated with development without saying what type of development (Mafeje, 1999: 4).

These misinterpretations by the various careerists' civil society groups as argued by Mafeje provided some advantages such as providing ground for a socially-informed debate among the African intellectuals from 1986 to date.

Taking a queue after Mafeje was Jephias Mapuva who in "*Challenges to the Democratisation Process in Africa*" (2010) drew attention to the fact that it was not until the intensification of popular struggles for democracy in the 1970s and 1980s that African scholars started paying sufficient attention to the question of democracy in Africa. Initially, African scholars were not unduly worried about "one-party state" or "parti-unique" but more about the failures of the African states to deliver the promises of independence (Mafeje, *ibid*). Before 1980 most African scholars were pre-occupied with the Cold War effects on the underdevelopment of Africa, ideological competition between capitalism and Marxism and the role of workers and peasants in development (Mafeje, 1998).

The Cold War confrontation not only "disfigured" the liberation and democratic discourse in Africa, it turned the newly and fledging independent states into pawns, and the continent into a chessboard, of proxy hot wars. The

consequences of those hot wars have been devastating for the continent. Though these scholars were completely oblivious of the growing disillusionment that were associated with these failures but the disillusionment reached an articulated crescendo in the 1980s when the euphoria that greeted independence had completely evaporated with enactment of draconian 'legislations and policies reminiscent of the colonial period' (Mapuva, *ibid*).

Prior to these events, it was generally believed that the 'progressive' African leaders who were commonly referred to as the 'Monrovia Group' comprising of Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Modibo Keita etc could bring independence to its fruition irrespective of whether they were advocates of one-party state or multi-party. The underlying reason for this conviction was that the independence movements led by these leaders were popular, diverse and mass based movements that gave the people rays of hope in an independent state. A salient point to be emphasised here is that these social movements especially the ethnic groups were not as homogenous as the African leaders assumed them to be. The unifying factor for the various movements in the independence struggles was the desire to be free from bondage and not to escape the foreign bondage and be trapped in its domestic variance.

It was when the popular trust in these leaders began to dwindle due to some remarkable economic and social events between 1970s and 1980s that the African scholars began to examine the democratic credentials of their states and leaders. Somewhere else the issue of Africa's statelessness is fully addressed. This becomes vital as it compels the examination of why the states failed to prevent the popular struggles for democracy after independence.

The remarkable events of the 1980s were unprecedented since the colonial struggles for independence. These events swept through the Africa

continent forcing changes in political arrangements and leading to multi-partyism, and political pluralism, a new emphasis as stressed by Hyden and Bratton and corroborated by Mamdani and Wamba dia Wamba, on the importance of human rights, dialogue between political opponents, and the liberalisation of the post-colonial politics (Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Mamdani and Wamba dia Wamba, 1995). The events included the reactions of the people to the attempts by the post-colonial rulers at protecting their profligacy.

In achieving this, Shivji (1989), explains that the post-colonial rulers put in place laws and policies to protect themselves and their illegitimate financial squeeze. Wamba dia Wamba (1991) and Mafeje (1999), see such protection as resulting in governments not only losing legitimacy but shrinking the support base of the rulers to a narrow circle of trusted friends, kinsmen and ethnic associates all of whom had survived on the political patronage of the ruling elite. This situation as argued by Mafeje (*ibid*) effectively elicits large-scale upheavals and struggles for democracy from below. Democracy from thereon assumes a new dimension in Africa with challenges. The popular struggles are articulated by the civil society groups to revolve around three major issues. These as highlighted by Mafeje (1998) are, the quest for multi-party democracy as against one-party arrangement, power devolution and decentralisation from the centre to greater local autonomy and respect for rule of law and human rights by the African governments.

Although, these demands reflect the level of revulsion of the generality of the African peoples against the states governments whose leaders have become progressively oppressive and ruthless dictators (Mafeje, 1998), plunged their economies into crisis and their states into political abyss (Mapuva, *ibid*). If the military is an aberration, why can't the civil societies fill the vacuum by being the vanguard for the state and economic reconstruction? African scholars were unanimous in their conclusion as put forward by Mandaza and Sachikonye (1991), that democracy is any phenomena based on participation of common

citizens in political debates and consultation on democratic decision-making. There is a vital point left unaddressed by Mandaza and Sachikonye, which is how the citizens are to be involved in the decision making process. Whether they are to participate directly or through political parties make their conclusion a little bit unclear. However the conclusion still serves as a contrast to bureaucratic or technocratic decision-making based on the assumption that those that are affected by a given decision have the right to participate in the making of such decision. Bingu Wa Mutharika (1995) points out a likely hitch in this assumption that

...the masses can still be oppressed by the system or excluded from the decision-making process by the same system they have installed and that human right abuses can still take place even under plural democracy’.

The fear expressed by Bingu Wa Mutharika was what Mapuva (2010) opines to have taken African democratic debates to a level resulting in the incorporation of civil society as the most appropriate catalyst and promoter of democratic institutions. But does this solve the problem? In line with Mutharika’s (1995) expression, the multi-party democracy creates some democratic challenges to post-colonial African states due to its inherent contradictions and the class structures in the liberal state. For example, the conventional first-past-the-post method of determining the winner in an election assumes a new dimension with supplementary or run-off elections appearing in the African political lexicon. This is a situation where a winner is regarded to have won an election but not with sufficient votes to be declared the winner. This was the case in Zimbabwe in March 2008 when the opposition won the elections and the same scenario was observed in Nigeria May 2011 when an opposition won a governorship election in Imo state and another opposition candidate won a Senatorial election in Enugu state but their elections were declared inconclusive by the Independent Electoral Commission.

A new political jargon dubbed Coalition or Government of National Unity (GNU) appears in African political dictionary. This is a political arrangement that exposes a weak side of liberal democracy. GNU which is most visible in Zimbabwe, Kenya and Nigeria (federal level only) is an arrangement where both the winners and losers of an election combine to form the post-election government. This arrangement is evident in Zimbabwe with ZANU-PF and Movement for Democratic Change, also in Nigeria in 1999 between PDP, AD and ANPP. This arrangement does not only short-changed the electorates but also forced the winners to share the stage with losers (Mapuva, *ibid*) thereby depriving the electorates the right to determine their ultimate leaders and representatives through the ballot box. The GNU is a ploy to relief the ruling government of vibrant opposition and to turn the state into another form of one-party arrangement.

These amendments to liberal democracy are parts of the responses of the African elites to the failures of liberal democracy in addressing the political peculiarities of the African societies. They are also a reflection of the basic agreements among the elites in spite of their disagreements, on the fundamentals of the existing economic system and vision of a democratic order. Allocation of offices and resources, as evident in their formation of alliances and governments of national unity is more paramount than deepening democracy.

### **2.9.2 The role of civil societies in democratic process**

The overall goal of this section is to examine the significance of the civil society group in the democratisation process in order to determine whether it represents a new dawn or false hope in Africa's democratic actuality and state-building. Much of the section tends to focus on (and question) the influence of civil society, both as it directly influences democratic development, and as it constructs a global interpretation of, and set of responses to worldwide democratic needs. This becomes necessary because of the dwindling fortunes of the African states in spite of the changing nature of the political space with convincing



evidence that an increasingly strong and complex array of non-governmental actors and new non-governmental organisations both at domestic and global levels is emerging and sometimes assumed to be shaping the democratisation process in Africa.

Critique of the state domination of public life, the renewed interest of the economic superpowers in the global democracy and globalization, the persistent agitation by the domestic societies for economic and political changes and the transfer of the determination of political initiatives from the state actors to non-state actors have collectively brought the concept of civil society and its role in democratisation process and governance into prominence in social theory. This development reflected in the democratic wave that blew across sub-Saharan Africa in 1980s where mass organisations effected changes in governments in Benin Republic and Cameroon and of recent in the Arab Spring.

What are actually propelling the popular struggles in Africa are not the civil society groups as being presented by the liberal and neo-liberal scholars but the frustrations of the people by the failures of the liberal states to provide the basic necessities of life several years after independence. Civil society groups only catch on the opportunities provided by the aggregate of angers of the peoples against the state to provide pseudo-professional or professional platforms where such angers could be better articulated.

Civil society became prominent in Western social sciences when the contemporary social scientists first used the term to describe the democratization wave blowing across the globe immediately after the demise of the Soviet Union which in itself signals the end of the Cold War. In fact, some neo-Tocquevillians affirmatively concluded with the cliché: no civil society, no democratization (Perez, 1993; White, 1996; Bermeo and Nord, 2000). Their claim emanates from

the hostile conditions of authoritarian rule with energetic associational life comprising independent, voluntary organizations distinct from the state, economy and family which would trigger democratic development by challenging autocratic leaders and forcing the state to accept liberal reforms (Sean, 2005). The bedrock for this assertion was the mass protests against the long years of repression by the authoritarian rulers in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, East Asia and Sub Sahara Africa. These protests were accompanied by spontaneous bouts of political actions by civic groups who persistently organized mass resistance against authoritarian regimes.

The persistence and the force of the popular forces compelled the power elite to initiate some populist changes and pacts that eventually snowball into full-fledged institutional transition towards electoral democracy (Diamond, 1999).

Some political theorists such as Bunce, Lewis and Koo traced the role of civil society in the collapse of autocratic regimes all over the world and concluded that civil society facilitated and orchestrated democratic development by restraining state coercion and seeking international support for democratic reforms (Bunce, 2003; Koo, 2000; Lewis, 1992). Hence by the middle of 1990s, as revealed by Freedom House, there emerged consensus among the liberal political theorists that a dynamic civil society remained a *sine qua non* of democratization because available evidences indicated that civil-resistance (non-violent opposition in form of protests, strikes and boycotts) played a prominent role in driving out 50 of 67 transition governments from authoritarian rule (Freedom House, 2005). By the turn of twentieth to twenty-first century, the development of civil society has become a significant criterion of the development of democracy. Now let me go back to Africa to explain the pre and post independence nature of civil society groups.

In spite of its pre-eminence in the political discourse in Western social sciences immediately after the Cold War, activities that could be described as civil society in the African political discourse it could also be traced to various social forces in the struggles against authoritarianism and colonialism. It is apposite to posit here that civil society in Africa has long been associated with decolonisation and subsequent independence of the colonial states. They were then characterised by the development of powerful popular movements in most African colonies when large number of organised workers entered the arena of political activity (Mamdani, 1990) in collaboration with other ethnic based social movements.

Immediately after independence many of the civil societies in the post-colonial Africa were co-opted, suppressed or out-rightly outlawed by the post colonial leaders (Kafisr, 1976). The current explosion of the civil society therefore seems novel because of the “protests season” against authoritarian dictatorships in Africa from the late 80s which provided the opportunity for political activism in the ‘third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991). Civil societies now become the most vocal opponent to authoritarian regimes and also the “cutting edge of the effort to build a virile democratic order” (Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 1985; p.26). Some observers believe that the survival and consolidation of the new democracies is predicated on a civil society that is active in delimiting the state dominance (Harberson, et al; 1994; Gymah-Boadi, 1996).

Unfortunately most contributors to the debates of civil society in the African democratisation process are not free from the liberal dispensation. They concentrate more on the sustenance of the present post-colonial states with the active involvement of civil societies without giving sufficient attention to the characters of such states and the civil societies. The liberal dispensation emphasises liberal democracy's condition for the state to regularly produce government through free and fair election, while civil society should be able to enjoy civil and political rights and associational autonomy (Mercer, 2002).

Edwin Madunagu in his "*Dialectics of Structures and Governance*" published in the Guardian of 11 August, 2011 explicitly states the two sides of the liberal dispensation as a near-fully-privatised and commercialised, capitalist economy that progressively deepens and spreads mass poverty; and competition between large political parties that often lay claim to series of democracy. These two sides of the liberal dispensation are inseparable. Because of the Siamese relationship between liberal capitalism and liberal democracy, it becomes extremely necessary for us to be careful when picking any of the sub-elements such as civil society in articulating a programme of radical transformation. Why? Madunagu provides an answer that however "democratic" or "reasonable" any element of this economic and political dispensation may appear, it will still be affected by the liberal value.

Any radical social transformation must therefore be insulated from this effect of liberal value. Contributions of the civil society groups to the democratisation process are unfortunately heavily underpinned by the liberal capitalist ideology. A strong and plural civil society is regarded as a *sin qua non* for the protection against the excesses of state power and also to legitimize the authority of the state when it is based on the rule of law (Diamond, 1994).

Most contributors seem to ignore the fact that the nature and character of civil society will also be shaped by the character of the state. They sometimes confuse the phenomenal growth of nongovernmental organizations in Africa in the 1980s with the desire of the African peoples for democracy. They, in the process, got infected with the liberal virus which blind their view from seeing that it was the shift of attention of the western nations from the state (after it has become glaring that the client-state could no longer effectively protect the interest

of capital as envisaged on the eve of independence), to non- governmental organizations for multi-party democratisation process.

The shift of attention became part of the conditions for financial support by the donor agencies. These two factors especially increased availability of large scale donations and funding, collectively account for the sudden emergence of so many non-governmental organizations in Africa since 1980s. So taking a deeper view of the global recognition of civil society as the institutional vehicle for democratic actuality will reveals the real intention of neo-liberal institutions that mediate through their collective instruments of intervention – IMF, the World Bank and donor agencies (Mercer, 2002) which of course is the consolidation of liberal multi-party democracy. However the assumption of the liberal scholars that civil society aids democratic process because it expands and strengthens political sphere by bringing more actors into the political arena became suspicious in Africa because the mere existence of civil society does not translate to involvement in the democratic process.

Presently the World Bank recognises the role of civil society in articulating the people's aspirations and mounting pressures on government to yield to popular demands (2000: 43). Civil society is seen as playing different roles at different stages of democratic development such as democratic transition and democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1994; Diamond et al, 1995; 1997). In the former, civil society's chief role is to mobilize popular pressure for political change; hence it constitutes a crucial source of change (Diamond, 1994: 5), whether this takes place quickly and dramatically as in the assertion of 'peoples power in the Philippines in 1986 or whether the transition is a lengthy, negotiated process, as in South Africa as in early 1990s (Mercer, 2002).

In consolidating democracy, civil society is considered to have a crucial role to play especially in checking abuses of state power, preventing the return of authoritarians to power, creating room for wider citizen participation and public scrutiny of the state and these enhance state legitimacy. This crucial role perhaps informed Diamond (1994: 7) to emphasize that a vibrant civil society is more essential for consolidating and maintaining democracy than for initiating it. It is on this basis that the World Bank premised its assumption that an active civil society will aid decentralization, encourage wider participation at the grassroots and across all sectors of society especially in an ethnically divided society and reduce the scope for autonomous government actions (2000). Civil society could in this wise be regarded as a force that underpins an effective and streamlined state, ensures legitimacy, accountability, and transparency and effectively strengthens the state's capacity for good governance (Mercer, 2002).

In the light of these arguments it is evidently clear that liberal democracy allows both state and civil society though as separate but essentially complimentary to each other. This therefore implies, as Baker concludes, that civil society can only exist in relationship to the state and not a potentially democratic sphere in its own right through which alternative ideology might be pursued (Baker, 1997). The ideological differentiation between the public civic realm and the private realm (Schumpeter in Oyewole, 1987) blurred the social configuration of the civil society. It is a captive of state ideology. The post-colonial civil society groups in Africa were mostly engaged in the pursuit of democratisation projects (Ikelegbe, 2001) that are mainly liberal multi-party democracy, through persistent struggles against the oppressive, dictatorial, repressive regimes and more importantly against the state violation of individual and collective rights (Makumbe, 1998).

The most important factor underlying the popular struggles for democracy in Africa but which the liberal interlocutors fail to address is the

production and reproduction of the existing conflict laden class system by the post-colonial states and the socio-economic structure that underlies the post-colonial liberal states (Abdelali Doumonu, 1987: 48). Any attempt at analysing these popular struggles from the civil society perspective, without taking into consideration the analysis of the liberal states and their inherent social classes will result in a deformed opinion.

Point must be taken of the fact that in any society, social differentiations do not emerge from 'relations within civil society but from relations with the state' (ibid). Post-colonial African states are victims of 'double historicity' which increases their vulnerability to crisis in any form. Firstly, they still accommodate the histories of their pre-colonial political societies which are living products of their own particularism and secondly, the history of their integration into the free market economy and liberal democracy that guide the transition of the colonial to post-colonial states and exerted the liberal state structures over the pre-colonial political structures.

Civil society cannot be exonerated from having damaging effects on the consolidation of democracy especially where there is severe socio-economic inequalities, corruption, an ineffective legal system, lack of democratic culture, ethnic or regional differences etc civil society would be weak and become a potential problem for the consolidation of democracy (Diamond et al, 1995; 1997). All the assumptions on the positive roles of civil society groups in the democratic struggles will become problematic whenever they are confronted by the ideological underpinnings and sometimes the complex realities of the organisations in the civil society and their relationships with the wider social, economic and cultural contexts. These factors alone make it very difficult for the generalization of the political roles of the civil society as assumed by most of the liberal scholars.

### 2.9.3 Crises of transitions in Africa

African states are still undergoing crisis of development which other continents had gone through. In addition to this the continent is also facing the challenges of political transitions in general and regime transition crises in specific. Regime transition refers to a shift from one set of political procedure to another or from an old pattern of rule to a new one as the current situation in Libya. Indeed, it is the most colourful aspect of political transition because it adds activity and glamour to the whole process; yet it can be the most stressful, turbulent, tensed period. This is because it results in uncertainties among individuals and groups, through the opening up of new opportunities for political access, ascent and competition, as well as for venting grievances, conflicts, hatred and seeking redress of some hitherto perceived injustice, such as marginalization.

Transition crises in Africa are rooted in both the internal and external causes. Internally, transitions in Africa are caused by inter-ethnic conflicts or ethnic grievance against the state. Externally, the interference of some super powers before, during and after the Cold War remains a strong factor. Therefore, transitions crisis in Africa may not be entirely blamed on identity conflicts as many contributors will want the world to believe, but the external forces' "voice of Esau and hand of Jacob" manipulation and collaboration

Transitions in the Africa have thrown up two types of rulers. These are those over-staying and those under-staying their tenure. The over-staying leaders are those that used their privilege of power to endlessly elongate their rules in the state. For instance, Tanzania President, Julius Nyerere, ruled for 24 years (1961-1986); Kenya's President, Jomo Kenyatta, ruled for 15 years (1963-1976); followed by President Arap Moi, who had 24 years (1978-2002). Julius Nyerere of Tanzania also ruled for 24years before getting tired and retired. Mr Mugabe has been ruling Zimbabwe since independence in 1980 (31years). Libya's Ghadafi ruled from 1969 before being swept aside by the NATO backed militants.





He ruled for 42 years. In Uganda, the first 24 years after Independence (1962-1986) witnessed five abrupt changes that involved eight transitions (eight Presidents), implying an average of three years' tenure per President, until when Mr Kaguta Museveni came to power. He is now in his 25th year as president and had just (on 20/02/11) won an additional term of 5 years. In Nigeria, transitions have, until recently, never been peaceful, right from the days of Premier Tafawa Balewa (1960-1966). The list continues to include Algeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Egypt, DRC, Niger, Mali, Somalia, Guinea, Gabon, Cameroun, to mention but a few. There is a need to point out that the idea of overstaying is not peculiar to traditional Africa's rulership. If a ruler remains in the good books of the people, he rules till he or she dies while the ruler that falls out of grace has the option of committing suicide or be force to exile by the people regardless the period he or she has spent on the throne.

Can the transition difficulties in the African continent find solace and be interpreted as undergoing a team-building process? Probably yes, if we mapped the continent into the phases of team-building. The first phase of team-building is the formation/familiarization phase that is characterized by group awareness and relationship-building, including passive conduct, laying down ground rules (Constitutions), and less activity. Africa has passed this stage during the first 25 years after Independence. The second phase is the storming / charge phase, which is dominated by more activity, power play, confrontation, ambiguity, negativity, finding faults and recognition of the need for dominance and attempts to achieve same. This is the phase most countries in Africa are in; hence the crises. The other later phases include forming or constructive phase and performing or freezing phase.

This is where the mission of this thesis becomes relevant as it provides the pathway for the constructive phase through neo-communitarian democracy, neo-communitarian state and speconomy while it diverts the course of the democratisation from the path of freezing phase engineered by multi-party liberal

democracy. Following the neo-communitarian pathway will provide an alternative model of governance that may enable African states to grow into the productive, constructive and performing phases and escape the recurring crisis of transitions.

Reflecting on the setbacks to the transition projects in Africa, some have concluded that democracy could not in the first instance have a good chance of survival in Africa because there are some cultural values that inhibit its emergence and sustenance. They are wrong. They failed to explain whose democracy and which democracy failed to survive in Africa. As discussed earlier that external factors in the process of imposing best practice ideology that makes Africa susceptible to crisis of various kinds, could not be exonerated from the transition crisis in Africa. If we look at the political changes which occurred between 1980s and 1990s in Africa, it will be seen that those changes were essentially donor-driven prompted by the donors collective instrument of intervention – IMF and the World Bank.

The intervention further driven Africa to the periphery of the periphery of the global economic calculations and this did not only stultified the economic development of the African states but also the democratic projects. The overall effects of this were the series of uprising from the people clamouring for regime change, power devolution or decentralisation. The uprising in turn elicited extreme autocratic measures from the rulers whose leadership credentials were not only questioned but threatened. As Samuel Decalo argues “...the majority of Africa, in the absence of global fiscal munificence may...once the international vogue with “democracy” recedes – be cut loose to drift their own way, sliding back to their into political strife, dictatorship and military rule” (1994), Along this line of thought in some occasions for different reasons, some contributors went to the extreme of suggesting that what Africa actually requires is a “Second Colonisation” as it appears that most countries in Africa cannot take charge of their own destiny (Mafeje, 1995).

For the progressive African scholars, the above submission remains a factor of lack of understanding of the African politics and governance on the part of those clamouring for the re-colonisation of Africa. The position is that although democratic transitions remained endangered but there is nothing that makes democracy un-African or that makes Africans ungovernable. Democracy as a concept is universal but it does not endorse the imposition of liberal idea rather it gives room for best-fit approach. There is nothing to suggest that the basic values of democracy are alien to Africa or diametrically opposed to African social values and culture but rather it is the disconnection with those social values by the imposition of liberal democracy that put democracy on fire in Africa.

## **Chapter 3**

# **COLONIALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PRE-COLONIAL STRUCTURES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

## **3.0 Introduction**

This chapter does not set out to romanticise the past, but to reveal the impact of colonialism on the pre colonial structures, how it facilitated the transportation of liberal values into the politics and economy of the sub-Saharan Africa and the subsequent contributions of such values to the current political crisis in the sub-Saharan Africa. Culpability of colonialism in putting the post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa on foreign founding philosophy cannot be ignored in any analysis of the region's political crisis. Following Aseh's contention in 'Ideologies, Governance and the Public Sphere in Cameroon' (2011), the post-colonial sub-Saharan African states have no indigenous philosophical basis of existence evolving from their indigenous perception of reality. As most of the independent African states were delivered during colonialism and the Cold War; their pre-colonial political structures were flooded with ideological mechanisms that could transform them not only to achieve the foreign economic objectives but also to reproduce either liberal or socialist democratic state fashioned after their mentoring European states.

When discussing colonialism, we should not ignore the historical background of the colonisers, which of course was of state-organised racial discrimination. This chapter addresses two major issues. The issue of colonial governance as it relates to the socio-economic transformation of the sub-Saharan Africa with the emergence of neo-patrimonial system in the region. The chapter demonstrates that the issue of colonialism, and the market, political and military agenda of the colonising countries must be considered together if we desire to loom out of the murk of colonial contributions to the post-colonial states' crises. The essence of this consideration is to lay bare the reasons for the European scramble for Africa. The need to understand why

they decided to colonise is vital to this study. Critical examination of the following questions to gain a clearer picture of the impacts of colonialism on sub-Saharan Africa becomes imperative. What types of governments were developed in pre-colonial Africa? What type of relationship exists between economic systems and political practice in Africa? What was the political legacy of the colonial political system for independent African governments? What types of governments were developed in Africa in the first three decades after independence? Once these questions are properly addressed, we will among other outcomes have;

1. A clearer understanding of the diverse nature of the traditional African political systems and practice.
2. An appreciation of the impact of the colonial legacies and the colonial political economy in shaping contemporary African politics.
3. A better understanding of the complexity of political issues confronting contemporary sub-Saharan African states.

The effects of colonialism on Africa's socio-political structures like its progenitor, slave trade and its off springs - neo-colonialism and globalisation, can hardly be discussed without taking into account their economic and political objectives which of course destabilised the pre-colonial structures. Colonialism provided the pathway for liberal democracy as a decolonising strategy which did not only provide state building blueprints but offered the few urbanised and Western trained political elites who, under pressure from or by acquiescing to colonial forces, further undermined the pre-colonial structures with a model of 'modern' behaviour.

The second issue borders on how the pre-colonial structures of the African kingdoms that ruled over some parts of sub-Saharan Africa were able

to cope with the internal problems and demands of their people and why such kingdoms were unable to cope with the external pressures of the time. Almost all political issues in contemporary Africa have deep roots in the colonial and immediate post-colonial experience (impact of the Cold War and Globalization). The capacity and reach of the African states, the absence of democratic structures and practice, the ethnic, religious, and regional rivalry, that plague post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa are reflections of the legacy of the practice and structure of politics and governance in the colonial era.

This chapter also seeks to explain the issue of checks and balances as embedded in the pre-colonial structures for checking the excesses of the rulers or disciplining an erring rulers as well as the traditional perception of leadership and governance in the sub-Saharan African societies. The aim is to show how governance in the pre-colonial kingdoms was mediated by the traditional control systems. The impact of Europe's relations with Africa is presented here under international factors and actors. To permit ease in analysis, they are separated into four different phases. Two of the phases shall be fully examined in this chapter, namely, contact with European traders in the pre-colonial era and the incorporation into the world capitalist economy during the colonial period. The phases of import substitution and unequal trade in the neo-colonial era up to 1980 and the era of systematic marginalisation since 1980 (Jaffe, 1980) are examined at Chapter Four.

### **3.1 Pre-colonial African Political Structures**

Prior to the arrival of the Europeans in Africa, African kingdoms and empires had their forms of governments that were peculiar to their social systems. These peculiarities which enabled the indigenous peoples to cope with their various social relationships, failed to provide sufficient roots for the germination of the liberal style democratic institutions and values. The peculiar social and political traditions of the sub-Saharan Africa are generally

benevolent authoritarian in nature, but not without checks and balances mechanisms embedded to curtail the excesses of any erring ruler.

The horizons of the people were accustomed to local or village level with deeply embedded traditions which maintained a passive and submissive rather than the individualistic liberal state or command-like socialist state. It is therefore not surprising that there was a lack of familiarity with the liberal or socialist political institutions derived from an entirely different background by the mass of the people. Only a few urbanised and Western-trained elites are familiar with these traditions. For example, political parties which constitute a major institution of the liberal style free institution or socialist institution were largely creations of these urban elites with little organisation at the local level, hence they became far too removed from the daily lives of the people. The nature and character of political parties in Africa truly represents what Mair (2005) describes as democracy in the 'absence of the demos'. Regrettably, there are lean literatures from party scholars on the cartel nature of political parties in Africa.

The traditional understanding of the political processes and structures by the sub-Saharan African peoples was propelled by the values and collective responsibilities of the traditional social life derived from their social contract. The pre-colonial societies erroneously described as tribes by the colonialists were actually people of historically structured diverse origins inhabiting a geo-political space through social contracts and amalgamation of differences to develop a common identity for themselves by themselves. As a result they came to share one worldview in their similarity and differences (Aseh, 2008).

These pre-colonial societies had their unique systems of governments with a set of customs and conventions guiding their peaceful co-existence and how they form part of the larger group. Unfortunately, these pre-colonial

systems were erroneously classified into two broad categories as centralised and decentralised political systems. Classification of the traditional societies into these two broad categories only serves as an analytical entry point, beyond this; the typology does not represent true classifications of the pre-colonial political institutions. It lumps the various political systems with differing degrees of accountability together, therefore makes it difficult to distinguish the significant characteristics and similarities of each type of traditional institutions. For us to have a fuller understanding of the characteristics and dynamics of the traditional institutions, we need to align more with the Economic Commission of Africa's (ECA) typology (2007). This typology provides us with an insight into the intricate characteristics that are lost in the simplistic categorisations of centralised and decentralised systems. These categorisations are as follows:

1. Centralised Systems with Absolute Power, Abyssinia (Ethiopia), Rwanda, Swazi
2. Centralised Systems with Limited Checks and Balances, Nupe, Buganda, Zulu, Hausa, Yoruba, Igala
3. Centralised Systems with relatively Well Defined Systems of Checks and Balances, Ashanti, Busoga of Uganda, Lesotho, Tswana of Botswana
4. Decentralised Age-Set Systems, Oromo, Kikuyu, Masai
5. Decentralised Village/Kinship Systems, Ibo village assembly, Eritrean Baito, Tiv of Nigeria, Owan society of Nigeria, and the council system of the Berbers

### **3.2 Centralised political systems**

The centralised systems were large empires with well established systems of governance governed by kings and monarchs with near absolute power. Examples of such societies include ancient empires of Egypt in North Africa, Nubia and Axum in North East Africa, Ghana, Mali and Songhai. These empires had a complex system of government comparable to similar kingdoms and empires that were in existence in Asia and Europe during the same time periods. Kings like Mansa Musa of Mali and Sonni Ali of Songhai



were rulers with near absolute powers with no separation of powers. These kings together with their councillors and advisors performed the executive, legislative, and judicial functions. In view of this fusion of powers and functions, in the hands of a few political elites, political scientists often refer to these societies as centralised states.

However there were variations in the level of centralisation of power in such societies. These variations were primarily determined by the degree of accountability of the rulers to the people. For instance, in places such as Abyssinia, (now Ethiopia) and Rwanda, the rulers enjoyed absolute powers while in some other cases the powers of the rulers were restrained by some measures, including the institution of councils (Beattie, 1967; Osaghae, 1989). The control measures were not uniform as their development and application varied from society to society. In some cases, such as the Buganda in Uganda and the Nupe in Nigeria, the formal institutions of checks and balances and accountability of leaders to the population were rather weak (Beattie, *ibid*). In other cases, such as the Ashanti of Ghana, the Tswana of Botswana, and the Busoga of Uganda, the systems of checks and balances were relatively better defined with constitutional provisions and customary laws authorising a council of elders, religious leaders, and administrative staff of the chiefs to check the power of the leaders and make them accountable (Busia, 1968; Jones, 1983; Coplan, 1997).

If subjected to the litmus test of liberal democracy, these pre-colonial centralised political institutions will be emphatic democratic failures. The mechanisms for accountability – a crucial element of democracy appears to be non-existent due to fusion of executive, legislative and judicial powers, and absence of periodic elections, especially in societies where the rulers enjoyed absolute control. However the weakness of this type of liberal assumption is that there were various informal control mechanisms that also ensure accountability. For example the ability of the people to shift their allegiance away from a despotic chief to other chiefs was, for instance, an important

mechanism that mitigated the autocratic tendencies of chiefs. Where the chief fails to meet with the aspirations of the society, he could be de-stooled (removed) or abandoned by his people. In case of the latter the people would simply 'have rapid dialogue' with their feet and relocate elsewhere. Kikuyu of Kenya refer to this as 'itwika', meaning breaking away. This factor accounted for series of migration in the history of pre-colonial Africa.

The broad categorisation easily ignored that the centralised systems are characterised by a great deal of decentralisation at the bottom. Generally, in Africa's indigenous system of government, the chief was typically chosen or appointed either by the appropriate Council or 'by a queen mother with the full approval of a council of elders' (Ayittey, 1991). At the grassroots level, chiefs often act primarily as facilitators, who preside over a consensual decision-making process by the members or elders of their communities. The chieftaincy system overlaps in many respects with the decentralized consensus-based systems. The administrative structure of the Ashanti of Ghana, for example, allows each lineage, village or subdivision to manage its own affairs, including settling disputes through arbitration by elders (Busia, 1968). In Botswana also, the powers of the chiefs are regulated by the consensual decision-making process in the Kgotla. Without the Council of Elders, the chief is powerless. The chief could not make any law without its approval. Even the powerful Zulu king could not dictate a law without the approval of the Ibandla, or state council. Council positions are hereditary, which means that the chief could not remove the councillors and pack the assembly with his own appointees.

The council is an independent organ of government. The chief and the councillors had to reach unanimity on all important matters. Any adult could participate in the council meetings, called Ndaba by the Zulu and Kgotla by the Tswana. In Senegal, even slaves, djam, sent their representatives to the

king's court. The Angolan king, Alfonso, allowed the Portuguese merchants to send their representative, Don Rodrigo, to his court (Ayittey, *ibid*).

Traditional African political decision making was noted for its culture of protracted debates. If the chief and the elders were deadlocked on an issue, a village meeting would be called and the issue put before the people for debate until a consensus was reached. This aspect of democracy in Africa is well illustrated in David Maillu's "Cultural definition of Democracy" (Maillu, 1997: 255) For Maillu, African societies were socially and politically structured so that "everybody participated according to his ability, ages-status, and wishes... everybody was invited to offer the cooking of his mind" (*ibid*). This type of democracy according to Nwauwa, (2005) transcends the realm of politics; it constitutes an integral part of the peoples' culture, which allows everyone a sense of belonging.

### **3.3 Decentralised political systems**

The other categories of the pre-colonial political systems were the decentralised societies that were often referred to as stateless political societies by many political historians e.g. Potholm (1970), Ohaegbulam (1990), and George Ayittey (1991; 1992). These societies were classified as stateless because they did not have well defined centralised political systems as found in the bigger kingdoms or small city states. Decentralised societies were sometimes mistakenly referred to as small mobile or nomadic bands of hunters and food-gatherers. This impression led to the wrong assumption of such societies being classified as stateless. Though these types of societies were politically decentralised but they did not truly represent decentralised societies. Large parts of sub-Saharan African pre-colonial political systems were highly decentralised with law-making, social control, and allocation of resources carried out by local entities, such as lineage groupings, village communities, and age-sets. The system was largely based on consensual decision-making arrangements with variations from society to society.

As noted by Legesse (2000; 1973), the fundamental principles that guide the consensus based (decentralized authority) systems include curbing the concentration of power in an institution or a person and averting the emergence of a rigid hierarchy. The decentralised system is based on mutual respect for the rights and views of individuals. While individuals can disagree with the opinions of majority, such individuals must however respect the wishes and interests of the community by accepting compromises. Failure to respect this reciprocal gesture from the community by the individuals may attract various forms of sanctions from the community, including social isolation. This control mechanism serves to protect the accommodation of the minority views in order to prevent conflict between minority and majority. Decentralised systems have mechanisms that prevent the existence of social gaps between the governed and the leaders. All eligible members of the community participate in the creation and enforcement of rules and regulations.

Hardly can a winner or a loser emerge from conflict resolution because the consensual arrangement requires narrowing of differences through negotiations rather than arbitration. A typical example of such societies in the sub-Saharan Africa is the Igbo speaking people of the contemporary Eastern Nigeria. The Igbo live in politically autonomous villages with each village being politically separate and not connected to the neighbouring villages. Each village is governed by a headman assisted by council of elders who responsibilities include selection of the headman.

In addition to the village authority, there are religious organisations; lineage groups and secret societies that provide rules and regulations to govern peoples' relationships and lives. These organisations serve as mechanisms for checks and balances by ensuring that no institution or group gains too much power or abuse the privileges of power. In most of the decentralised communities, the elders wield tremendous social, economic and political

powers which compel some historians to classify the system of government as 'democracy of age'. It is important to note that the decentralised African traditional political institutions allow the leaders to be mandated by their people before any commitment to a major decision unless they have been initially granted with such powers, or the issue borders on the defence of the state of which the king or the paramount chief must act on behalf of the people with little or no consultation (Iyela et al, 2002: 269-78).

Either chiefly or non-chiefly communities, most of the workings of the council of chiefs in the pre-colonial societies, were done on committee basis which are sometimes institutionalised or ad-hoc. This salient feature is akin to the contemporary representative government that allows principle of decision-making by all, after the fullest debate and discussion of different points of views and decisions are made largely in a consensual manner.

In the economic sphere, the means of production were owned by the African people, not by their chiefs or tribal governments. Even land was not owned by the chief. It belonged to the ancestors, and the chief merely acted as custodian. Whatever was grown on the land was private property, belonging to the farmers, not to the chief. Peasants were free to choose whatever occupation they wished. They did not queue in front of the chief's hut for permission to engage in trade. Pre-colonial Africa was characterised by considerable freedom of movement of people and goods. The continent was crisscrossed by a dense web of trade routes (for example, the Trans-Saharan) along which the natives moved freely and engaged in trade.

The African peoples have an ingrained cultural propensity to trade. Throughout their history, they travelled great distances to purchase goods from "strangers" at cheaper prices to sell at higher prices to make a profit. Much of

that activity was free from state controls and regulations. State intervention in trade, commerce, and markets by the traditional rulers was an exception and not the rule. There was no native African law that forbade Africans to enter into businesses of their wish. The market was the nerve centre of traditional African societies, and market activity was dominated by women.

From the above analysis, it is apparent that the pre-colonial African political-economic structures had a clear vision of governance and accountability that could have provided their post-independence states with an indigenous philosophical foundation to govern their public spheres and support their own reality if not for colonialism and its imported foreign values (Casely-Haford, 1922, Montagne, 1931; Aplort, 1954; Alport, 1964; Beattie, 1967; Busia, 1968; Jones, 1983; Osaghae, 1989; Coplan, 1997; Legesse, 2000; Aseh, 2008).

### **3.4 Transformation of the pre-colonial political structures by colonialism**

The defining contact between sub-Saharan Africa and the Europe originated with the era of non-slave trade that started about 15<sup>th</sup> century. As at 17<sup>th</sup> century, Africa was also showing some knowledge of technological breakthroughs as exemplified in the inventions of writing on the papyrus in ancient Egypt and mathematics at the University of Timbuktu (Diop, 1976). As at this time, and like every other advancing continent, Africa was also gradually climbing the ladder of technological progress.

The Industrial revolution which started in Europe about 1750 changed the trade relationship between the sub-Saharan Africa and Europe (Robertson, 1986). The tide of events changed around 1445 when the Portuguese arrived in Senegal and the first set of slaves were viewed on sale in Lisbon, Portugal (Onimode, 2000: 71). This was in response to the demand for manual labour in the shipyards and textile mills in Europe, cotton, tobacco and sugar cane

plantations in North and South America, and European owned plantations in Mauritius, Seychelles and the Middle East. The slave trade cost the pre-colonial Africa a huge loss of population and decimation of manpower in addition to physical destruction of property, rise of Islamic slavery, decline of African trade in the world, proletarianisation of African workers for European industries (Lovejoy, 1989; Amin. 1972). All these led to the technological stagnation and severe dislocation of and distortions of Africa's pre-colonial economy (Amin, *ibid*; Lovejoy, *ibid*; Onimode, 2000: 72).

The horrendous losses from slavery according to Onimode (*ibid*) bled African countries so terribly that at the next European onslaught in the form of colonial invasion, Africa was already prostrate. The continent had almost lost the will to fight after some 425 years of slave raids of 'over twenty-one million' able bodied men and women (Lovejoy, 1989: 387), physical destruction, depopulation, technological de-mobilisation and the most unimaginable destitution in human history. Due to decimation of manpower, African communities averaged a loss of up to 120,000 people per year (Lovejoy, *ibid*: 388). The sex ratio of captured male slaves to female slaves was always higher reducing chances of population reproduction. The population loss weighed heavily on the local communities due to their inability to continue with farming or trade as successfully as before reducing them to poverty, which to this day has not been alleviated. Following Lovejoy's argument of assessing Trans Atlantic slave trade to be adverse, capturing slaves mainly from one region in West Africa upset the internal balance and dynamics of local regions and changed the African political scenario forever.

As explained by Lovejoy (1989) and Amin (1972), the devastating effects of the slave trade on particular ethnicity such as the Gbe and Congo, destabilised the local kingdoms because the whole communities were wiped out. Amin submits that wiping out of the local communities eliminated the traditional boundaries of African kingdoms and created room for the creation

of a power vacuum which allowed the European colonial powers to divide and rule the weak and fragmented African states and societies.

One of the consequences of this, according to Amin, was that the boundaries carved by European rulers did not match the traditional boundaries and dynamics of African society. This caused a great deal of gerrymandering and balkanisation as evident in the amalgamation of North and South Protectorates of the post-colonial Nigeria. The boundary adjustments provided the Europeans with the opportunity to implement various political, economic, and social policies that enabled them to maintain or extend their authority and control over different territories in Africa with little or no challenge from within. It was this thoroughly dispossessed, paralysed and traumatised Africa that was forcibly incorporated into the capitalist economy from about 1850 on the basis of unequal trade (Rodney, 1980).

The process of colonisation involved exploitation of the resources of the colonies to strengthen and enrich the economies of colonising nations (Alemazung, 2010). Colonialism commenced with the defense of the economic interests of the colonisers which in the first instance was the propelling factor for colonisation. For the sake of emphasis colonisation was adopted as a strategy to purposely exploit the natural resources of the colonised. This process as reported by Meredith, left bad legacies on the exploited colonies (Meredith, 2005: 95-97). Alemazung (*ibid*) avers that:

...besides the economic imbalance (Western profit at the detriment of the weak: Africa) resulting from colonialism, the social, cultural and political lives of the people and societies in Africa were greatly interrupted and transformed by the policies applied by the colonial masters during the colonial period. An instrument of this transformation on the social and cultural life style of the African people was the policy of Assimilation (Alemazung, 2010: 63).



The policy of assimilation, championed by France meant complete eradication of African cultural values and total transformation of Africans in French colonies into black French men and women (Eko, 2003). To Alemazung, (*ibid*) 'assimilation implies the social process applied by the colonial masters to absorb the cultural entities existing in their colonies'. The policy was meant to transform the colonised peoples to think and behave like the people in the coloniser's homeland.

The collective view of the French, the Belgians and the Portuguese colonisers was that an African who had received their kind of education and an understanding of their culture and life style stood the chance of getting assimilated into their culture (Rodney, 1972: 247). Education therefore became a major tool for recasting the indigenous Africans into a superior Western cultured person. Anyone who had attained this level became an *assimilée* for the French, or *assimilado* or *civilisado* for the Portuguese (Rodney, 1972: 247; Shillington, 1989: 357). The French colonial policies were to eliminate the African culture in their colonies. For example only French censored and approved newspapers were allowed in the colonies for the "frenchification" of Africans (Eko, 2003).

Mahmood Mamdani (1996) offers a further insight into the impact of colonisation on the pre-colonial structures. While wrestling with the submissions of many writers who only understood the colonial rule as either direct (French) or indirect (British) and with apartheid as the third and exceptional variant, Mamdani argues that the benign terminology only masks the fact that these were actually variants of the same despotism.

Direct rule was the main mode of control attempted over the "natives" in the 18th and early 19th centuries by the French. It was a rule based on the presumption of a single legal order formulated in terms of the colonial 'modern' law (Mamdani, 1996). This implies total rejection of the existing pre-colonial 'native' institutions by the French. Though direct rule claims equality

of civil rights as its primary foundation but a closer examination reveals equality of civil rights does not translate into equality of political rights. Political rights were grounded in the ownership of property which separated 'civilised' from the 'uncivilised' or better still, separation of the 'citizens' from the 'natives' - a problem that was generally referred to by Mamdani as the "native question" (*ibid*). The social prerequisite of direct rule involves a drastic comprehensive sway of market institutions i.e. appropriation of land, destruction of communal autonomy, and total annihilation of local populations. Given that background, direct rule meant the reintegration and domination of "natives" in the institutional context of semi-servile and semi-capitalist agrarian relations (*ibid*).

While direct rule denied rights to subjects on racial grounds, indirect rule incorporated them into a "customary" mode of rule, with state-appointed Native Authorities defining customs. This was a mode of domination over a "free" peasantry. Here, land remains a communal - "customary" - possession. The market was restricted to products of labour, only marginally incorporating land or labour. Peasant communities were reproduced within the context of spatial and institutional autonomy.

The tribal leadership was either reconstituted as the hierarchy of the local state, or freshly imposed where none had existed as in the "stateless societies". The political inequality went alongside civil inequality. Both were grounded in a legal dualism. Alongside the received law was implemented a customary law that regulated non-market relations in land and in personal (family) and community affairs. Indirect rule became the form of colonial rule elaborated by the British in equatorial Africa early in the 20th century by Frederick Lugard in Nigeria, Uganda, Cameroon, and Tanganyika. It was later emulated by the French after World War I, the Belgians in the 1930s, and the Portuguese in the 1950s.

By tapping authoritarian possibilities in culture and by giving culture an authoritarian bent, indirect rule (decentralised despotism) set the pace for the post-independent Africa's political development. Colonial rule wiped out the dependency of the traditional chief on his councillors, which characterised pre-colonial rule and replaced such dependency on the colonial superiors and later foreign powers (Nugent, 2004: 107-108). Alongside with this dependency was autocracy in its extreme.

Explaining the post-colonial situation, Ndirangu Mwaura (2005; p.6) submits that nothing in Africa changed after the colonisers left apart from the replacement of 'colonial governors with colonial ambassadors'. This statement contains some truth judging from the ways and manners the post-independence leaders personalised state powers and assumed 'fathers of the nation' status. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo was King Leopold's personal property (Shillington, 1989: 312; Meredith, 2005: 95). In the like manner after the DRC gained independence in 1960, and the murder of Partrice Lumumba, President Mobutu Sese Seko ruled the state as if it were his personal property (Young 1986). Mobutu's cult of personality rose to such heights that for weeks at a time, Zaire's official press was forbidden to mention the name of any other Zairian than the president himself (Howard, 1997).

The selfish and exploitative character of the master-colony relationship that reigned during the colonial time, continued in different forms after formal colonial rule had ceased. All the administrative and economic structures installed during colonialism were left intact to preserve the flow of wealth from the continent to the West (Mwaura, *ibid*).

This situation led Mwaura to assume that all the national leaders who took over after the colonisers left "were traitors, with ... false patriotism", who upheld a political network that exploited the African people to the benefit of the ruling elites and their western patrons (Mwaura, *ibid*). Nothing could justify this assumption than the disappearance of all the post-colonial sub-Saharan Western type representative governments within the first decades of

their independence and replacement of such with either military rule or some form of oligarchic domination. What Mwaura ignores in his sweeping generalisation are the international forces of the global economy that shape the characters of the political economies of these African states and the Cold War pressures from both the East and West axis of the War.

William Easterly, while stretching Mwaura's assumption opines rather inaccurately that "colonial administration re-enforced autocracy in Africa" (2006: 273) and opened the flood gate for bad governance and extremely selfish and cruel governors in the likes of Mobutu in Zaire, Idi Amin in Uganda and Bedel Bokassa in Central African Republic (Meredith, 2005). On the contrary, it was the removal of the traditional control measures through the replacement of the traditional political institutions with the liberal or socialist values that actually facilitated the emergence of autocracy in Africa. Colonialism only remodelled patrimonialism in Africa to produce hybridised patrimonial leaders with personalised powers within the context of liberal or socialist values. This does not remove the fact that there were autocratic leaders in the pre-colonial Africa but such leaders were also adequately taken care of by the traditional measures.

### **3.5 Colonial Legacies and the post-colonial states**

Following the rupture of the dynamics and patterns of the African pre-colonial political and economic institutions by colonialism, a different set of instruments of political and economic control was constructed by the colonisers, sometimes, 'violently' (Lonsdale, 1986: 145). These instruments were also violently employed to provide the much needed stability for the colonial administrations. Stability was provided with the use of coercive force to facilitate economic exploitation, social deprivation, political exclusion and cultural oppression, the combination of which left negative legacies on the political structures and processes of both the transiting state and its post-colonial form.

Colonialism could therefore be argued to be a continuation of slavery that further destroyed Africa's chances of progress, and channelled the political and economic direction of the continent towards dependency. The period left legacies that negatively impacted on the pre-colonial Africa's political structures and the general polity which are still affecting contemporary Africa's politics and states till now. One of such legacies was the authoritarian colonial ruling style of oppression which the post independent African leaders applied to governance without any option of choice or consent of the people. This style of ruling has been erroneously referred to by many such as Richards (1996), Keen (2005) etc; as patrimonial style of governance.

The colonisers ruled without the consent of the people: they deposed and executed traditional rulers, when the latter failed to implement the instructions of colonial administrators or failed to serve the needs of the colonial government (Shillington, 1989: 354-357; Hochschild, 1998). The authoritarian ruling structure, which was based on control by a few, through oppression and the use of force, laid a basis for despotic and unaccountable leadership in post-colonial Africa.

My classification of "patrimonialism" follows the distinction made by Roth in 1968 taking into consideration the ways and manners, the colonial authorities manipulated the patrimonial traditional values to pave way for the emergence of personal rulership that superintended the economic and political agenda of colonialism in the sub-Saharan Africa. Roth (1968) distinguished between "traditionalist patrimonialism" and "personal rulership" - a de-traditionalised form of patrimonialism that could be described as 'personalised patrimonialism' which Theobald (1982: 549) later characterised as "modern patrimonialism". Roth used the term neo-patrimonialism as a synonym for "personal rulership" or "particularistic personal rulership" (Roth, 1978: 18).

For Roth (1968: 196), “personal rulership” operates “on the basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler’s unique personal qualifications” or any traditional qualifications or inputs, but are “inextricably linked to material incentives, rewards” and closeness to the colonial powers. This type of leadership became an ineradicable dominant component of the bureaucracies in post-colonial Africa.

This is where Richards’ (1996) and his patrimonial adherents such as Bøås (2001); Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, (1999); Reno (2000); Clapham (1996); Keen (2005); and Médard (1996) generalisations on the roots of Sierra Leone civil war as based on the nature and collapse of patrimonial system of governance without a distinction between traditional patrimonialism and colonial patrimonialism becomes weak.

Though one may not agree less with their observations that the *dramatis personae* in the Sierra Leone war did so largely based on a combination of desire for political power (Abdullahi, 1998) and desire for wealth stemming from natural resources such as diamonds and grievances over the failure of the patrimonialist state (Richards, 1996; Bøås, 2001; Keen, 2005). However they failed to realise that colonial patrimonialism indeed altered the traditional patrimonial governance to produce the failed patrimonial states despite possessing the formal structures of modern bureaucracies, operating on patrimonial principles but characterised by personalised political authority, weak checks on the private appropriation of public resources, and pervasive clienteles (Callaghy 1987; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Médard 1982).

There is a huge gap between traditional patrimonialism of the pre-colonial period and the personal rulership that characterised the colonial period in the sub-Saharan Africa. The traditional patrimonial system, in contrast to Max Weber's assumptions, rests on the traditional mandate, and obedience is owed to the office and the person who occupies the position of authority by tradition.' It is not as impersonal or that "the servants are completely and personally dependent upon the lord" (Weber, 1968: 4), as Weber assumes

Neo-patrimonial leadership as practiced in many African countries is an extension of the kind of autocratic rule that the colonial master's had initiated (Alemazung, 2010). There is a need for caution not to affiliate post-colonial hybridised patrimonialism with the African traditional patrimonialism. Eisenstadt (1973) was the first to call our attention to this fact using the concept neo-patrimonialism to describe the new form of patrimonial leaders. It will be wrong to perceive the traditional patrimonialism as a continuum of the neo-patrimonialism with some modifications, or to equate the traditional patrimonial rule with authoritarian rule. The usage of the term has considerably changed over the years. In the 1970s "patrimonialism" was employed in terms of social capital as a way of explaining political cohesion in African societies (Theobald 1982: 555) but in its contemporary form - "neo-patrimonialism" serves as a threat to the peaceful political development of African states and the development of societies in general.

Another major difficulty African states have to deal with as part of the colonial legacies, which has repeatedly been mentioned by many African and non-African Africanists (Amoo, 1997; Rodney, 1972; Dumont, 1966; Nugent, 2004; Meredith, 2005), is the problem of ethnic divisions and the state conflicts resulting from ethnic rivalry (Blanton et al. 2001). Ethnic division is one of the leading legacies of colonialism assessing the colonial impact on the continent. African authors as well as non-African scholars concerned with African politics blame the ethnic divisions and rivalries amongst the nations in Africa

among other considerations, on the arbitrary boundaries and cultural differences created and imposed upon these peoples by the colonial masters (Mahoso, 2010). Sufficient considerations were hardly given to the religious dichotomies among the ethnic groups.

Colonial administrators failed to take peculiarities of the traditional societies into consideration before using legal and political rights to introduce a generalised notion of liberty that chastised most of the African cultural values. They only promoted liberal values at the expense of the peculiar communal values. To achieve this, the traditional leadership institution was subjected to many changes in its procedures and rules of appointment, in its roles and functions and in its jurisdictions and powers. Their strengths that used to derive from their communities became firmly rooted in the colonial policies. Traditional leaders were vested with extensive powers, especially powers of coercion. They became local-level lawmakers, tax collectors, police commissioners and judges. Customary law became a mechanism for upholding the colonial order: perhaps even to the extent that the colonial order became the “*customary*”.

Colonial authorities frequently intervened in matters that were traditional and customary. They regularly appointed chiefs where there were none and deposed those traditional leaders that opposed them. For example a feature of colonial rule that was to have far-reaching consequences for the post-colonial Africa was what Nicholas Dirks (2004: 1) describes as a ‘cultural project of control’, one that ‘objectified’ the colonised, and reconstructed and transformed their cultural forms through the development of a colonial system of knowledge that outlived decolonisation. It was an approach that reified social, cultural, and linguistic differences, causing the colonial state to be described as an ‘ethnographic state (Dirks 2004). As reported by Geschiere, (1993) local chieftaincies were re-organised by both the British and the French and graded according to importance (first to third degree chiefs) In some cases,



these changes reinforced the role of previously accepted traditional authorities, while in others chieftaincies were simply created in order to organise labour and collect taxes.

Though, contrary to Mamdani's conclusion, some traditional leaders like Jaja of Opobo in the contemporary Nigeria resisted the colonial authorities. However Mamdani's compelling argument of decentralised despotism had some significant consequences for the institution of traditional leadership during the colonial and in the post-colonial periods which contributed to the pervasiveness of liberalism over the traditional values. The consequences were identified by Keulder (1997a) as follows:

- I. Many traditional leaders effectively transformed themselves from custodians of their people into custodians of the colonial order. This not only eroded their support base, but also overemphasised their coercive functions.
- II. Frequent interventions by the colonial authorities in matters traditional and customary, coupled by the strategy to employ customary law as a mechanism to enforce the colonial order, transformed the customary into a site of contention and struggle.
- III. Decentralised despotism meant that traditional leaders were incorporated into state structures. They were paid by the state and performed State functions; hence, they became civil servants in most respects.
- IV. That many traditional leaders acted for the colonial interests pitted them directly against other social forces that resisted that same order. This paved the way for an inter-elite strife in the postcolonial order.
- V. That the "tribe" was used as the political base for the colonial order, and that the subsequent development of tribalism became the dominant socio-political ideology, ensured that ethnicity would remain an omnipresent ingredient of the postcolonial political order.

A new set of traditions or what Hobsbawm and Ranger (1994) classify as “*invented traditions*” replaced the old traditions to pave way for the entrenchment of liberalism. According to Hobsbawm and Ranger (1994: 1), an invented tradition constitutes –

... set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historical past.

Traditions are likely to be invented when and if –

... rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which “old” traditions have been designed, producing new ones to which they are not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise eliminated (Hobsbawm and Ranger, *ibid*: 4-5)

The essence of the invention was to give “rapid and recognisable symbolic form to developing types of authority and submission” and “to allow Europeans and certain Africans to combine for “*modernising*” ends” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1994: 237). This colonial thought of invention arose from the condemnation of the pre-colonial authorities as autocratic, corrupted and undemocratic systems that need to be remedied by creation of constitutional state and exercise of reason.

The notion of remedifying the traditional values as expressed by Turner (eds ;) became a major factor in the political crisis (2006: 81-3). The traditional social systems and culture of the colonised territories that initially hampered smooth realisation of sufficient volumes of agricultural produce and mineral resources were overcome through series of invented strategies. These strategies, according to Olateju, (2006: 55) include gerrymandering the subjugated territories to become viable periphery of the centre, introduction of private property in land where such was not in existence, expropriation of land for the use of white settlers and for plantation agriculture, coercion of labour

through wage trap, stimulation of use of money and commodity exchange by imposing money for payments for taxes and land rents, and where the annexed territory had already developed industry, production and exports by the indigenous manufacturers were curtailed.

On top of this, declares Magdoff, (1982: 12), came socio-political innovations designed to support and perpetuate such radical economic transformations. Local elite strata that would benefit from co-operation with the foreign rulers were activated. Suitable administrative techniques were introduced. New or amended legal codes were installed to facilitate the operation of money, business and private property economy. Above all, police and armed forces were developed to assure social stability and sustain environments conducive to the new social order. The imposition of foreign language and permeation of the culture and ideology of dominating power tied all these together leading to a social psychology based on the presumed superiority of the colonisers and inferiority of the colonised.

The values of living together in kin-centred social processes with patterned extended families system which prevailed in the pre-colonial period, the values and collective responsibilities of traditional social life were all replaced by the liberal I-feelings values (Mazrui, 1986: 7). Liberal doctrines were promoted through systematic attack on traditional leadership using unfettered freedom of individuals to pursue their own preferences (Held, 1987) as a gateway to promote market economy based on respect for private property (Sørensen, 1998).

Invariably the traditional social and moral continuity and consensus of the communal values became weakened. The colonisers created and stressed the differences amongst the various ethnic groups within the same nation even where the differences did not exist, only to facilitate colonial domination and exploitation of a divided people. As argued by Shillington (1989: 356),

colonial administrations emphasised the differences between the different ethnic groups which invariably intensifies rivalries between those groups and preventing them from forming a united opposition against the colonial administration. Keulder, (1997b), sharing Shillington's (*ibid*) position, came to the same conclusion that the "colonial authorities invented 'tribalism'" which invariably reflected in the formation of the political parties along ethnic lines and consequently giving way to ethnic division and rivalries among the power contenders.

Nnoli (2008) succinctly summarised Shillington's and Keulder's observations on how colonialism invented tribalism. He argues that the indigenous ethnic groups that were once relating to each other in a non-hostile manner, that maintained friendly relationships through trade and social contacts suddenly hardened indigeneity into a theory of exclusion which invariably became a strong negative force in Africa's political developments.

Alemazung (2010) expands Nnoli's submission that when scrutinising problems and causes of ethnic conflicts in Africa, the conventional explanation is that the polarisation of ethnic communities and the outbreak of ethnic violence are a legacy of colonialism which ignored cultural differences during the creation of artificial state borders (Taras and Ganguly 2002: 3; Clapham, 1985: 57-58). As if the "creation" and insistence of the differences between the African peoples (separatist feelings) by the colonisers who compounded these different ethnic groups in one nation together was not enough, successive colonial constitutions in Nigeria for example, "entrenched political power on regional lines" (Ogunbadejo, 1979: 86).

One of the worst examples of colonially-constructed ethnic rivalry was the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda characterised by the ruthless massacre of the Tutsi ethnic group and moderate Hutu in the country by the extremist Hutu ethnic group (Scherrer 2001) The death toll which was estimated at 800,000 by various accounts could be traced to the divide and rule tactics of the Belgian

colonising authority. The minority Tutsi group was accorded the aristocratic status with leadership positions by the colonisers over the majority Hutu groups. Identity cards were issued to the Tutsi illustrating their superiority over the Hutus in the same country. The result was hatred and the nurturing of feelings of revenge by the Hutus, which culminated first in the 1959 “revolution” and then in the 1994 genocide with massacre of over 800,000 people within a period of four months. Ethnic conflicts are not only rampant in contemporary Africa but are also very severe compared to those of other regions in the world. This could be traced to the high diverse nature of the continent. That Africa has several thousands of ethnic groups is a well documented fact. Each ethnic group has its own distinct language, traditions, arts and crafts, history, way of life and religion.

In “Ethnic Conflicts in Africa” (Nnoli, ed; 2000), Nnoli was able to convince us that there is a consensus over the genesis of ethnic antagonism on the continent and the effects of colonialism on inter-ethnic relations. In line with this argument, the fact that the ethnic division is ubiquitous precursor to political instability strongly distorts the democratization processes on the continent. The impact of ethnic division and rivalry has unfortunately not been properly addressed by the state-constructors of these nations, a factor which cannot be underestimated in assessing the failure of liberal state-systems in Africa.

This failure, though may not be intended, but in the process of facilitating colonial administration, colonialism got entrapped in the destruction of the foundation for potential autochthonous state building process in Africa (Nnoli, ed; 2000). This unintended goal developed from the adoption of divide and rule strategy by the colonial administration which set ethnic groups against each other. In regions where there were no chiefs, Europeans invented chiefs and imposed them on the people, and always stressed tribal differences to create differences amongst the people. The post-colonial leaders did not do much to address this volatile issue of ethnic divisions rather they

continued with the manipulation of ethnic groups in order to perpetuate their own grips on the power leverage.

Another legacy of colonialism is the legal dualism in the application and practice of rule of law which now serves as major indicators for measuring democratic performance of governments by donor countries and international institutions. The practice of legal dualism could be traced to the contention between positive and negative conceptions of liberalism. While those operating with positive conception favourably disposed to strong interventionist foreign policies, those with negative conception incline towards non-intervention and toleration. This lack of uniformity in what kinds of institutions are required to deliver the liberal values in a decentralised multicultural society is bound to reflect in the activities of the colonial administrations in the colonies. As reported by Alemazung (2010), the International Commission of Jurists in 1959 in New Delhi drew up the “Declaration of Delhi” which stated that rule of law “should be employed to safeguard and advance the civil and political rights of the individual”. The Economist magazine added that the Declaration was also to create “conditions under which individual’s legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realised” (The Economist, 13/03/2008).

A salient point to be noted here is that the rule of law from this point of view is inextricably linked to liberty and democracy. On the contrary, the torch bearer of the rule of law, A V Dicey, only stressed property rights and efficiency in the administration of justice. His explanation clearly emphasises the role of laws in the society, which is provision of stability for the society. The rights of individuals are to be determined by the legal rules and not the arbitrary behaviour of authorities. There can be no punishment unless a court decides there has been a breach of law. Everyone, regardless of his/her position in society, is subject to the law.

The critical feature to the Rule of Law here is that, while individual liberties depend on it, its success depends on the role of trial by jury and the

impartiality of judges. Juxtaposing the colonial administrations with the above reveals otherwise. The colonial administrations implemented none of the above requirements of rule of law in their colonies. There was a legal dualism that placed the operation of modern law side by side with the customary law. Mamdani avers that "Modern law" governed relations between "non-natives," and "non-native" relations with any "natives." Customary law, on the other hand, governed relations between "natives" (Mamadani, 1996). The customary laws were supposed to be the unwritten customs of a distinct tribal or ethnic group with its source being the traditional tribal authority. Under the colonial authorities, the supposedly customary laws were purely invented administrative laws administered by the colonial native chiefs – not a 'holdover from the pre-colonial era' (Mamdani, *ibid*). These native chiefs were selected not in line with tradition but according to loyalty to the European administrator. This paved the way for the emergence of what Mamdani (1996: 37) as "decentralised despotism"

The principle of separation of powers that safeguards against absolute power by an individual in the dispensation of justice was clearly absent. The chief did not only have the powers to make rules or bye-laws, he also executed the laws and administered justice in his domain. The authority of the chief thus fused in a single person all organs of power and governance - judicial, legislative, executive, and administrative. There was neither property nor citizens' rights for the people and in many cases the people were not citizens but subjects (Shillington, 1989: 354).

In addition to the legal dualism in the application of the rule of law, colonial laws were by their nature, very harsh and in many cases entitled colonial "administrators to imprison any African subject indefinitely and without charge or trial" (Shillington, *ibid*: 355). Chiefs had to enforce forced labour, ensure compulsory crop cultivation, recruit labour, collect taxes and fulfil other state requirements (Easterly, 2006: 275). These chiefs were made to rule as if they were the law and the people were under their jurisdiction. The only higher authority was the colonial authority from they received instructions

and command. The chiefs were prosecutors as well as judges, who employed the jailer to hold their victims in custody as it pleased them. The chiefs had more powers than any oriental despot (Easterly, *ibid*).

The conclusion is that, the method of rulership of the colonial administration with its decentralised despotism which abolished the traditional checks and balances, prepared Africa safely for autocracy (Easterly, *ibid*). The traditional political system that once combined with other traditional institutions to serve as a bastion of justice and equity in the body politics was replaced by the liberal political culture to lay the foundation for a dependent economy which dissolved the principle of pre-colonial self-reliance and created a disarticulated structure of production geared towards the need of the colonial home countries (Bush, 2007).

Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992, eds.) highlighted the extractive nature of colonialism as the driving force of the replacement of the traditional institutions with liberal values. The duo underlined that the colonial administration was predisposed to extracting resources from the colony and therefore geared the political administration to this direction. This praetorian character formed part of the colonial legacy inherited by the succeeding political elites, who subsequently see nothing wrong with the centre extracting from the periphery that comprises the masses. As in the colonial period, the succeeding African political elites also perceive people as mere disposable objects of governance that could be discarded when seen to be no longer useful. This created a system where leaders demonstrated a culture of impunity and lack of accountability and insincerity towards the people. The people also feel alienated by the political elites.

From the above analysis, it is glaring that colonialism through the creation of personalised form of leadership successfully constituted what Oloruntimehin (2007) refers to as a 'veritable revolution' in the lives of the colonised territories that were subjected to individualistic liberal values. Colonisation as a process involves profound transformation of the world-view



and values of the colonised, which Obasanjo and Mabogunje describe as the underlying force of colonialism. Its direct or indirect style involves a deliberate cultivation and reorientation of the colonised towards the goals and value systems of the dominant people.

The identity and self-worth of the dominated suffer degradation. Such institutions of the dominated that find acceptance with alien rulers, largely on account of their utility in facilitating alien control such as patrimonial leadership, are subjected to modifications that transform them into new entities, with new significance and relevance for their own peoples. This, according to Mamdani (1996), explains why some the traditional leadership institutions that were adopted for indirect rule by the colonial rulers in Africa, were able to acquire new orientations and became distanced, sometimes even alienated, from the peoples, their collective values and aspirations. The legitimacy of such institutions started deriving more from the colonial state authority and, later neo-patrimonial leaders in the post-colonial states rather than from the societies that originally created them.

Generally, through colonialism, Africa experienced the phenomenon of alienation between individuals and state – a social reality that Adedeji has variously described as ‘cohabitation without marriage’ (Adedeji, 1999). The effect of this separation is fully discussed under ‘speconomy’ as an alternative economic model in Chapter Seven. However suffice it to mention here that the gap between the pre-colonial indigenous cultures and forms of colonial and post-colonial governments created by policies of liberalisation, civilisation and modernisation, has its destructive consequences on the governance, peoples and their search for political stability and developments. The impact of this gap on the pre-colonial African political, social and economic structures and development are negative.

Godowoli summarises the effects of these policies of liberalisation, civilisation and modernisation on Africa’s traditional political space. He describes African politics as now characterised by competition and conflicts

between individuals and interest groups with each struggling to ensure that its interest prevails (2002: 2). The impacts of the separation of individuals from the state were more pronounced in the economy as evident in the economic crisis that plagued the continent. By the end of 1970s, many African states, regardless of the nature of their states or their economic policies or ideological orientation, found themselves in deep economic crisis with high debts, low or negative growth rates, hyper inflationary trends and massive transfer of surpluses through various ways, to the developed nations.

Political liberalism on the other hand, that calls for equal treatment of all persons without regard to race, ethnicity, religion or language. It therefore failed to address problems of real divisions by birth among the peoples of various ethnic groups. Glazier and Moynihan (1975, eds ;) robustly pointed out this deficiency of the liberal assumption with an emphasis that:

...when those bearing a distinctive identity make claims for their group or demand protections for their religion or culture that in some way violate the equality of persons or individual rights that liberalism entails (Glazier and Moynihan, eds, 1975)

Democratic majority principle of liberalism ignores the fact that in Africa, equal treatment for individuals will result in an unequal condition for a given group. The greatest flaw is the non-consideration of population advantage which makes it hard for minority groups to escape from the periphery of both the regional and national political equations. The majority groups always dominate the leadership positions. Examples of this domination are Tswana domination in Botswana, Kikuyu domination in Kenya, Hindus domination in Mauritius, Creole domination in Cape Verde, Southern domination in Cote D'Ivoire, Northern domination in Cameroon, Oromo and Tigrean domination in Ethiopia, Southern Sudan marginalisation in Sudan, and Jadu marginalisation in Libya.

Colonial methods of administration and domination in which patterns

of penetration and concentration of socio- economic activities and the dual practices of Direct and Indirect Rule etc; discriminations between and among the ethnic groups in the various ethnic communities, as in the case of Hutu and Tutsi, consequently constituted the basis for identity politics. Colonialism has created more national disunity in Africa than any other single factor in Africa. Governments have tended to be more tribal than national in structure, with inter-tribal oppression becoming common practice. On balance, this in effect created more societal tension and turmoil.

Tribal politics as captured by Post and Vickers (1973) prevails as the virtue of the new African states' politics while regionalism replaces nationalism as ethnic bloc and groups were sensitised to the advantage of being at the centre of power by the power elites who tactically developed emotional ethnic symbols and perfecting the art of ethnicity in order to cling to political power (Ako-Nai, 2004). Cases in point were Buthelezi's Nkatha Freedom Party Movement in South Africa, UNITA in Angola, KANU and KADU in Kenya, NPC, AG and NCNC in Nigeria. One-party state adherents whose legitimacy was supported by pre-colonial African political values also emerged on the African political turf led by Nkrumah (1957) Nyerere, Sekou Toure and Tom Mboya (1963) (Mafeje, 1995: 3). This perhaps compels Macpherson (1977) to conclude that Africa belongs to 'non-liberal democracy' and 'developmental authoritarianism'.

### **3.6. Existence of State in post-colonial Africa**

Discussing whether state exists in Africa in the first instance requires understanding of what a state is. The state has throughout the nineteenth and the early part of twentieth century's received considerable attention among scholars most of whom were of law, philosophy and history backgrounds. These backgrounds explain why the state was initially conceptualised as a formal legal-structure based on constitutions, government structures, legislatures as epitomised by European democracies in the period leading to the World War II. Immediately after the World War II, a new wave of interpretation and representation of the

state especially among American scholars took attention away from the formal legal structures to the “informal” politics within “society,” because the juridical approaches were thought to be too legalistic and too narrowly focused on state structures (Opello and Rossow, 2004: 4). The new focus adopts a pluralistic approach to investigate the ways in which various social interests such as political parties, pressure groups, civil societies, and professional groups influence the production of public policies.

The pluralists with their new interpretation firstly assumed the society to be separate from and prior to the state (*ibid*) and also that state could only do what the various interests groups within the mirage of societies wanted it or pressured it to do. In essence state is being driven by the interest groups, who are sometimes competing, for the prioritisation of their interests with the scarce resources available to the state. In short, unlike the formal legal-structural school, societies explain the politics in the state, following the pluralist approach.

This pluralist view championed by the political scientists in the United States perceives society as an integral part of the state. In order to project the Western model of state and society, United States political scientists sought a “general” theory to explain how societies could function well, if their economies, politics, and social structures were integrated and balanced. The view dominated the study and interpretation of the state up to the 1970s when some significant developments cast doubts on the society-interest theory of the pluralist school. Before delving into these developments, it is germane to briefly explain factors that aided the dominance of the pluralist school. These factors include the successful management of the economic prosperity and advances in the welfare of the people by the state in the capitalist countries. More importantly the Western Europe states and the Japanese state had successfully transformed the war-ravaged economies into prosperous, dynamic capitalist power houses (Opello and Rossow, 2004: 7). In this wise the state did not attract any serious analytical attention from political scientists.

Part of the development that brought the pluralist theory under interrogation and challenge was the emergence of some mainstream political scientists who developed 'policy analyses' as a new subfield of political science. They cited the US insistence on carrying on the Vietnam War against the disapproval by the American society as a valid example of the weak point of the pluralist theory. Though they identified a major weakness in the state-society theory but they still accepted the pluralist model of the state but with a concentration on the activities of government. Without any explicit concept of the state, policy analysis theorists applied game theory from mathematics, social psychology and cybernetic engineering to develop a focus on theories of organisational behaviour and decision-making. Sharing the same goal of promoting order and efficiency with their pluralist counterparts, the policy analysts opine that this goal could be achieved without the messy indeterminacy and contingency of politics.

This development prompted the need to re-envision state without politics. The Marxian theorists were the first set of social scientists with renewed interest in the state (Jessop, 1982; Clyde, 1993). They sought to explain why neither the buoyant capitalist nor the welfare states could sustain their economic prosperity nor advance the welfare for the common good of the people. This failure, they traced to the dwindling revenue of the state occasioned by the capitalist economy arising from the additional burden of the Cold War Military budgets on the one hand and the erosion of the state legitimacy by social inequality created by the capitalist economy on the other (O'Connor, 1973; Herbermas, 1973; Offe, 1975). The Cold War budgets were seen as necessary to ensure a hitch free passage for capital and sources of raw materials in the production-outsourcing quests of the MNCs.

These schools of thought on the state did not go unchallenged. The statist theorists presented a challenge with a focus on how the state had functioned historically either as an organisation of domination or as promoter of reforms that might make good on the promises of the welfare state (Tilly, ed.; 1975). The

major argument of the statist theorists was the way in which the state has been subordinated to society by the preceding schools (Skocpol, 1985). The statist view state as an independent agent of action-taking or decision-making autonomous entity that is institutionally different from the society. The statist theorists successfully integrated historical sociology with political science in the study of particular states.

These are the divergent views in the analysis of the state that Hyden categorises into those who opine that the essence of the state is to constitute itself into an instrument of power and control; and those who believe that state should be a tool for solving societal problems (Hyden, 1999: 8). Hyden argues that while the first group sees the state as an instrument of oppression and exploitation, the second group views it as a mechanism for reconciling the divergent views in the society and providing a forum for finding solutions to the pertinent problems facing the societal members.

All the above explanations of state can be broadly discussed as empirical and juridical views of the state. The empirical view focuses mainly on the external environment of the state, while the juridical view concentrates on the internal environment of the state. Most of the empirical definitions draw their strengths from the Weber's definition of the state as a corporate group that has compulsory jurisdiction, exercises continuous organisation, and claims a monopoly of force over a territory and its population, including all actions taking place in the area of its jurisdiction (Weber, 1964: 156; Jackson and Rosberg, 1983: 1).

The underpinning assumption of the Weberian definition is the sociological definition developed by Niccolo Machiavelli, who emphasised the use of force, and force alone, as the foundational element of the state. In Weber and Machiavelli's definition, the basic test of the existence of the state is whether or not its national government can lay claim to a monopoly of force in the territory under its jurisdiction (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 1). If the state is to exist, the

dominated must obey the authority claimed by the power that is (Fritz and Rocha, 2007: 11). Saskia and Stefaan simplify the state centric view of Machiavelli and Weberian school with an argument that the strength of the state has to do with the recognition and acceptance of its authority (Saskia and Stefaan, 2002: 575). In essence if an external or internal organisation such secessionists or rebels can effectively challenge a national government and control part of the territory and population for itself, such rebellion or secession will acquire the essential characteristic of statehood. Weber further establishes that statelessness arises once there are rival groups within the same territory claiming statehood and none of them could establish permanent control over the contested territory (Weber, 1964: 156).

By this state-centric view, most of the post-colonial African states can be considered as being states for being able to claim a monopoly of the coercive instruments throughout their territorial jurisdictions, even though they need to rely on the foreign forces to accomplish this. However, cases of statelessness in this regard are well established in Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra-Leone and Burundi.

The juridical view as stated earlier, expresses state as a legal institution, recognised by international law, with the following attributes: a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective and independent government, or the right —to enter into relations with others (Brownlie, 1979: 73-76). This view emerged after the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of the State. Statehood does not require diplomatic recognition by other states, but rather a recognition that it exists. Once the existence of a territory has been recognised by the United Nations as sovereign and autonomous without necessarily meeting claim to monopoly of the coercive instruments as explained by Machiavelli and Weber and Mann (Fritz and Rocha, 2007: 12), such territory stands as a state. Using Brownlie's definition to characterise states in the sub-Saharan Africa reveals that these empirical conditions are highly variable in spite of their meeting the juridical conditions (Jackson and Rosberg, 1983).

Brownlie's definition of the state requires a stable community sharing common norms and values which of course there are nationality groups in the sub-Saharan Africa sharing common cultural values but no single state can be identified as resting solidly on an integrated culturally homogenous nationality groups. Sub-Saharan Africa is not a homogenous entity. The region is well documented as divided into many distinctive ethnic nationalities whose desires for self determination have being at the centre of bitter ethnic conflicts as explained in the thesis. Political tensions arising from these ethnic conflicts that have crept into the distribution patterns of state resources among the ethnic groups and the developmental patterns of the state in an unequal and unbalanced manner have seriously affected national political stability of the sub-Saharan African states and weakened the capacity of their governments to control their territories.

One vital issue Brownlie brings to attention is the insufficiency in using monopoly of force by the state within their juridical territory to describe statehood. A state should be able to combine both the empirical and the juridical properties before it could answer the state appellation. Jackson was able to point at this basic condition by asserting that statelessness can still manifest itself in a situation where the state is unable to have effective control of all of the important public activities within its jurisdiction; in some, the government is perilously uncertain, so that important laws and regulations cannot be enforced with confidence and are not always complied with (Jackson, 1993: 1).

Adopting Jackson's definition means every post-colonial sub-Saharan African state lacks existence due to the absence of what Michael Mann (1986; 1993) calls infrastructure power to penetrate their societies with state bureaucracies and state-sponsored programmes (Mann, 1986) or to possess the ability to enforce policy throughout their territories (Fritz and Rocha, 2007: 11). A few indicators will suffice to illustrate the absence of states in Africa after independence and that what are commonly referred to as states are 'hand-me-down' political organisations with some public authority which lacked the



capacity to intervene in the economic development as envisaged in the Lagos Plan of Action.

The trajectories of dependency of the African states on their colonial or Cold War mentors, assume different interpretations in different discourses. Some contributors such as Ahluwalia opine that the post colonial states are new institutions of their colonial forms that only continue the strategies of administration and adaptation of the new institutions to modernisation principles of development and progress (Ahluwalia, 2001: 67-71). Bayart (1993: 265) had earlier highlighted the extraneous strategy of the colonial and Cold War mentors of the post-colonial state which he sees as a vital window of looking at what is negatively described as tribalism or instability in Africa.

Instability is not just a case of adaptation but a reflection of the local appropriation of alien institutions. Following this trend of argument, Wallerstein, (2002: 164) stresses that whichever form dependency takes, it is glaring that two-thirds of the world's people do not have liberal states simply because the structure of the capitalist world economy makes it impossible for such a state to emerge. The idea of unified nation-state constitutes a "post-colonial misery" (Charterjee, 1993: 11) for some of the post-colonial leaders who found it extremely difficult to reconcile this idea with their ethnically and religious diverse societies. To accomplish this means to place the modern states on shallow foundations that relapse into high level of violence that sets persistent pattern of crisis for the post-colonial governments.

Building of modern states in the sub-Saharan African is truly on a shallow foundation. They all manifest increasingly deficiency in facing the challenges of the burgeoning complexity of the contemporary social world. These challenges have not only affected the traditional forms of government but the structure of individual identity as well (Gergen, 1991; Turkle, 1984). As Alvin Toffler declares, 'today's businesses simply lack the requisite variety to make it in

the 21st century' (Toffler, 1990: 190), same is valid for states in sub-Saharan Africa. The 'crisis of governance' that has plagued the region since independence cannot be isolated from the deficiencies of these states which are practically weak to serve either as instruments of coercion or arena for solving divergent interests due to loss of control. Political crisis in Zimbabwe, Cote D'Ivoire, Benin Republic, Togo, Sierra Leone, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria etc. could not be managed by the state in spite of its monopoly over instruments of coercion. By the late 1980s, limitations of African states – reflected in weak policy formulation, ineffective public administration, and corruption – featured prominently in official diagnoses from both sides of the structural adjustment debate (UNECA 1989; World Bank 1989). These failures further strengthen the argument that state, either in the sense of mechanism for resolving divergent views, or as instrument of control and power is yet to exist in post-colonial sub-Saharan Africa. This forms part of the conclusion that earned sub-Saharan African states the failed states label by most donor agencies and some political analysts.

African societies like every other ethnic societies start with imagination and common linguistic features including language and cultural practices to underlie their creation. Members use these features to identify themselves with specific nations. Anderson (1983) sees linguistic features especially language as a key factor in the creation of national identity which he claims to be 'one of the inspirations to national consciousness' (Anderson, 1983: 45). Every African society recognises these linguistic connections and uses such to refer to themselves as nations or groups. Each of the society has its own history of origin and independent rulers (Laitin, 1986: 110) which was adopted in the formation of their various pre-colonial city-kingdoms.

This form of cultural and social empowerment has been linked to nationalism by scholars such as Hobsbawm and Anderson, who argue that both communities and nations are a product of imaginations. In "*Imagined Communities*", Anderson argues that the development of nations is "distinguished, not by their falsity or genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined"

(Anderson 1993: 6). David Graeber expands this line of thought with argument that the development of nations has travelled along the road of anarchist musings. To him, nationalism is a form of revolution which he defines as:

...a matter of people resisting some form of power identified as oppressive, identifying some key aspects of that power as the source of what is fundamentally objectionable about it, and then trying to get rid of one's oppressor in such a way as to eliminate that sort of power completely from daily life. (Graeber 2004: 33)

This revolutionary struggle as identified by Graeber is reinforced by the thesis's search for how a democratic state could be achieved and stabilised in sub-Saharan Africa. The state, however, cannot be viewed in isolation and a clear-cut distinction has to be drawn between three main concepts: state, nation and nation-state. As stated earlier Weber defines the '*state*' as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (Weber et al., 1979: 78). Guibernau refers to nation as 'a human group conscious of forming a community, sharing a common culture, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, having a common past and a common project for the future and claiming the right to rule itself' (Guibernau, 1996: 47).

Guibernau attaches five characteristics to any group before such could be regarded as a nation. These are psychological (consciousness of forming a group), cultural, territorial, political, and historical. Going by Opello and Rosow's argument (2004), people who share these characteristics are referred to as having a common national identity. Opello explains further that it is the sharing of a common national identity, expressed in terms of culture, language, religion, ways of life, common memories, shared past experiences and territory that makes people feel they belong to the same community and have a certain degree of solidarity towards their fellow-nationals (Opello and Rosow, 2004). Most of the pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa societies shared these five characteristics and they were gradually nourishing modern state institutions of government in their

Kingdoms and empires before they were truncated by the colonial policies and administrative styles to produce what Reno (2000) refers to as shadow state or a hand-me-down' political organisation.

A shadow state according to Reno (2000) is a parallel governance system that operates outside formal state institutions and is founded on 'the ruler's ability to manipulate access to resources...to enhance his own power' (Clapham, 1996: 250). In the shadow state, the leader restricts the provision of public patronages and services to "obedient" citizens as a way of cultivating sustained allegiance from the people. He does this by limiting the distribution of such goods to himself and a few loyal followers (Zack-Williams, 1999). This was exactly how Siaka Stevens ruled Sierra Leone (Lord, 2000) and Kwame Nkrumah ruled Ghana, Julius Nyerere ruled Tanzania, Sekou Toure ruled Guinea (Mafeje, 1995: 31) and lately Olusegun Obasanjo in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.

A major consequence of the transfer of legitimacy is that most post-colonial African states inherited colonial forms of government that are, most of the time at variance with the pre-colonial social and existential realities of their traditional societies. Unfortunately these forms of government being products of alien cultures, their values and their world-views, are sometimes not understood by the same post-colonial leaders who conduct public affairs as state actors. The meanings and importance of public institutions as embodiments and expressions of the history and collective experiences of the societies which built them are often lost upon the new leaders as they rely on mechanically running state institutions without an understanding their origins.

The desire of anti-colonial idealists, such as Frantz Fanon, to avoid imitating Europe was belied by the post-colonial reality (Fanon, 1967: 252). Since colonialism provided the template for the shadow state building and governance, African territories were guided to independent nations but dependent economies. The anti-colonialist therefore had little choice than to

operate within the framework of the foreign state-building dynamic provided by the withdrawing colonial authorities (Cooper, 2002: 67). This dynamic did not only suppress the pan-African dreams of the indigenous anti-colonial groups it also ensured the prevalence of the liberal values in the post-colonial shadow states. The effect of the suppression was the unprecedented challenge from the aspirations of indigenous people. Their aspirations threatened the new state model due to the failure of the withdrawing colonial authorities to acknowledge the values of pre-colonial patrimonialism (Clapham, 1985: 57-58) in either the democratisation process or in state building.

In short, the post-colonial shadow states did not differ much from their progenitors. They were fashioned as instruments of control and power designed by the colonial authorities for the realisation of colonial objectives. They were built to serve the same purpose for dependent economy. In this process, the new structures that were entrenched further ruptured the pre-colonial dynamics and patterns in the process of strengthening the political control and economic interests of the colonisers (Lonsdale, 1986: 145).

Though there were challenges from the traditional leaders but such leaders as Jaja of Opobo, in Nigeria, were banished while the compliant rulers were rewarded (Nugent, 2004; Elkins, 2005; Meinertshagen, 1957; Ellis, 1981; Lapping, 1989; Berman, 1996). The ruthlessness with which recalcitrant traditional leaders were dealt with provided the colonial administrations with stability and consistency required for economic exploitation, social deprivation, political exclusion, and cultural oppression. This draws violence into the domain of legacies that the colonial administration left for the ex-colonial territories in Africa. This legacy later became a tool in the anti-colonial struggles to right the wrongs created by colonialism.

### 3.7 Ethnic violence and rivalries in post-colonial states

After independence, African leaders applied the inherited instruments of coercion to unleash terror and violence on their people (*ibid*). Ethnic divisions and the intra-state conflicts became rife and prevalent challenge for the post-colonial African states (Amoo, 1997; Rodney, 1972; Dumont, 1996; Meredith, 2005; Blanton et al, 2001). Differences among the ethnic groups were also stressed especially religious dichotomies in order to facilitate access to power and hegemonic domination. The legacy of tribalism which according to Shillington (1989: 354) was originally invented by the colonial authorities, was fully exploited by the post-colonial leaders to perpetuate themselves in power.

Perpetuation of all these separatist sentiments had serious implications for the structures of post-colonial states, which already stood on weak foundations. The strategy made it almost impossible for the leaders to unite and mobilise the array of ethnic groups towards nation-building. Generally, the post-colonial African states were not autochthonous, guided structures, political arrangements, and functional governance procedures for the rational and appropriate distribution of state resources and power. These are largely responsible for quick resort to violence among ethnic groups when competing for power and resources (Harris and Reilly eds., 1998: 9).

One of the worst examples of violence was the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Scherrer, 2001) which according to BBC report titled "*Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened*" (2008) saw the slaughter of more than 800,000 Rwandans, including moderate Hutus, within a period of four months.

Ethnic conflicts are not only rampant in contemporary Africa, but they are also more severe compared to those in other regions of the world. To some

observers, post-independence tribal politics was inherent in the systems that created the post-colonial states (Post and Vickers, 1973). Others contend further that the systems paved the way for nationalism to become regionalism (Ako-Nai, 2004). Each ethnic group was sensitized to the advantage of being at the centre of power, with leaders developing ethnic symbols and highlighting their ethnicity to gain and hold political power. Rather than reducing negative facets of social life, post-colonial African politics fostered them, thus exacerbating the problems of citizenship and nationality.

### **3.8 Stunted Autochthonous State in Africa**

The foundations for autochthonous state was stunted by the colonial practices and legacies. Ethnic divisions were not only applied for administrative purposes but also used to prevent unified actions of all ethnic groups against the colonial administrations. This practice turned out to breed animosity among the ethnic groups which destroyed the foundation for any genuine state-building project (Nnoli, 2000). There is demonstrable evidence of sophistication in some African pre-colonial political institutions, including defined separation of powers. These institutions were supported by the values of traditional social life, which nurtured a system of government suitable for African societies. Of note, some pre-colonial institutions had some features of modern government similar to British parliamentary government. These included legislative councils, dialogue, and principles of representation. In other words, the parliamentary principles of decision making, debate, and discussion of different perspectives and preferences, expressed by accredited representatives, were features of traditional African politics and not peculiar to liberal democracy.

If pre-colonial African kingdoms and empires had features similar to parliamentary government, what was responsible for the failure of post-colonial African states to embrace modern institutions of liberal constitutional government, immediately after the de-colonisation? Some who have addressed this issue contend that post-colonial African leaders lacked requisite knowledge for operating government on a national scale (Tordoff, 2002). This argument, on its

face value may look plausible unless one considers that most post-colonial African leaders had been involved in the governance of their various states through imposed constitutional arrangements before the physical disengagement of the colonial administrations. For example regional governments headed by Nigerians, and with Nigerians in legislatures, were established in 1954, six years before independence. Prior to that, Nigerians had been involved in the legislative functions of the colonial state as far back as 1922, during the Clifford Constitution. The period 1946 to 1951 brought an expansion of Nigerians involved in the colonial administration and in political party activities. Limited deliberative principles were put to use during these constitutional periods.

After gaining independence, the new African shadow states assumed primary roles in economic development, although the degree of state intervention varied from weak, as in Botswana, Cameroon, and Mauritius, to strong, as witnessed in Algeria, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Zambia. A major factor that further compounded the failure of post-colonial shadow states was the ideological posturing of leaders that was in itself, a product of the Cold War orientation. Colonialism was exploitative, but its rectification in the post-colonial context was transformed into an ideological aversion to the economic philosophy of the colonisers.

Capitalism based on the views that since the colonialists were exploitative, capitalism must be as well (Ayttey, 1994). Such reasoning characterised the actions and pronouncements of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Modibo Keita of Mali, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe went the opposite direction to capitalism which was socialism. According to them, free markets, free trade, private enterprise, and the parliamentary system of democracy were all Western capitalist institutions that should be rejected by Africa. They ignored the fact that there were some features of parliamentary system in most of the African traditional political structures. For example, Nkrumah warned Africans against believing that 'western



democracy and parliamentary system are the only valid ways of governing; that they constitute the only worthwhile model for the training of indigenous elite by the colonial power' (Nkrumah, 1980).

As a reaction to colonial economic structures, Nkrumah and some other African leaders chose to establish highly centralised and interventionist socialist systems to spur development, which was a reflection of their own personal ideological leaning in the Cold War. Capitalism or socialism was rejected or accepted by the post-colonial leaders mainly because of their relationship to Cold War mentors without any consideration of the effects of such acceptance to governance.

The failure of the post-colonial states to successfully operate modern institutions of government brought into focus the bankruptcy of the universal application of the grand theories to governance globally. The impracticability of this universal application is what Booth (2011), addresses by suggesting that the proper approach to governance is the adoption of suitable system which he labels as 'best fit', rather than the best-practice conditions stipulated by the grand theories. Insistence on any best-practice template by their proponents such as the IMF, World Bank requires an examination of their vested interests in such state (Booth, 2011).

The indigenous grains in the state-building were abandoned by the colonial authorities and why did the neo-colonial institutions insist on every nation to accept liberal democracy and free-market as the 'end of history and terminus for all ideologies' (Fukuyama, 1989). The prominent culprit for Africa's political crisis was the unwillingness or inability of colonial authorities to build on the 'grains' of pre-colonial society when laying the foundation of post-colonial states.

The 'notion of individualism' that elevated best-practice over best-fit contributed to recurring political crises in post-colonial Africa (Turner, 2006: 81-83). This notion, imported from Europe, replaced the communitarian values of the pre-colonial period derived from living together in kin-centred social structures, with members of extended families, engendered a sense of collective responsibility (Mazrui, 1986: 7). Traditional political systems that once combined with other traditional institutions to foster justice and equity in the society were replaced by neo-patrimonial systems to produce dependent economies with disarticulated structure of production (*ibid*).

The post-colonial political leaderships promoted liberal, individualistic values at the expense of communal values. The traditional institutions that had played prominent roles in the religious, political, and economic sectors were superseded by the amalgamation of various ethnic societies into a single political entity and the introduction of multi-party competition. In the process, new, specialised institutions emerged to replace the indigenous institutions and systems and create new social relationships (Held, 1987). The same doctrines were also used to entrench private property (Sørensen, 1998).

Post-colonial African state building process witnessed attempts by the post-independence leaders to evolve a nation-state by accommodating the various ethnic nationalities. Members of these nationalities were subjected to the rules of the nation-state by means of creating a common culture, symbols, values, reviving traditions and myths of origin, and sometimes inventing them (Opello and Rosow, 2004). Attempts were made to evoke a sense of belonging among the citizens by demanding for loyalty and identification with the national aspirations and symbols of identity. These efforts were encouraged by the successful consolidation of all the pre-colonial nationalities behind the single banner of struggles for democracy

which the leaders wrongly assumed to be an acceptance of nation-state and the preparedness of the different nations or ethnic groups to accept a single culture and lingua franca under a state's protection. The internal struggle between Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) is a classical example of misconception of African independent leaders about the aspirations of each ethnic group that queued behind the banner of struggles for independence

In the process of building the nation-state the post-independence leaders assumed the role of father figure with massive control of state institutions and laws, the national media and the national education system. They variously:

... sought to nominate and promote a single official language, sometimes a single religion, and disseminated a specific version of the nation-state's history based on remembering, ignoring or forgetting certain key events, and recovering and inventing national symbols, ceremonies, rituals, heroes, sacred places and traditions (Opello and Rosow, 2004: 7).

These strategies were employed to create and sustain a homogenous national identity among the citizens however numerous examples proved that none of the imagined nation-states in sub-Sahara Africa have successfully homogenise their populations. Differences have prevailed in spite of the nation-state's historical strategies to instil a common identity among the otherwise diverse citizenry.

The attempts at creating new states by African founder presidents based on the assumption that there was a positive relationship between economic development and greater social and political integration initially compounded the stage for conflicts in the African societies due to "conflict between the traditional authorities and the modernizing politicians" (Drake, 1965: 150-158). The modernising politicians ignored the fact that relations between traditional and modern political power develop from very different starting points that are mostly

parallel to each other. Skinner explains:

With the exception of Botswana and Swaziland the emerging African leaders opted for the political cultures of their metropolises: the Westminster model, and the Belgian and French presidential and premier systems. These men ignored that the governmental processes they cherished had evolved in economically, industrially, politically, and socially complex state systems (Skinner, 1989: 18-19).

Post-colonial African leaders ignored what Pearl Robinson refers to as the "cultures of politics" that had developed during the colonial period, and used by the colonial authorities, as stated by Gramsci, to maintain "hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" (Gramsci, 1971: 243). During independence, most of the African nationalists easily abandoned their anti-colonial clichés and anti-racist philosophies such "African Personality" by their systematic rejection of any compromise with African traditional leaders for fear of derailing the drive for independence (Chazan; Mortimer; Ravenhill; Rothchild, eds; 1992: 7). For example, Kwame Nkrumah had a bitter conflict with the Asantehene and other traditional leaders in Ghana who objected to being excluded from government. In Ouagadougou, a frustrated traditional emperor, the Mogho Naba of the Mossi people, attempted to use his traditional army to dissolve the Territorial Assembly. Sir Edward Mutesa II of the Baganda quarrelled with Sir Andrew Cohen, Britain's last colonial governor, about the future government of Uganda and was exiled to England where he died in poverty. These are incontrovertible evidences that were legion (Wilson, 1994).

In their desire to integrate the states in the face of plethora "ethnic collectivities" (Skinner, 1989; p.19), with their usual mono-economies, some of the new African leaders such as Julius Nyerere espoused "African Socialism" where the state controlled the economy. Insisting upon the need for "national integration," they in the process introduced into the African political lexicon through imposition a single party system which they erroneously claimed to be close to the African "palaver." As later explained by Decalo, (1989) there was

often some justification for these actions, since competitively engaged in the Cold War, the protagonists did attempt to profit from African ethnic competition (*ibid*).

The “Africa’s Tragedy” failed to succumb to any ideological permutation ranging from Marxism-Leninism, African and non-African socialism, capitalism or mixed capitalism espouse at various times by African leaders. African leaders never gave a thought of compromising their ideological orientation with the advice offered to Nkrumah by Sir Arthur Lewis, “that the political-economy of the new African states should use agriculture to build their economies and should employ ethnic-based coalitions for government” (Lewis 1967: 64). The outcome of this monumental failure was the “African Tragedy” expressed by Leys (2004) where confusion and crises enveloped both the African economies and governments.

Those who are quite familiar with African multi-ethnic societies and the influence of traditional institutions on African politics and economies especially the anthropologists were never taken by surprise like their western political theory counterparts, over the socio-political crises that characterise the post-colonial Africa. For example Peter Lloyd, a specialist in Yoruba kingdom, observed that while

...the chiefs have not been in the van of the national movement, at least in recent decades ... the picture so often painted of a straight fight between elderly illiterate chiefs, living in the past, and modern Western-educated politicians is not in accord with the facts (Lloyd, 1970, pp.382-412)

Lloyd and his fellow anthropologists saw the danger in the practice of the modern African political leaders who tried in vain to turn the allegiance of the people from “their ethnic groups to the state, and from their traditional rulers to the parliamentary leaders” (Skinner, 1989) — “especially when members of the

new ruling class, by training and ways of thought, and in styles of life, were divorced from the masses" (Lloyd, 1970).

It was on this basis that Lloyd took a queue behind Sir Arthur Lewis to offer an advice that politicians need to recognise the loyalty of the people to their traditional leaders, and to involve the latter in the governance of the country. Moreover, the modern politicians should avoid the danger of using traditional leaders only for symbolic purposes, thereby running the risk of "destroying the prestige of the rulers just as did too close an association with the colonial administration in past decades" (Lloyd, *ibid*).

Norman Miller added his voice against the danger in relegating the traditional institution in state building project. On the need to harmonize the role of Tanzanian traditional rulers in development and governance so as to avoid ethnic conflict, Miller declares:

Viewed from the higher echelons of government in the new nations, the rural leader is an insignificant individual who goes about managing his local affairs and carrying out--with varying degrees of success--the policies and hopes of the government. Viewed from below, from the inner recesses of the village, the leader is a man of authority; a man who has used wealth, heredity, or personal magnetism to gain a position of influence. (Miller, 1970: 185-198)

He argues that the rural leaders were the key to development plans in the rural areas, and warned that any "lack of initiative ... would entrench the status quo and doom the modernization plans before they begin" (Miller, 1970: 185-198).

Skinner also observes the negligence of the modern state officials in the then Upper Volta – now Burkina Faso, in neglecting the traditional institutions and devoted much attention to the integration of their new states into the global economy. Skinner presents his observations right from the decolonisation period that many traditional leaders in the Upper Volta

...feared for their positions, when faced with disinterest from the capital, in 1968, they simply pitched in and helped their subjects. The politicians in Ouagadougou were too busy quarrelling to deal with rural problems, with the result that the military replaced them (Skinner, 1970: 199-201).

Bond observes the same phenomenon in the Northern Rhodesia – now Zambia during the transition from the colonial rule to independence. In a vivid account he explains that:

...disagreement about development pitted the royal houses and the "new men." When rural villagers wanted economic development, but were reluctant to pay for it, this put pressure on all those chiefdoms leaders whose power ... [was] based primarily on popular support (Bond, 1976: 160).

Bond sees the chief and the royal clan as an alternative source of leadership that can always fill the vacuum created by the party-leadership in terms of attention to the needs of the local people. Bond's observation became manifested in Zambia when in the early seventies a one-party structure was firmly put in place with all the local politicians moving to the centre for party patronages thereby leaving the rural people in the limbo.

Joining the debate for the recognition of traditional elements institutions, Owusu stresses the need to recognise and satisfy the aspirations of the different ethnic groups and their leaders as a panacea to solving the problem of governance in the contemporary Africa. This need, according to him is based on

his observation of different African societies and their types of governance based on compromises between the groups and individuals (1991: 369 - 396). Skinner's observations of political change in Upper Volta, now Burkina Faso, reveals that the failure of the modern politicians to compromise with the traditional leaders in the interest of all the groups as suggested by Owusu, contributed to the political crisis (Skinner, 1974) in Burkina Faso. This failure was evident in the manner of reaction of the populace to change of regimes starting with the regime of the first president, Maurice Yameogo in January 1966 through subsequent military regimes and terminated in the assassination of Thomas Sankara in October 15 1987 (Otayek, 1985). In an eloquently written obituary of Sankara, Skinner laments that

...wishing to break too quickly with the 'old order'... Sankara did not understand that the 'disinherited masses,' was still caught up in the yoke of the ancestral hierarchy. The 'working class' who until recently only listened to the emperor of the Mossi, ... did not know that they needed to be liberated (Skinner, 1989: 434-455).

Learning from this pitfall Blaise Compaore – Sankara's successor-though introduced multi-party democracy but quickly sought the support of traditional rulers (referring to them as representative of different national cultures). In order to retain the support of the traditional institutions, Compaore offered to create a third parliamentary chamber to give representation to a large number of groups (Skinner, 1989: 434-455). This in Compaore's argument will address the problem of economic inequality emerging from the notion of inherent individual differences and unbridled political and economic competition associated with western notion of democracy and development.

Stemming the tide of challenge from the quest of the people for the resurgence of the traditional institutions in governance, President Yoweri



Museveni of Uganda among other measures, on July 31 1993, installed the son of Mutebi II in person of Ronald Muwenda Mutebi II as the new Kabaka of the kingdom of Buganda to signal the “rebirth of Buganda Kingdom” (Pierre Englebert, 2002; pp.345–368). He also gave full support to a parliamentary bill restoring monarchies to governance and also opening of Lukiiko – Buganda’s parliament. This according to him will preserve local languages and culture which are under serious assault from external forces and also address issues of national unity, mobilisation, and the welfare of society. Many Ugandans who bought into the cultural rebirth project of Museveni opined that revival of the traditional institutions carries the potential for getting greater participation because of a more natural sense of self-belonging. Ugandans are reportedly seeing the European type of state as alien and the old set-up of kingdoms and chieftainships as more organic (Skinner, 1989; Pierre Englebert, 2002: 345 – 368; Obasanjo, 1989).

For the sake of emphasis, democracy according to Hindess is “a medium and form of political struggle...” (Hindess, 1983:11); and a special form of self-government where people as a whole exercise power and have equal political standing in the state (Hindess, 1989). The principles of self-government and equal political standing were conspicuously missing in post-independence sub-Saharan African states. Whereas these principles of equal political standing are vital in the modern state building process due to the impact of culture-mix.

Culture-mix remains a dynamic part of human history that can hardly be halted. This mixture is however not sufficient to erode the unique features of each culture which provides their members with group identity. Each culture retains its unique traits and features distinctively from any hybridised form. This retention helps the societies and groups with their culture to remain localised within ‘territorised’ spatial boundaries sharing their unique values and norms and see themselves differently from ‘others’. Pre-colonial African Kingdoms were groups that were “tightly territorialised, spatially bounded, historically self-conscious and culturally homogeneous” (Appadurai 1997: 49).

The non- localisation of ethnic-group identity within the grand theories of liberalism or socialism which provided the template for the post-independence state building project undermines the post-colonial states. This challenge arose from the omission of knowledge of how the ethnic groups identify themselves as a social, political, and cultural group on the one hand and how they see others on the other. This understanding is crucial to the group's perception of 'other' which helps them to nurture cultural sensitivity and acceptance. This omission poses a serious erosion of the stateness of many African polities and limits their scopes of effectiveness. It also opens the door for a complex web of civil conflicts between the indigenous groups and the state with a renewed saliency of informal politics.

From the above analysis, it is glaring that any analysis of state in Africa needs to accommodate the knowledge of the various ethnic groups identifying themselves and seeing themselves as social, political and cultural groups. The essence of this is to get the state to function more effectively in collaboration with ethnic nationalities. This does not only strengthen the state institutions but also strengthen the various nationality groups and enhance their capacity to underpin healthy nation-state relations. It must be noted that in Africa, nations antedated modern sovereign state or contemporary nation-state.

Historical evidence according to McCandless and Schwoebel (2009) has convincingly demonstrated that in almost all cases in Europe, with the exception of the Balkans (an exception that may provide the clue to the current violence and strife in that region), the emergence of the modern sovereign state was the precondition for the formation of the nation-state. This is not the same in Africa. The pre-condition for modern state-building in Africa is the understanding and accommodating the nationality groups as semi-autonomous entities within the larger state. This is where it is essential to analyse states in Africa, according to Olukoshi (2011), primarily in terms of 'Africa's dynamics'

It is in view of this fact that neo-communitarianism holds state as a superstructure that derives its legitimacy from the ethnic nationalities which are semi-autonomous entities but control coercive instruments for domestic security only. This recognition will help our understanding of how cultural, social, political and class alienation can lead to rupture resulting in struggles of social movements. This understanding is essential for the creation of political space that allows the cultural groups to converge within a context where each group can have an equal footing and where identity and power can aid in the reconstruction of our cultural selves within the state.

### **3.9 Disarticulation of Africa's economy and politics by the decolonisation**

#### **strategy**

Political turmoil and economic crisis replaced the optimism and euphoria of the 1960s. Independence did not herald prosperity envisaged during the independence struggles. Five decades of independence and "freedom" from the colonial rule, have witnessed a steady increase in the incidence of poverty and a systematic deterioration of living standards across Africa. As argued earlier, the economic exploitation and political oppression of the African people intensified at the hands of the same elites and nationalists who denounced the colonial powers for exploiting Africa (Ayittey, 1994). With few exceptions like Patrice Lumumba of Zaire, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; the nationalists who took over were worse than the departing colonialists.

The argument that the failing democratic project in sub-Saharan Africa is a reflection of a wrong decolonisation process could hardly be ignored in any political discourse of Africa's politics and democracy. This strategy includes Choudhry's vital observation of constitution making processes in the post-colonial states. Choudhry observes:

...many imperial powers drafted the post-independence constitutions of colonies as part of the process of

decolonization. A foreign power would design the institutional and legal architecture of another political community without its consent. The constitution was presented as a *fait accompli*. Local participation—there was usually some—did not entail meaningful, substantive decision-making power. Rather, it was directed at ensuring the acquiescence of local elites, with fundamental questions of constitutional choice safely remaining in foreign hands (Choudhry, 2005: 933)

The greatest effect of decolonisation on constitutional making strategy is the constant threat it poses to the post-colonial states because there remains a continuous challenge to the imposed liberal values by “the deep and irreconcilable tension between the outside imposition of a constitutional order and the right of all peoples to self-determination” (Feldman, 2004). The spirit of self-determination which Choudhry rightly notes:

...encompasses more than merely the right of a political community to exercise power within an extant constitutional-legal order with democratic features. Rather, that right extends down to the very structure within which a community exercises its power of self-government, encompassing the most basic questions of institutional design. This is what is meant by the phrase that the right to self-government is the right of rights (Choudhry, 2005: 933).

One basic issue Choudhry brought to the fore is the issue of national question in the sub-Saharan African states. Addressing the issue of national question makes it compelling to conceptualise a nation. Clarification of this concept will illuminate the manifestations and origins of national question, which has remained at the root of political instability in the sub-Saharan Africa.

The idea of treating nation as simply as people of various cultural backgrounds coming together on the basis of simple choices while preserving the various elements of diverse cultural backgrounds is weak. It is weak in the sense that choices and forms of human behaviours as argued by Laughland (2008) are partly determined by factors such as ethnicity, nationhood and

parenthood – very often without people being aware of it. Those choices are sometimes beyond our personal control. They all formed part of our social beings and without them we remain biological beings. The experience of second and third generation immigrants in Europe whose parents or grandparents have chosen to come to a new country, and chosen to remain in it, often shows the truth of this. In spite of their individual choice, people's behaviour often remains ethnically based and culturally separate from that of the host nation, especially if they are of a different race. A nation which is a vital constituent of a state is summarised by Laughland (*ibid*) as not just a community of shared values or an impersonal social construct governed by certain laws as the word suggests. It derives its membership from family of procreation.

Nations can certainly welcome into their midst people who are not originally members of it, just as a family can expand to include in-laws. Nations like families are bodies of people related to each other by blood. National question arises from the spirit of nationalism through where ethnic groups that have been subjected to acute deprivation within a polity demand for equal economic, social and political opportunities and active promotion of the welfare of their people.

Some post-colonial leaders attempted to respond to these challenges by either drafting new constitutions or imposing one party state structure in the guise of African socialism. Some also see themselves, like their predecessors, as trustees of the ethnic groups holding in trust the right to self-determination for the various groups. All the leaders virtually took upon themselves “to produce order in the very literal sense of monopolizing violence” (Feldman, 2004: 79) and “to preside over the formation of the basic institutions necessary for a stable, democratic state” (*ibid*: 81) by allotting more powers to the central governments. They unfortunately in the process, ended up in deep commitments to the protection of the artificial liberal state which on several

occasions denied the people to freely draft and adopt the constitutions of their choice, which means denial of an autochthonous state-building process.

The post-colonial state-building process could hardly be distinguished from the colonial process except that the former was an imperialist enterprise that was motivated by colonial interest of extraction (Choudhry, 2005). The post-colonial process though not imperial, was designed to sustain the colonial legacies and therefore lacks the space for the principle of self-determination. Ignatieff observes that,

...although superficially justified by appeals to the right to self-determination, the new nation-building as currently practiced is imperialism under a new guise—an “empire-lite” in which the trappings of self-government mask a new form of “imperial tutelage (Ignatieff, 2003)

Ignatieff reveals the similarities of weakness in both the colonial and post-colonial state-building processes. He underlines the absence of opportunity for the indigenous cultural groups to decide what kinds of democracy, rule of law and stability of property that can be successfully absorbed in their culture and context (2003). This absence could be traced to the ready-made templates of liberalism with pre-determined terms of association among the various ethnic groups that coexist within the post-colonial states. No room was left for the indigenous groups to determine what was culturally appropriate to them, and what should be the boundaries of the ethnic requests for self-determination within the context of the post-colonial state. The recurring failure of the liberal democratic institutions arises from this fact. The prepared templates enabled the withdrawing colonial powers to retain the capacity to orchestrate and manipulate the decolonisation process sufficiently through constitutional arrangements. In addition to the templates, ethnicisation of military institution, and excluding where possible the most uncompromising, the most intransigent and the most stubborn aspiring leaders

in the colonies (Obasanjo, 1998) were all applied to ensure the retainership of dependent relationship.

The decolonisation strategy like its colonial source, further contributed to the instability of the post-colonial states. Babawale (2006) sheds light on the how the contribution was effected. He explains that the departing colonial powers instituted a social arrangement that would make the economic and political policies of the sub-Saharan African states be dictated to them by the metropolitan powers. Szeftel had earlier explained that repercussion for deviation from these dictates, as later observed by Babawale, would be met by a fierce hostility either in form of sanctions and/or destabilisation of such state and regime (Szeftel, 1989: 7). Such repercussion was not only meant to serve as a warning signal to any 'erring' nation but to ensure that the post-colonial leaders remain 'obedient' and strictly adhere to the liberal multi-party competition. It is the 'responsibility' of the post-colonial leaders to avoid programmes that would derail the states from maintaining an obedient regime to the wishes of the foreign monopoly capitalism (Szeftel, *ibid*) even if it causes a war weary population to 'give in'.

In the late 1980s, many African governments, including those of Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Mozambique, Sudan, Togo, and Zaire, typified this responsibility by declaring wars against their own citizens in their obsession with political stability. In Mozambique as observed by Ayittey (1994), ragged government troops and a shadowy guerrilla army took turns terrorizing villages and stealing their meagre crops. Guns instantly became a source of income for many people (Ayittey, *ibid*).

The impact of political instability deriving from the colonial legacies as earlier indicated was enormous on the African economy. From 1965 to 1987 Africa's annual rate of growth of GNP per capita averaged a dismal 1.1 per cent

(African Economic and Financial Data, 1989). Agricultural growth was negligible, with output growing at less than 1.5 per cent after 1970. Food production failed to keep pace with population growth. Food production per capita fell by 7 percent in the 1960s, 15 per cent in the 1970s, and continued to deteriorate in the 1980s. In 1987, for example, it dropped by 4.9 per cent (*ibid*: 154).

Though net foreign direct investment in Africa as a whole has fallen, the drop has been sharpest in sub-Saharan Africa. Foreign investment dropped dramatically from \$1,222 million in 1982 to \$498 million in 1987. The French seem to have been especially disillusioned. "French direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa ran at \$1 billion a year in 1981- 83; by 1988 that had translated into a net outflow of more than \$800 million"(The Economist, 1990). The overall picture is even more distressing when compared with other regions of the Third World. Social and economic indicators of development, such as growth of output, health, and literacy, have shown the weakest performance in sub-Saharan Africa.

A fundamental issue arises from the UN/World Bank package for the African countries and that is the issue of democratisation. This democratisation process is programmed along the OECD<sup>6</sup> model of democracy. . The democratic transition crises which characterise Africa evolves from the integration of African states into the 'conventional process' of democracy that promotes democracy and state building along the lines of western OECD state model without taking into consideration, the historical and cultural peculiarities of these African states and peoples.

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<sup>6</sup> Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development There are 32 member countries of OECD in which Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Trieste, Turkey and United Kingdom are founder members



The influence of economic liberal values on the African economies grew by leap and bound with the emergence of budding capitalists, professional groups and intellectuals who were wedded to the capitalist ideology and the bourgeois conception of democracy. The free market democracy theorists perceived the newly independent African states as a poor continent that has a lot to catch up with due to lack of capital, technology, professional skills, rational administration, finance, etc and could only catch up with the rest of the world especially the west by allowing human and private capitals from the west to have an unfettered access to their resources and space. This was the dominant view of economic and political development thinking between 1960s and late 80s.

Behind this façade was the penetration of capital without any restraint. This was also accompanied by the promotion of liberal values designed in the guise of multi-party democracy where majority of the African people lack the wherewithal to compete effectively in the monetised multi-party democracy. The grafted political institutions of Europe and the corresponding capitalist Europe opened the floodgate for the acquisition of western consumption patterns without accompanying local production techniques and skills. Power became personalised by the political elites who capitalised on the multi-party democracy to float interest-based political-economic associations. Many of the political parties assumed the role of limited liability companies that offer political platforms to political merchants who pay either in cash or kind, or both to the party leaders in order to secure space in the political enterprise dubbed elections or secure public appointments.

## **Conclusion**

From the foregoing, it is clear that the roots of current political crisis in Africa lie in history. These problems, originate in the colonial period. That is not to say that post-colonial Africa states have not changed profoundly in the last few decades. Colonial powers remodelled the territory for their purposes, establishing plantations, inducing population movements and creating the beginnings of modern urban life. But the reflexes, habits and methods of the

post-colonial state rule are a product of colonial regime continuity. The centralised authoritarian state that emerged from the colonial structures justifies this continuity. As in the colonial period, post-colonial leaders continue with the state building project at the expense of pluralism. This failure continues to produce significant dialogue deficit between the majority ethnic groups and the minorities on the one hand, and between the state leaders and opposition on the other. This invariably results in lack of regime legitimacy from the various post-colonial elections. The rejection of pluralism, as reported in Crisis Group Africa Report (2010: 2) constantly leads to a deficit of dialogue and an inability to accommodate discontent or minority views. This development has produced a situation in which genuine democratic reform is obliterated. The consequent frustrations account for violence in a pattern synonymous with the independence struggles.

The colonial legacies are well pronounced on the economy and politics of the pre-colonial societies through its impact on land and traditional leadership institutions. Land that was collectively owned by communities and families became personal property. Disputes over land are now common place between individuals or between indigenous communities in the post-colonial states. The urge to claim traditional title also became a source of fierce battle among contenders. The character of the post-colonial state and leadership was laid during the colonial period through the alterations of the pre-colonial structures and liberalisation of the African politics and economies. The crisis was particularly trenchant in sub-Saharan Africa. The decline has been especially calamitous in Nigeria, which could not translate its oil wealth into sustainable economic prosperity.

## **Chapter 4**

# **POST-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND THE NEED FOR ALTERNATIVE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MODELS**

## **4.0 Introduction**

Post-coloniality as explained by the anthropologists is the relations between colonisers and the colonised (Fischer-Tine, 2011). These relationships produced some political and economic developments in sub-Saharan Africa that could hardly be ignored in either the explanation of the political or economic crises that plagued the region or in any justification for alternative models that may be adopted for fixing the broken linkages created by these developments. The broken linkages are many, but as briefly discussed in chapter two, the major ones that underlay the vulnerability of the region are: unchanged perception of the colonised by the colonisers, tide of decolonisation, democratisation in the absence of state, disarticulation of the pre-colonial economy and state systems, legacy of violence and ethnic rivalry, stunted autochthonous states, and legal aberrations through the constitution.

## **4.1 Unchanged perceptions and the tide of decolonisation**

The colonial practices of 'othering' (Fischer, 2010: 6) and the subsequent classification of the traditional African world as underdeveloped and defective continued to influence the West's foreign policy and their developmental aid towards Africa. These colonial assumptions and stereotypes underlie the engagement on the present and future of the post-colonial states by the West. Changing this perception requires a reconfiguration of the states and the economies of the post-independence African states.

In contrast to the long history of colonisation, the tide of decolonisation came in fast beginning in Asia rolling through the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The decade following the Second World

War witnessed the tsunami of decolonisation in North Africa and covering most of sub-Saharan Africa within a few years of Ghana (formerly the British Gold Coast) became the first independent black African state in 1957. By 1980 it had covered most of the rest of the erstwhile European colonial empire in the Caribbean, the Persian Gulf and South Arabia, and the Pacific.

The speed of the decolonisation process was influenced by factors including the weakening of European power following the two world wars, the emergence of the United States and the Soviet Union with each competing to win over the anti-colonial movements, thus serving as pivots of the bi-polar world or Cold War. In addition to these were the increasing pressures from anti-colonial nationalists who were also inspired in part by the independence of India in 1947.

Did the decolonisation bring any developmental change? The answer is negative. As explained in chapter two, the decolonisation processes were affected by the conditions in which power was transferred. These conditions were far from optimal in spite of the fact that in some cases the process involved the use of violence or war as in Kenya, South Africa, Mozambique etc; in the majority of cases, independence was accompanied or preceded by negotiations and conferences as witnessed in Nigeria, Ghana etc;. Whichever path the process took, it was disfigured by a transfer of administrative powers characterised by unsustainable political compromises, economic dependence, and self-interest based democracy in the garb of multi-party democracy and neo-patrimonialism.

After a careful observation of how colonialism fatefully structured political choices along regional and ethnic lines in Britain's most populous African territory, Nigeria, Sam Nolutshungu submits:

...the political systems of post-colonial societies 'carried . . . in their genes—the heritage of the colonialism that designed them, authoritarian in its day, but also, invariably, in its retreat, a

champion of elitist and paternalist notions of democracy  
(Nolutshungu, 1991: 100).

In Nigeria for example, six years after independence the post-independent government quickly gave way to military putsch in 1966 followed by thirty months of civil war. Whichever path the transition to independence took, either negotiated constitutional conferences or liberation war, appeared not to make much difference to the institutionalised destabilising legacy of colonialism.

Even the colonies that achieved their independence through the war of liberation especially Algeria and the ex-Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, as well as Zimbabwe, Namibia and Eritrea were also caught up with “inertial forces” (Young, 2004: 29). These forces not only made them to retain their colonial bureaucratic and legal legacies but also made it impossible for them to remove the long shadow cast by their colonial legacies. The path of most of the post-colonial governments of 1960s could be traced to their colonial progenitors however the post-colonial forms were more vulnerable to dependency due to what Mamdani refers to as “bifurcated” colonial state that mutated into two forms. Multi-party democracy that was assumed to open the political space could not transform the neo-patrimonial decentralised despotism into a competitive game of multi-party politics. Most of the countries still remain under the firm grips of their nationalist presidents such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe or under political parties such as Botswana National Party in Botswana.

Cooper (2002) addresses the disparity between gatekeeper state and its predecessor indicating the former as lacking its predecessor’s external coercive capacity, financial resources and largely dependent on either their former colonial masters or their Cold War mentor. The state easily hybridises with the economic and political interests of their former colonial powers or ideological mentors to reproduce the pre-colonial trading posts in form of neo-trading posts to perform the functions of a modern state. This was evident in the Francophone states where the former colonies remain members of the French Community of Africa with

their currencies pegged to French franc and Euro, after 1999. France remained a vital source of their economic and military support in times of crises as witnessed in Cote D'Ivoire in 2010.

Though British government still maintained relationship with its former colonies but to muddles less in their affairs and only intervenes militarily perhaps to stop civil wars as done in Sierra-Leone in 2000 – 2002. However as a way of maintaining the dependent relationship, political independence of the colonies was designed to place the resources of the colonies in the hands of few locals rather than allowing the total overhauling of the system. The enormous influence of power over politics and economy, according to Cooper (2002: 200) intensified the power struggle among the elites who use every known and unorthodox tactics including ethnic sentiments to capture the “gate” sometimes with support from the external agencies and aids.

#### **4.2 Democratisation in the Absence of States in Africa**

At the end of the cold war, prominent issues in the political discourse include the global prospects of democracy and state failure. While the full prospects of democracy are yet to materialise, state failure has become a global phenomenon, surfacing in several regions. Pointing to cases such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, some researchers have argued the existence of a broad trend towards the disintegration of state institutions, especially in so-called third world countries. The state failure discourse has bearing on the prospects for democracy in Africa (Olateju, 2012a).

A great deal has been written about the democratisation process and failed states in Africa, two issues that continue to engender intense debate (Herbst 2000; Zartman, 1995; Beissinger and Crawford, 2002; Rotberg, 2003; 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Cooper, 2002; Wallerstein, 2002; Helman and Ratner, 1993) International organisations, including the World Bank and United Nations, have commissioned research on state failure and published policy recommendations for

avoiding it. The European Union, African academics, and international donor organisations have also given considerable attention to democratisation and state failure, and much has been written on the dependency inherent in the African political economy. All these studies were however carried out with the mission of improving structures of governance and democratisation processes, reducing poverty, improving or reducing aid, stimulating or sustaining economic development projects, and so on within a neo-colonial framework (Olateju, 2012a). Some of the studies engage in critical analysis of African states' fragility stemming from a liberal economic approach that has plagued political economies through the state-building strategy adopted by administrations during the colonial enterprise.

Picking from Hagg and Kagwanja (2007: 21), it is evidently clear that African states are becoming irrelevant in the eyes of many of their citizens as the IMF and SAP imposed economic reforms diminished the ability of governments to provide the essential social infrastructure and services, such as health and education for their citizens. Devastation arising from the greed of international corporations, such as Western oil companies, also undermined the livelihoods of local people, creating grievances as fertile grounds for the proliferation of militias in places like Nigeria's Niger Delta region (Akpan 2007). Several studies point to the role of international actors in the proliferation of small arms in Africa's hotspots, which has intensified conflicts and increased tensions and deaths (IANSA/Oxfam 2007).

The problem with the democratisation process in Africa is two-fold. Firstly, there is the absence of autochthonous states to guide the process and, secondly, there is the problem of combination of market with democracy. Prevalent political crisis in Africa lend credence to doubts raised in the thesis about the abilities of the contemporary African states to resolve problems created by divergent interests - one of the primary roles of a state. The post-independence prevalent political crisis in Algeria, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria,

Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zimbabwe, are put forth as exemplifying the inability of the post-colonial state to manage affairs despite having the monopoly of the instruments of coercion – another primary role of a state. Failure of the post-colonial African state in these vital qualities further strengthen the view expressed in the thesis that the post-colonial state can hardly be described as state in the true sense of a state.

Most of the post-colonial states as indicated earlier are hand-me-down' political organisations that could be best classified as 'neo-trading posts' that share same characters and nature with their pre-colonial forms, established for the sustenance of extractive trade economy. Picking from Stuart Hall, because the post-colonial African states are not all post-colonial in the same way, does not mean that they are not post-colonial in any way (Hall, 1996: 242- 60). The ghost of colonialism still looms irrespective of a state's path to independence or how stable they may appear to be. This therefore makes it compelling for us to expand the discussion of failed states beyond the security benchmark discourse that has remained popular since the end of the Cold War. It is expressed in this thesis that 'good governance', which has been fashionable since the 1990s, will better explain the genesis of the failed state in Africa better than the security paradigm (Weiss, 2005).

The hypothetical questions that beg for answers here are that given a situation where state-building strategies are designed to omit the indigenous elements, is it appropriate to consider such states as failed or is it the state-building strategies that have failed? More importantly, can the superficial neo-trading posts euphemistically referred to as state in Africa sustain democracy? Is the state meant to sustain democracy or sustain the dependent relationship between the colonised and the colonisers? Should Africans reject liberal democracy or modify it to incorporate indigenous aspects of their societies? These challenges are critically investigated in the thesis because they hold the potentials to reveal the limits of external intervention in Africa's political development



(Fischer and Schmelze, 2009). The conclusion here suggests that state building as a means of social engineering, social control, and resolution of divergent views is yet to emerge in Africa.

#### **4.3 Explanations for Failed states in Africa**

Labelling states as “failed” or “fragile” implies that liberal state model is the normative reference by which all states are categorised, along the broad spectrum of “strong” or “collapsed” (Hofmann, 2009: 79). Helman and Ratner (1993) were for instance more concerned about a state being ‘utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community’. Michael Ignatieff (2002: 118) adopts a Machiavellian/Weberian understanding of state failure to argue that state failure occurs when ‘the central government loses the monopoly of the means of violence’. Zartman in a wider sense of state failure, Zartman (1995) develops the idea of state failure along the lines of when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed as well as referring to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart. These concepts and measurements of failed states are not generally helpful in understanding the economic and political realities in the sub-Saharan Africa. Efforts are geared here toward seeking to differentiate the post-colonial from the post-colony in the way Edward Said, Pal Ahluwalia and Achille Mbembe assert it in the literature of third world politics. Herein lays the underbelly of the crisis of post-colonial dictatorship. The African societies were either totally subordinated or extricated from playing any significant role in the development of the post-colonial states. The post-colonial states have been measured against the OECD type of liberal constitutional democracy based on an industrialised market economy which is regarded as the model for a stable state (Boege, Brown, Clement and Nolan, 2008: 18).

Boas and Jennings (2005), explain a failure in the post colony, by measuring and comparing one post colonial state against/to the other. Hameiri posits that ‘state failure’ talk refers to comparing the various states to the classical model of liberal democratic sovereign state benchmarks through which a state is

judged from its approximation to such benchmarks (2007: 138). The content of these benchmarks means the existence and acceptance of westernised liberal state values which unfortunately, have never existed in most of the African states, and therefore have little or no relevance to them. As argued by Boege et al (*ibid*), promoting the liberal state as the ultimate model is to ignore the historical context, which is vital to understanding of the persistence of political crises in Africa.

Helman and Ratner (1993) were among the first analysts to use the term 'failed state'. As stated earlier, they were more concerned about the incapability of a state sustaining itself as a member of the international community. Such a state according to them will not only imperil their own citizens but also threaten their neighbours through the outflow of refugees political instability, and random warfare. It is very germane to emphasise here that state failure cannot be categorised by just one definition as all the concepts discussed above did. There are many dimensions such as political, economic, governance, development, security etc; to analyse state failure and each dimension has its unique genesis. It is possible for a state to succeed in one dimension and fail in another while in some cases, as witnessed in Liberia and Somalia a state can fail in all dimensions. It is thus imperative as avers by Jonathan Di John (2011) for any definition of 'failure' to be explicit in which dimension a state fails. Given the variation in state capacity across sectors, aggregate measures or categorisations of 'failure' can be misleading.

The concept of the failed state became popular in academic and policy-making discourses after the end of the cold war. Arguments about the genesis of state failure and political crisis took on a new dimension in the 1990s when the state became a central theme in the economic and democratic discourse on post-colonial Africa. As John Hoffman points out, the paradox of the state derives from the fact that it is:

...not just a product of divisions; it is also a producer of divisions. It embodies and perpetuates divisions in its everyday

working, for a state can be said to monopolise legitimate force only because it institutionalises a division between rulers and ruled. . . . Why the state constitutes such a challenge to the concept of democracy is the fact that it sharply dichotomises the social order into those who have and those who do not (Hoffman, 1988).

One striking feature in Hoffman's paradox of state is the allocation of central role to state in terms of possession of coercive instruments. This situation hardly exists in Africa since 1970s when most of the states were unable to protect themselves against military coups and 1980s when some regimes collapsed under the pressures of popular demand for change. African states are today the most vilified for their weaknesses and dependence on foreign powers for stability. As argued by Chazan and Rothchild, state in Africa has become 'dysfunctional in terms of the management of larger societal issues' (Chazan, 1988a; Chazan, 1988b; Rothchild, 1994).

The state in the first instance as explained in Chapter Two does not exist in the post-colonial Africa considering the fact that the gradual nourishment of modern state institutions by the nationality groups in their kingdoms and empires was truncated by the colonial administrative styles and the decolonisation philosophies. If this historical background of the state-building process in Africa is inserted into the failed state analysis, it will be clear that pre-condition for modern state-building in Africa which is the accommodation of the nationality groups as semi-autonomous entities within the larger state is completely lacking. This in essence renders any superstructure put in place to either serve as an instrument of coercion or as a mechanism for reconciling the divergent views to lack the capacity for the delivery of such function.

The flaws of the current failed state discourse reveal a truth about the failure of Western liberal political thought that has no bearing with the African political reality. The notion of the failed state only manifests in the West's

inability to give the correct interpretation to Third World political crisis, and disenchantment with its own state institutions. It is the loss of trust in the state by the West that informs the preoccupation with 'state failure'.

This development arose from the fact that the post-Cold War widespread optimism about the prospects of economic development and development of democracy in most parts of the world evaporated faster than expected. Instead of accelerated economic development and rapid development of democracy, a growing number of post-colonial African states were entrapped in severe socio-political crisis, leading to spread of the phenomenon of state failure between 1980s and 1990s, a period that was dominated by the New Right policies of both Ronald Regan and Margaret Thatcher.

It was a period that the neo-liberal advocates nurtured rising internal opposition by mobilising behind the banner of 'civil society' in their attempt at dislodging authoritarian governments (Anyang' Nyong'o 1987; Harbeson et al. 1994; Lewis 1992) and "rolling back" the state. The triumph of the neo-liberal economic policies was prompted by the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the Eastern Europe in 1989 and its eventual collapse in 1991. These two developments brought the bipolar Cold War of the Soviet Union and the USA to an end, leaving the USA as the global superpower. With the exit of the Soviet Union from the global power contest, the neoliberal agenda of Thatcher and Reagan was able to spread across the globe without any hindrance thereby making neoliberalism the dominant ideology within the global order.

The rapid success of neoliberalism prompted some assumptions about the superiority of the ideology over all others; and its classification as the terminus of all ideologies (Clarke, 2001; Falk, 1998) For example President Bush Senior assumed that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the world's only superpower represented something more

profound than just the ending of hostilities between two superpowers. For him, it marked the end of an *Old World Order* and the beginning of a *New World Order* (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998).

Francis Fukuyama, a deputy director of the Department of State's policy-planning in George Bush Snr administration, followed the line of thought of his boss, to assume that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the USA as the global power proved that liberal democratic states, such as the United States, represented a kind of terminus toward which all states were evolving and at which all states would eventually arrive. In furtherance of this assumption, Fukuyama claims that the gradually forming global consensus around the New Order meant that history, manifested in ideological conflict, was coming to an end (Fukuyama, 1989).

Samuel Huntington, then a professor of government at Harvard University, who saw these events as the beginning of a new phase of global history in which the fundamental conflicts will not primarily be ideological or economic but rather the source of conflict will be cultural. For Huntington, nation-states will still remain the most powerful actors in the global politics but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nation-states and groups of different civilisations. In essence clash of civilizations will dominate global politics in the future (Huntington, 1993). If Huntington's clash of civilisations theory is applied to Africa, it will be glaring that the nation-states which Huntington predicts to remain as principal actors in the world affairs are yet to emerge and the real source of conflict in Africa is not clash of civilisations but clash between ethnic nations and the post-colonial super-structures put in place by the departing colonial administrations.

The state, rather than mediating conflicts in society, is unable to serve the ruled and, instead has an organic and penetrating relationship with capital, the

arena of social contradictions and class struggle. According to Peter Hitchcock, the contemporary concept of the failed state originated in an article by Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner in *Foreign Policy*. (Hitchcock, 2008; Helman and Ratner, 1993) In the early 1990s, Helman and Ratner looked at Haiti and saw a similarity in Cambodia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia—a form of state ‘utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community’. Their common characteristics included ‘civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation’. Africa certainly has failed states in the context described by Helman and Ratner.

However, it is germane to note that these states were not designed to survive the onslaught in the first instance if their foundations as explained earlier were taken into consideration. Helman and Ratner partially recognised this basic fact when they concluded, though insufficiently, that most of these states had been doomed to fail from inception due to the high number of nation-states tied to the process of decolonisation after World War II. The high number argument is not sufficient to explain why the states are doomed to fail but the ways and manner these nation states were amalgamated to produce client-states with imposed best-practice constitutionalism. Most of these states owe their survival to aids, loans and military support from their colonial and/or ideological mentors especially during the Cold War. Once the support was halted all the dependent states were shaken to their foundations.

Most analysts who shared the neoliberal view persistently cited poor governance, political instability, geographical features, and historical conditions such as colonialism as different reasons for Africa’s economic malaise. None saw the weak foundations of the states as a major contribution of such malaise. Consensus emerged that dysfunctional political institutions and governance bear much of the blame for the region’s disappointing economic performance, hindering the successful pursuit of any development strategy – whether oriented towards capitalism or socialism, self-reliance or global integration (Mkandawire

& Soludo, 1999; Ndulu & O'Connell, 1999; Sandbrook, 1986; van de Walle, 2001). Whereas the inability of these post-colonial states due to their weak foundations, to assimilate the foreign policies and integrate such into their social relationships are yet to be fully explored as causes of poor governance and state failure in sub-Saharan Africa. The consequences of this inability exposed the fault lines in the modernisation and neo-liberal but which they are yet to accept as policy- failures; and rather christened it state failure.

Labelling states as 'failed' or 'fragile' implies the liberal state model as the normative reference by which all states should be judged along the broad spectrum from 'strong' or 'collapsed' (Hofmann, 2009). Furthermore, the characteristic flaws of the failed state discourse reveal a truth about the failure of Western liberal political thought, not the African political reality. The notion of the failed state is only manifest in the West's inability to construct a sufficient interpretation of the developing world political crises. It is the loss of trust in the state by the West that informs the preoccupation with 'state failure'. This development arose from the evaporation of widespread post-cold war optimism about the prospects of economic development and prosperity through democracy. Instead of accelerated economic development and the rapid spread of democracy, a growing number of post-colonial African states succumbed to severe socio-political crises. The crises took the forms of popular revolutions against the state and the leaders and bending towards the beginning of a new history in the ideological waga.

As a solution to the emerging crises, arising from the failure of the post-colonial leaders to provide the political stability required for capital to flourish; and to protect the movement of capital, states were considered to "roll back". Attention was immediately turned to civil society as the new force for the democratisation in the state. However the sincerity of this assumption appears doubtful because the same state is still expected to enact laws and policies that will tackle obstacles to inward and outward flow of capital, in addition to creating

comfortable zones for its operation. Civil society instantly became the alternative force that could sustain the multi-party free market liberal values. An important issue that remains to be clarified is whether civil society groups represent a new dawn or false hope for democracy and state stability in Africa; and whose and which democracy are they propagating?

#### **4.4 Conclusion**

Weak state remains the greatest challenge to political stability in Africa. The weakness of the post-colonial 'neo-trading posts' is rooted in the faulty decolonisation strategy that could not determine a workable terms of association among the ethnic groups within the proposed state boundaries on the one hand; and the desires of these groups for self-determination within the proposed state on the other. Resulting from this failure is the paralysis of the state that infects governance and democracy. Post-colonial leaders are yet to accept that the failure of the post-colonial African states and their political crisis lie in the history of colonisation and the de-colonisation strategy. Today's failed states were once upon a time the darling or demon states – depending on the point of view one takes of the global hegemonic powers. The overconcentration on these issues actually drew away the attention of the African scholars from the daily struggles of the people for genuine democracy (World Bank, 2007) while dictatorship regimes were on the increase with the concept of 'life presidents' becoming a trend.

The colonial powers re-modelled the territories for their own purposes, establishing plantations, inducing population movements, and creating the beginnings of modern urban life. The reflexes, habits, and methods of the post-colonial African leaders still reflect the continuity of colonial legacy. The authoritarian leadership style, which emerged from colonial structures, exemplifies this continuity. The leadership style produces a dialogue deficit between the people and the state leaders, and in some notable cases between the



ethnic groups. There is a lack of regime legitimacy in spite of the multi-party elections because democracy is obliterated (Crisis Group Report, 2010) by the cartel nature of the political parties. This nature of the political parties casts a big doubt on the possibility of the current multi-party system producing genuine democratic change.

## Chapter 5

# NEO-COMMUNITARIAN DEMOCRACY AS AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL OF DEMOCRACY FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

### 5.0 Introduction

Politics is about the possibility of choice out of many options. It is also stressed that out of the benefit of historical hindsight, neither the choice of socialist nor liberal capitalist democracy has served as appropriate entry point for sub-Saharan African states into the arena of democracy, stable state and self-sustaining economic development. These underline the point that the 'end of history' is not yet in sight. The efforts also put up an argument for the availability of alternative economic and political models that may assist the people in their collective and individual upliftment into democratic actuality and self-sustenance. It is with this spirit that neo-communitarianism is designed as a new model of democracy. It is not designed as a paragon of ideas that can wholly rectify failed democracy or failed state associated with the sub-Saharan African states, but to serve as an alternative model worthy of consideration for workable solutions to political and economic crises that have plagued Africa for decades.

Before delving into the philosophy of neo-communitarianism as a form of democracy, it is appropriate to commence with an examination of communitarian<sup>7</sup> philosophy and its brand of democracy from whose fountain neo-communitarianism draws on.

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<sup>7</sup> The term communitarianism is of 20th-century origin, it is derived from the 1840s term communitarian, which was coined by Goodwyn Barnby to refer to one who was a member or advocate of a communalist society. The modern use of the term is a redefinition of the original usage. Many communitarians trace their philosophy to earlier thinkers. The term is primarily used in two senses: Philosophical communitarianism considers classical liberalism to be ontologically and epistemologically incoherent, and opposes it on that ground. Unlike classical liberalism, which construes communities as originating from the voluntary acts of pre-community individuals, it emphasises the role of the community in defining and shaping individuals. Communitarians believe that the value of community is not sufficiently recognized in liberal theories of justice. Ideological communitarianism is characterised as a radical centrist ideology that is sometimes marked by leftism on economic issues and moralism or conservatism on social

## 5.1 The concept of Communitarianism

Communitarianism is a term commonly used in two forms. These are philosophical communitarianism and ideological communitarianism. Philosophically, communitarianism rejects classical liberalism as an ontologically and epistemologically incoherent ideology that fails to recognise the role of communities in the determination and shaping of individuals. It also regards classical liberalism as faulty for construing the communities as originating from the voluntary acts of pre-community individuals. Communitarianism therefore represents a thick conception of individuals and their communities as explained by Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alisdair MacIntyre and Michael Waltzer.

The communitarians challenged the individualism inherent in the liberal opposition to the concept of common good (Turner, 2006: 81; Etzioni, 1998: ix). This group of political philosophers in their critical reactions to “*A Theory of Justice*” (Rawls, 1971) pioneered the contemporary communitarian theory whose major flaws draws neo-communitarian thinking into the terrain of alternative model of democracy. Drawing on Aristotelian and Hegelian philosophies, they debunked Rawls' assumption that the major goal of government is securing and distributing fairly, the liberties and economic resources required by individuals to live their freely chosen lives (Bell, 1997).

The communitarian perspective according to the communitarians recognises both individual human dignity and the social dimension of human existence. Preservation of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as well as self-respect; and where each acquires a lively sense of personal and civic responsibilities, along with the habit of serving others and not just self. Though

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issues. This usage was coined recently. When the term is capitalised, it usually refers to the Responsive Communitarian movement of Amitai Etzioni and other philosophers

there are variants of communitarianism, but they are all united in their view of communities, like individuals having obligations and duties towards their members which include being responsive to the needs of their members and fostering their participation in social and political life. Picking from the communitarians, a communitarian perspective does not dictate particular policies, rather it mandates attention to what is often ignored in contemporary policy debates which is the social side of human nature and the responsibilities that must be borne by citizens, individually and collectively, in a regime of rights. Communitarianism serves to point out the ripple effects and long-term consequences of present decisions.

Rawls left nobody in doubt of his initial commitments to the universal truth in "*A Theory of Justice*" (1971) which the communitarians argued not to be in touch with reality. Rawls presents "*veil of ignorance*" he claims to blind people to all facts about themselves and also cloud what their notion of justice is as principles that allow each member of society to have an equal claim on their society's goods. Rawls argues that

...no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance....They are the principles that rational and free persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association (Rawls, 1971: 11)

According to Rawls, ignorance of these details about oneself will lead to principles that are fair to all. If an individual does not know how he will end up in his own conceived society, he is likely not going to privilege any one class of people, but rather develop a scheme of justice that treats all fairly. In particular, Rawls claims that those in the Original Position would all adopt a maximum strategy which would maximise the prospects of the least well-off.

While disagreeing with the atomistic image of individuals presented by Rawls in the “Theory of Justice”, the communitarians assert the standards of justice are peculiar to forms of life and traditions of each society and that values and beliefs are formed in public space in which debates take place. Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor argued that moral and political judgment depends on the language of reasons and the interpretive framework within which agents view their world. It therefore makes no sense to begin the political enterprise by abstracting from the interpretive dimensions of human beliefs, practices, and institutions (Taylor, 1985; MacIntyre, 1984). Contributing to the argument earlier, Walzer asserts that effective social criticism must derive from and resonate with the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and places (Walzer, 1983: 8).

Bell summarises the communitarian argument that liberals who ask what is just by abstracting from particular social contexts as best-practice are doomed to philosophical incoherence and those theorists who adopt this method to persuade people to do the just thing using the best-practice template are doomed to political irrelevance (Bell, 1997).

Rawls in “*Political Liberalism*” (Rawls, 1993) eliminates the universal presuppositions from his assumptions and admits individuals as impartial citizens that provide the best account of liberal-democratic political culture. He explains further that the political aim of an impartial citizen is to cooperate with others to work out the rules for consensus in political communities. He follows this argument in “*Law of Peoples*” (Rawls, 1999) to clarify that liberalism may not be exportable at all times and places, sketching a vision of a ‘decent, well-ordered society’. A decent, well ordered society, he concludes, needs not be democratic, but it must be non-aggressive towards other communities, and while it must internally have a ‘common good conception of

justice', a 'reasonable consultation hierarchy' and secure basic human rights (Rawls, 1999). It is pertinent to point out that by 'needs not to be democratic'; Rawl refers to liberal democracy as the template for democracy.

To Communitarians, individuals are products of the communities in which they live and shaped by values and beliefs of such community. Communication of those values, mores, norms etc are done through socialisation which guides the shaping of the individuals and forms the backdrop against which the people formulate and understand reality.

Defining reality through our own values and norms underlies communitarian philosophy's emphasis on different societies having different and multiple needs which are not wholly compatible with each other and even not compatible at different historical times in the same society. Achieving the needs of the society is the chief responsibility of a good society. This achievement requires constant maintenance of balance between individual liberty and social order in accordance with the principle of individuals, severally and collectively having lively sense of personal and civic responsibilities, along with the habit of serving others and not just self. Therefore communitarians argue that a good society could only be achieved through a balance between liberty and social order, and between communal and society-wide values with such balance taking place within some historical-social conditions.

These conditions account for why a specific society at a particular period adjusts itself in order to attain the same balance. For example, contemporary Japan as illustrated by Turner requires a balance that permits greater tolerance for individual rights, while the American society requires a balance that can curb the effects of excessive individualism (Turner, 2006).

The main argument of the communitarians that is very germane to this study is that contrary to the liberal view, there are social attachments which determine the self and thus individuals are constituted by the community. The individuals are constituted by the community but the emotional connection between the individuals and the community needs to be stressed in any explanation of determinism of the individuals by the community. We cannot overlook this organic connection as it constitutes the core of the social attachments that determine the self. Both the community and individuals are socially embedded, organically related and mutually reinforcing. The image of individuals as unencumbered selves by Rawls in "Theory of Justice" according to the communitarians is ontologically false.

The liberal argument that the good in each community should be individually determined and that social institutions and policies required should be based on agreements freely entered into by individuals, has no place in communitarianism. Turner (2006) elaborates more on this view with a submission that the communitarians see these social institutions and policies partly reflecting the communal norms and values that are transmitted from generation to generation through socialisation. These values become part of self and are also modified by persuasion, religious or political indoctrination, leadership and moral dialogue. Communitarianism therefore represents a philosophy that offers the view that 'individual is dependent on the community' (Bell, 1993). Millbank summarises this view as impliedly placing the importance of the society ahead of the unfettered rights of the individuals (Milbank, 2001: 9).

Membership of a community as expressed by the communitarians is involuntary. The social attachments that determine the self are not necessarily the chosen ones as posited by the individualists but by those provided by the organic relationship between the individuals and the community. Sandel (1984) was emphatic on the expression of social attachments that make up an individual. He sees individuals as having constitutive ends which determine who the person is

(Sandel, 1984). As argued by Sandel, we need to firstly consider the ends and values of individuals before analysing their behaviour. We cannot analyse behaviour of individuals as if they were abstract entities or their values existed somewhere distant or 'outside'. The idea of separating who one is and the values one has as portrayed by the individualists is faulty in two ways - separating individuals from the communities and ignoring the organic relationship between the individuals and the community. It is this relationship that generates the social attachments to produce self and self-emotions.

Etzioni reinforces this thinking with an emphasis that the 'assertion of the liberals, to treat individuals as free agents when actually, they are, to a significant extent, social creations reflecting the communities which they are embedded' (Etzioni, 1998), is faulty. Shlomo Avineri and Avner de Shalit (1992) had separated the arguments against atomistic view of man in the society into two spheres. The arguments which they regarded to be an important issue in political philosophy mostly in the 1980s were divided into methodological and normative spheres. They opined that the communitarian methodological argument of liberals in favour of individualism as that rational person who chooses freely is wrong and faulty.

Instead of the atomistic perception of liberalism, the communitarians advanced their methodological argument that the only way to understand human behaviour is to refer to individuals in their social, cultural and historical contexts. This is a perfect methodological argument that sums up what makes a social being a combination of the stated contexts.

In the normative sphere, Avineri and Shalit aver that communitarians reinforced their methodological argument, that the emphasis of liberal ideology on individualism is responsible for the emergence of morally unsatisfactory



consequences which promote survival of the fittest values among the people. This according to the communitarians produces inequality in the community.

Communitarians view community as a good virtue that people must seek for several reasons. They therefore set to address inequality and other effects of the market in the community. However they failed to recognise the organic connection between the individual and the community as the underlying force for the social attachment provided by the community to produce self. In addition, redressing the problem of separation and segregation according to the communitarians requires the involvement of civil society and entrenchment of positive rights in order to make democracy people-oriented. They ignored the fact that the nature and character of civil society is been shaped by the nature and character of the state itself.

The idea of involving the civil society in management of the state is a neo-liberal battle cry for democratisation of African states that is prominent in the works of Charles Taylor (1989), Michael J Sandel (1998), Michael Waltzer (1983) and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984). Though they all premised their arguments against the atomistic view of individual in the society but proffering civil society as a form of collective voice required for democratic stability in the community serves as the umbilical cord between communitarians and liberal democracy. Nevertheless, the communitarians successfully provide another prism for viewing the state, people and relationships in the terrain of political philosophy. Their challenge of liberalism since 1980 heralded the "Third Way" of thinking (Etzioni, 1998) as a philosophy that favours social formulation of the public good (Turner, 2006).

In his accounts of communitarianism as the "*Third Way*" philosophy referred to as "*die neue mitte*" by the Germans, Etzioni further illuminates the ideological status of communitarianism with an explanation that it is a third way

of thinking, a form of centrist approach which does not view government as the problem or see it as the solution but as a partner in the formation of a good society. Etzioni goes further to reinforce the point about the relationship between communitarianism and free market liberal economy by asserting that communitarianism does not see market as a source of all that is good or evil but as a powerful economic engine that must be accorded sufficient space to operate while being properly guarded (Etzioni, 2000: 13). In essence, market and government are partners that must work together to produce a good society.

The implied meaning is that market must be guided by the state in order to reduce its evils. How the government is to be constituted was left unaddressed by the communitarians. If we considered their argument, we can deduce that the market becomes evil once individuals are detached from their cultural, historical and social contexts. The underlying force that facilitates the process of evil and how to disentangle such evil from the market are conspicuously lacking in communitarianism. It is the disentanglement of the evil from the market that speconomy addresses within a neo-communitarian context in chapter seven.

Lack of explanation for the removal of the evil from the market became clearer with Etzioni's distinction between the classical usage of the concept of communitarianism up to the 19<sup>th</sup> century and its usage thereafter. The distinction reflects the Cold War divide where most of the contemporary communitarians distanced themselves from the assumed socialist ideological undertone of the classical usage. According to Etzioni, the classical usage up to the 19th century implied putting the socialist principles into practice in a community (Etzioni, 1998). It is not surprising that the contemporary communitarians opted for leaving the market intact in order to avoid putting the socialist principles into practice. On the contrary, to the contemporary communitarians' assumptions of the classical interpretation, the classical interpretation only stresses the significance of social forces, of community, of

social bonds or social harmony as in the case of Asian communities (Etzioni: *ibid*).

This classical interpretation changed in 1990s to the balance between the individual rights and social responsibilities. The swing in interpretation which Selznick (1998: 3) claims to have come with the emergence of the liberal communitarianism whose philosophy, according to Robert Bellah, (1998: 18) seeks to provide a humane context for the market and the state. The distinction between the classical and contemporary interpretations is a reflection of the same old argument of socialism versus capitalism. This distinction reinforces why the contemporary communitarians preferred to leave the market intact and find a way the state can ameliorate market's hardship without necessarily altering the market calculus. This is where *speconomy* as will be explained later differs. While the market is retained however its mode of operation is altered for the benefit of both the state and the individuals.

The liberal communitarians, who sometimes referred to themselves as democratic communitarians to further distinguish themselves from socialist communitarians, left no one in doubt as to their acceptability of the values and inevitability of both the free market and the liberal democratic state. They only insist that the functions of both state and market are to serve in furthering the public good which is the main purpose of the state and not to dominate. They ideologically depart from the classical communitarians such as Ferdinand Tonnies and Robert Nisbet whose major concerns were to stop the perpetuation of the adverse effects of industrialisation and modernisation on the mechanical solidarity that existed in the pre-industrial communities (Nisbet, 1962). These effects included the loss of *Gemeinschaft* (communal society), and with it, of authority and the emergence of *Geshelfschaft* (associational society).

The major point of departure of the liberal communitarians from the classical communitarians was the fear expressed by the former that the latter never explored the possibility of the community becoming oppressive, authoritarian and may unduly penetrate the individual's privacy (Etzioni: *ibid*). It is the attempt at preventing the 'opposite danger' of the community, that the liberal communitarians came up with the idea of 'responsive communitarianism' to indicate that the new communitarians are concerned with a society that is well founded, attentive to its members and profoundly democratic (Etzioni, 1996: 1-11). Profoundly democratic refers to liberal state that is distinct from classical communitarianism.

Going by the submission of Robin West, one salient feature of communitarianism is the view that collective decision-making process whether public or private, should be employed to prevent or correct social injustice and other societal ills (Robin West, 1994). This perhaps compels Garfinkle to argue that the liberal communitarians provide a value-centred guide to defining society's common goals (Garfinkle, 1997: 1-24).

It is germane to mention that also central to the communitarian philosophy is the concept of positive rights. These are rights that enable a member of the community to legally enjoy certain benefits such as subsidised education, subsidised social services such as housing, transportation, universal health care services, safe and clean environment, right to a job etc;. It also includes an obligation from the government or individuals to provide these rights and services. In essence communitarianism favours a welfare state that provides social security programmes that sharpen the consumption aspect of individuals more than the productive aspect.

On the ideological plane, communitarianism occupies a centrist position in the ideologically contested terrain. It is characterised by left

domination on economic issues and conservatism on social issues. This ideological mixture was noticeable in the works of Robert Putnam (1995) – a leading figure of individualistic philosophy of liberal democracy in the United States of America. The effects of separation of individuals from each other and from the society became noticeable in the United States at the beginning of the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. Robert Putnam detailed the impact of such separation in “*Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital*”<sup>8</sup> as a deterioration of “social capital”<sup>9</sup>. By social capital, Putnam refers to the collective values of all the social networks and the inclinations of the people within the networks to do things for each other. As a way of reinvigorating the value of social capital, which Putnam and his followers consider as a key component to building and sustaining democracy, communitarians seek to boost a partnership arrangement between the private and public institutions in the provision of social goals such as housing, educational, health-care and social services.

They (communitarians), seek to retrieve the social capital by bolstering the institutions of civil society and entrenching the principle of positive rights. Though they opine that government should not seek to replace the local communities but empower them through technical and revenue sharing support. They however emphasise that such empowerment requires the need for the study

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<sup>8</sup> In ‘*Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital*’ (1995) Putnam surveys the decline of “social capital” in the United States of America since 1950. Here, Putnam describes the reduction in all the forms of in-person social intercourse upon which Americans used to educate, and enrich the fabric of their social lives. He believes this undermines the active civil engagement which a strong democracy requires from its citizens. Part of the ways identified by Putnam in which the Americans have disengaged from political involvement includes decreased voter turnout, public meeting attendance, serving on committees and working with political parties. He also cites Americans’ growing distrust in their government. Putnam accepts the possibility that this lack of trust could be attributed to “the long litany of political tragedies and scandals since the 1960s”

<sup>9</sup> In sociology, **social capital** is the expected collective or economic benefits derived from the preferential treatment and cooperation between individuals and groups.

of and experimentation with the creative use of the structures of the civil society in the public-private partnership.

The conceptual strength of communitarianism lies in its ability to sustain a social equilibrium between the demands for personal autonomy with the need of the society to maintain order through imposition of social authority. While maintaining this balance, communitarianism recognises the differences across the societies in tolerating personal autonomy and social authority by providing flexibility which allows the two social forces meet at the point of equilibrium. This strength of communitarianism is robustly summarised by Edward Wimberley, as a pragmatic and essentially optimistic approach to achieving harmonious relationship between members of a society as well as the willingness to do so within the context of the underlying needs and constraints of natural ecosystems (Wimberley, 2008). The strength of this balance is conceived by the communitarians as the required mechanism for the amelioration of the hardship imposed on individuals by the liberal market economy especially from the 1980s. This was a period when the citizens of most African countries in their search for political truth, were up in widespread uprisings against their various states demanding for democracy and an end to dictatorship.

In spite of its conceptual strength there is still a question mark on the capability of communitarianism to address the problems of inequality, group marginalisation, cultural identity and tension between the individuals and corporate actors in the operationalisation of democracy. Though democracy wears different garbs in different ideologies but central to democracy is the will of the constituents of a community to live harmoniously with each other but which the liberal or socialist democratic institutions are not necessarily achieving.

The essence of every political viewpoint is the search for political truth that is, public justification. Political truth stresses the reflective and

collective decision-making concerning the community's best interests and the expression of these interests in terms of the community's considered judgements, which deserves respect from every citizen. Political truth by nature seeks the reasons that are internal to both the actual and idealised political and constitutional practices of society (Lipkin, 1999). Internal reasons, as explicated by Lipkin (*ibid*), are those principles, standards and rules which have been tested in deliberative debate and embraced through consensus of the community. It is in the search for this political truth that communitarian democracy endorses the integration of individual's autonomy and responsibility with the standard of citizenship and community good.

In spite of their rejection of liberalism, it must be pointed out that the 1980s communitarians were unable to put forward attractive visions of non-liberal societies other than the Aristotelian local community. For example, "*In Spheres of Justice*" (1983), Michael Walzer pointed to the Indian caste system, 'where the social meanings are integrated and hierarchical' (Walzer, 1983: 313) as an example of a non-liberal society that may be just according to its own standards. This example is in contrary to many contemporary Indian thinkers who view the caste system as an unfortunate legacy of the past that Indians should strive hard to overcome. As Bell (1997) further explains, the communitarian case for the need to respect and perhaps learn from non-liberal societies that may be as good as, if not better than, the liberal societies in the West may have been unintentionally undermined by their own use of (counter) examples. In "*After Virtue*", Alasdair MacIntyre provides justification for the Aristotelian ideal of the intimate, reciprocating local community bound by shared ends, where people simply assume and fulfil socially given roles (MacIntyre 1984). Daniel Bell in "*A Communitarian Critique of Liberalism*" (1997) disagrees with this view by offering an explanation that the pre-modern *Gemeinschaft* conception of an all-encompassing community that members unreflectively endorse seems distinctly ill-suited for complex and conflict-ridden large-scale industrialized societies (Bell, 1997). He goes further to assert the use of these unattractive examples of caste based societies or actually-existing communism as alternatives to liberal societies

only reinforce the justification of liberal theorists as to whether there could be any attractive alternatives to liberalism in complex modern societies.

A salient opportunity provided by the communitarian arguments is that their arguments serve to point out the ripple effects and long-term consequences of present decisions of using universal arguments based exclusively on the generalisation of the moral and political experience of Western liberal societies for every society. The communitarians still have the responsibility of filling the gap of genuine alternative to free market liberal democracy that Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer and Alisdair MacIntyre set to confront in the 1980s. This is where neo-communitarianism becomes relevant as a rectificatory alternative to liberalism. Neo-communitarian democracy provides a democratic model that can suitably fit into the complexity of the modern industrial and multi-ethnically segmented society. The model firstly highlights the connection between communitarianism and free market liberal democracy to justify why the communitarians are unable to address the problems of segregation and inequality which they initially set out to address.

As explained earlier, communitarian philosophy holds a centrist position on the social order by mediating between totalitarianism and libertarianism. It is apposite to briefly clarify the nature of these two extremes. Totalitarianism emphasises collectivism in form of the nation state having superior needs and objectives and that the individual only exists to serve these collective needs. On the contrary, libertarianism upholds that the autonomous individual stands at the centre of the philosophic universe. The larger community can make no legitimate demands on the individual except those necessary to maintain civil order. There is always the possibility of constant tension between the two diametrical opposing forces. Communitarianism therefore seeks to mediate the tension between these forces of extreme autonomy and extreme centralised authority. This is what is commonly referred to in the communitarian



philosophy as the maintenance of balance between the social forces of individual autonomy and centralised authority.

There is an important omission in this balance. This is the omission of tension between the fragile post-colonial state and the traditional societies in Africa where states are still struggling to consolidate their democratic experiments. While the communitarians are more concerned about how the state can guide the market to reduce harsh effects on the people through welfare policies, the most important issue that affects Africa mostly, consolidation of democracy has no space in the communitarian calculation.

The communitarians believe in the free market, though they strive to strike a balance between free market and the public good, between the marketplace and the society, between economic freedom and society's broader needs. Though communitarians see free market as a remarkable engine of prosperity that is an indispensable foundation of a stable liberal democracy but the adverse effects of market occupies the central focus of the communitarians.

One of the adverse effects was politics becoming a money-driven activity. Selection of party candidates became an affair for the wealthy while candidates are to raise large sums of money for campaigns and election proper. Though political parties have become firmly rooted in the established democracies and have acquired global relevance (Mair, 2005), but failed democracy in Africa cannot be isolated from the characters and nature of their political parties. This is not intended as a sweeping statement of generalising all the political parties as undermining democracy but to draw attention to the cartel nature of political parties in Africa and how their leaders use the platforms to undermine and disfigure democracy through personalisation of the party machineries. To entrench their personal gains in party democracy, political elites employ state

instruments to systematically transform political party into a sine qua non for democracy (Nodia and Scholtach, eds; 2006: i; 7; 43-59).

Political pluralism is expressed as the *raison d'être* for this transformation but in reality there is little or no concern for the involvement of the citizenry in the democratisation project. Regrettably, there is lean literature from party scholars on the cartel nature of political parties in Africa. Most scholars often refer to Botswana, Mauritius and Cape Verde as democratic success stories (Frankel, 2009; Knutsen, 2010; Leon, 2010) in Africa, leaving their institutional, social and civil contexts out of consideration. Democracy is not a given but historically constructed. It must therefore have widely divergent meanings and ontologies attached to it. Democracy is expressed by Abraham Lincoln as the government of the people, for the people and by the people. Under capitalism, democracy was designed to become the rule of the bourgeoisie, of the capitalists over the vast majority of workers and peasants. In whatever form capitalism may take, democracy assumes the rule of the minority rich over the majority poor.

The liberal state which the communitarians strive to protect lays claims to being democratic and to being a free world but the foundation of such assertion, is the protection of property and prevention of the expression of the majority which was assumed will abuse the sanctity of the private property. The meaning of democracy in the capitalist world is briefly illustrated in this thesis using Bobbio's (1978) definition. His definition of democracy could be regarded as a fair representation of what democracy means in the western capitalist world. Ian Adams in "*Political Ideology Today*" (2001), notes, democracy in the western capitalist world refers to a 'cluster of rules' that permit the 'broadest and surest direct and indirect participation of the majority of citizens in political decisions, i.e. in decisions affecting the whole collectivity' (Adams, 2001). These rules are as follows:

- i) All citizens who have reached legal age without regard to race, religion, economic status, sex, etc; must enjoy political rights i.e. rights to express their own opinion through their vote and/or to elect those who express it for them.
- ii) The vote of all citizens must have equal weight
- iii) All citizens enjoying political rights must be free to vote accordingly to their own opinions, formed as freely as possible, i.e. in a free contest between organised political groups competing among themselves so as to aggregate demands and transform them into collective deliberations.
- iv) They must be free in the sense that they must be in a position of having real alternatives, i.e. choosing between different solutions.
- v) Whether for collective deliberations or for the election of the representative the principle of numerical majority holds – even though different forms of majority rule can be established (relative, absolute, qualified) under certain circumstances in advance.
- vi) No decision is taken by a majority

The United States of America, where nearly all the liberal communitarians emerged, practices free enterprise, liberty and freedom. The free enterprises have given way to monopolies and the right to be elected is economically limited to a privileged group of millionaires and their hirelings. Democracy in the United States leaves the electorate with choosing between parties that are both representatives of the financial oligarchy. The two parties share the same economic philosophy of free market capitalism and political philosophy of liberal democracy. The two-party system has become a vital principle of American tradition that it is so much a part of the government and political structures that have become the way American have always done things and the way they should always do them. Democracy in the USA though has a place for the third party or independent candidates; but this place is well located in the periphery of the political system. The place merely serves as outlet for dissent symbols of vaunted tolerance and nothing more than that.

What applies to United States, applies to other neo-liberal countries. The variations are related to historical factors. In Britain for example, there is not much difference between the Conservative Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Labour Party. The ruling force of the British Parliament remains the liberal bourgeoisie that is totally committed to the rule of the market. Democracy has been historically constructed in the USA and UK to be amenable to the liberal ethos of competitive, individualist, market society.

In Africa and Asia, democracy was used as revolutionary platform against colonialism. These territories saw their struggles for independence as interpreting democracy as a government of, by and for the people form. Democracy in this sense represents the rule of the majority who were mainly the plebeians. This non-liberal construction of democracy has its root in history and conventions like its liberal counterpart.

The conviction of the communitarians that societies will remain healthy once there is an effective balance between the two forces of extreme autonomy and extreme centralised authority; and that with every right there is a responsibility may end up begging the issue especially in Africa. Rights and responsibilities enhance one another if they are in proper balance. Such balance also requires involvement of the majority of the people in the economic decision making processes within their political communities. If rights of specific individuals and groups impose demands on all other community members and are to be effectively upheld once the basic needs of all community members are attended to, the right and the basic needs of the political community also impose demands on every individuals and groups within the community as the two are mutually reinforcing partners. Involvement of majority in decision making processes implies applying democracy in such processes. How does communitarianism address the issue of democracy?

## 5.2 Communitarian democracy

From the foregoing it is glaring that communitarianism sees diversity as a social given. It, in view of this acceptance, tries to put in place a political system that will render such diversity a positive and constructive force in the society. That is, a system that is committed to the perfection or improvability of both the individual human-consciousness and the collective-social consciousness (Preuss 1995).

The accomplishment of this goal requires the communitarians to seek a national community where people as equal citizens interact with each other to produce what Robert Lipkin referred to as the 'appropriate community' (Lipkin, 1983). This appropriate community is assumed by the communitarians to possess the capacity of providing solutions to social problems and also reducing group dissension by drawing support from the involvement of private institutions, civil society in particular.

Communitarian democracy advocates a form of democracy that embraces certain type of community with a form of political organisation, interaction and dialogue devoid of any external reason. It is a brand of democracy that incorporates such values as liberty, equality, egalitarianism, community and solidarity as defined through the consents of the governed. In line with communitarian democracy, citizens are obliged to present arguments in terms of reason which is internal to the constitutional culture. If for any reason they have external reasons for advocating a particular position, they should be able to find suitable translations of their positions in the language of and reason of liberty, equality, community and solidarity in the societal politics and constitution.

Principally, communitarian democracy relies more on civil societies for significant political and social changes in the society. They believe that the

survival and consolidation of democracy is predicated on a civil society that is active in delimiting the state dominance (Harberson et al 1994; Gymah-Boadi 1996). Presently the World Bank recognises the role of civil society in articulating the people's aspirations and mounting pressures on government to yield to popular demands (2000: 43). On this basis, the World Bank assumes that an active civil society will aid decentralisation, encourage wider participation at the grassroots and across all sectors of society especially in an ethnically divided society and reduce the scope for autonomous government actions (2000).

A pertinent question left unanswered by the liberal communitarian is how the character of the state will not affect the character of the civil society. Moreover the civil societies are non-profit organisations and most of them rely on financial support from the state and foreign organisations to execute their projects. The idea of seeing both a strong state and strong civil society though as separate but essentially complement each other, implies that civil society can only exist in relationship to the state and not a potentially democratic sphere in its own right through which alternative versions of democracy might be pursued (Baker, 1997). More importantly when we consider the fact that the nature and character of the state will impact on the nature and character of the civil society. The character of the state is shaped by the nature of its economic philosophy.

Communitarianism especially the liberal communitarians differ with the laissez faire conservatives mainly in respective roles of the private sector and the state. They are though concerned with the involvement of the third sector in governance, that is the civil society to address the effects of segregation on the people but the genesis of poverty arising from the segregation was left unaddressed. The issue of leadership and how they emerge in the community is left intact in the domain of party democracy. The classical communitarians were no doubt tending towards communism or what Keane (1998) later referred to as socialist republicanism. This represents a situation where autonomy, participation and the economy will be placed under the guide of a socialist system. Hindess

sees this as an inadequate conceptualisation of democracy because both the classical communitarians and Keane ignore that socialism and democracy can not mix effectively. Democracy according to Hindess will in the final analysis, incline towards exercising control over the socialist ideals in order to defend the autonomy of the citizens (Hindess, 1995).

The socialist communitarianism is therefore not an all-embracing model where every member of the self governing community will have an effective say in the governance especially in the leadership process. Management of such community is always handled by few bureaucrats that are hardly accountable to the generality of the citizens but the ruling single party. Communitarians, either classical or responsive, also fail like the liberal democrats to address the inabilities of pre-colonial African societies to get committed to working with their own local grains that have recognisable benefits as witnessed in their kingdoms and empires, to develop modern political institutions. They were rather coaxed to mimicry best-practice approach of the western liberal democracy.

The belief that once the people through their various communities are made to buy into the liberal state project, the community personnel occupy key positions in the state and the state becomes a baby-sitter for the people, the effects of segregation and poverty will evaporate remains the greatest fault-line of communitarian democracy. This is due to the absence of self-governing community in their democratic calculation. There is therefore a need for the communitarian shortcomings to be rectified by another model that can actually provide an attractive alternative to liberalism which the sub-Saharan African states can adopt to confront the challenges of the market, globalisation, liberal and neoliberal democracy.

At this point it is necessary to explain the concept of community as

used in this thesis in order to avoid any ambiguity and misrepresentation. . Also there is need to clarify what it is meant by self-governing community before addressing why the communitarian philosophy is unable to rescue the sub Sahara Africa from political ruination.

### **5.2.1 Conceptualising Community**

The penchant for community in social science discourse especially in sociology remains an interesting issue. The classical works of Ferdinand Tonnies and Emile Durkheim present community in different sociological perspectives. Tonnies in his *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* published in 1887 (Christodoulidis, 1998: 35) pitted community against society. He uses community to signify the organic and cohesive world of traditional society, while society according to him, refers to the fragmented world of modernity with its rationalised and individualised structures. In contrast, Durkheim as a positivist had no difficulty in accepting the burden of modernity and its individualised and differentiated social organization which according to him was potentially liberating. To Durkheim, society is essentially a community based on cultural values while modernity signifies the movement from mechanical forms of integration to organic forms of integration. Seeing society same as community as Durkheim does will mislead us to lose the essential character of a community which is more than sharing cultural values but possessing network of social relationships in a more organic and cohesive manner than a society.

Price, while following Tonnies' line of argument presents a simplified meaning of community. He describes it as a network of social relations propelled by shared meaning and above all shared values (Price, 1977). The liberal communitarians could not accept Price interpretation because it negates the universal nature of liberalism. Their rejection of Price's was premised on the assumption that community, if taken in its ordinary meaning will imply the abandonment of ethical universalism and withdrawal into closed particularistic loyalties (Bellah, 1998: 15). In place of this ordinary meaning, they suggest that the scope of community must be viewed as a nestled arrangement where a smaller



community nestle in the larger and more encompassing community (Etzioni, 1998). Therefore towns nestle in more encompassing regions that also nestle in a country wide colony, and invariably in a globalised world that encapsulate all settlements. In essence, liberal communitarians see the global community as a globalised structure starting from the smallest level and ending up at the global level through economic, political, technological and social linkages.

While we may agree with the hierarchical arrangement of the communities, abandoning the particularistic context which has been discussed elsewhere appears to be faulty. This fault forms part of the essence of clarifying what a community is. This is further reinforced by the desire to search for how democracy can assume its meaning of government of the people, by the people and for the people in sub-Sahara Africa. Doing this, will require resting the argument here on Hindess' argument of what democracy is. This is because his explanations are very germane to the principles of neo-communitarian democracy. But before embarking on discussion of alternative model of democracy for the sub-Saharan Africa, it is apposite to conceptually clarify neo-communitarianism and neo-communitarian community as these will become prominent in the remaining part of the thesis.

### **5.3 Neo-Communitarian Philosophy**

This section explains the underlying principles of neo-communitarian philosophy and ideology, before delving into its community and democracy. Before doing this it is apposite to explain why communitarianism is unsuitable for resolving post-colonial African states' political crisis. This arises from its assumption of the effectiveness of civil society in the delivery of the state services including democracy without taking into consideration the relationship between the character of the civil society and the character of the state as explained earlier. The relationship between these two characters is further elaborated here with two explanatory variables - the state structure and the dialectics.

In the context of this study and using Madunagu's argument in "*Dialectics of Structures and Governance*" (Madunagu, 2011), the structure is the "organisation of parts as dominated by the general character of the whole"; or the "aggregate of an entity in their relationships to each other". Dialectics is in the same context the "way in which aspects of a situation affect each other". When we therefore speak of a state's political structure, economic structure, social structure, geopolitical structure or governance structure, we are merely looking at the state as an organised entity through a particular prism, a prism that attempts to isolate a particular sub-structure and pull it out for closer look, deeper analysis and, hence, deeper understanding of not just the particular sub-structure but the entire superstructure as a whole and how both the sub and super-structures affect or influence each other. In this case how the democracy in the sub Saharan Africa's state influences the state and vice versa. It is an "attempt" because this "isolating" and "pulling out" can only be approximate, given the intimate and inseparable connections, in real life, between the various sub-structures of the state.

The corollary to this proposition is that not only are the various sub-structures of the sub-Saharan African states as structured superstructures inseparable, they also continuously impact on each other, and individually and collectively – impact on the quality and process of democracy and governance. It is therefore not an accident that the ideology that is dominant in the economic sub-structure is also the one that is dominant in the political sub-structure. It is also not a mere coincidence that struggles seen in politics are reproduced in, and are reproduced by, struggles in the economy.

Alleviating the effects of these struggles requires radical transformation of both political and economic substructures. This transformation will emerge from the invention of neo-communitarian democracy and socialised partnership economic system, which will both serve as an arrangement for the reconfiguration of the state. The combination of the two models will provide an

environment that will insulate democracy from liberal effects in Africa, reconstruct the state by taking the ethno-nationality groups into consideration, launch a democratisation strategy that recognises ethnic groups as semi-autonomous entities, and re-organise the market in a socialised partnership arrangement devoid of separation of individuals from the state. This is the underlying principle of neo-communitarianism that provides decommodified character of speconomy to prevent the people from recomodified strategy of liberal communitarianism.

Democracy in sub-Saharan Africa today, is understood within the context of liberal majoritarian democracy. Giving concession to Africa's historical predicament and the dismal conditions of human life and other spheres of existence in the continent, the trend of events appears to be one of a shift of political paradigm from autocratic structures to that of majoritarian tyranny. In the drive towards democracy in Africa, elite dictators and rulers, both military and civilians have for the most part being in alliance with external forces. The turn-around of these foreign forces in favour of multi-party democracy as currently witnessed in the Arab Spring does not imply political freedom for the people. Neither does it remove the political domination of one group by the other nor the people's exclusion from the economic decision making process. It is just a process of abandoning dictatorial leader for dictator party that will still sustain the market and dependent economy. The issue of freedom and how it's claim by the left, middle or right ideologies is weak, and how speconomy plans to rectify this is addressed in Chapter Seven.

While it is contentious that liberal democratic system has brought with it some gains, the fundamental question is, how substantial are these gains, and to what extent has this majoritarian democratic model built on the strengths of the non-indigenous institutions and impact on politics in Africa? The predominant assumptions of liberal democracy is that with the full enthronement of liberal majoritarian democracy together with its institutions in the post-colonial African

states, many of the problems bedevilling the continent will be effectively challenged and perhaps solved. A lot of these claims remain a false mirage. Contrary to these claims, there is the replacement of individual dictators with dominant party dictatorships, diminishing values in local currencies, rise in ethnic violence, careerist civil societies, electoral frauds and ear-deafening corruption.

Another major flaw of liberal democracy is over representative democracy. Always the electorate are made to delegate their sovereignty to one elected representative every four or five years. This creates the impression that sovereignty ultimately lies with the people and that the people have the final authority on government. On the contrary, people only delegate sovereignty to a representative who exercises such on their behalf through the institutions of the government. The first failure in this arrangement is that it serves as a recipe for democratic disaster because it usurps the sovereignty of the people.

Drawing on Athenian spirit, government of, by and for the people, democracy means the authority of the people and not the authority of a delegate acting on their behalf. Delegates act according to the dictates of their parties and which in African context, are dictates of the party leaders. This in essence means surrendering sovereignty to a political party or politicians who are at liberty to act instead of the people and not the people. This explains why governments and state operators take some actions that do not receive the support of the people, yet they claim to do such on behalf of the people. A good example of this was Britain and USA involvement in the Iraqi war without the support of their citizens. Though some Americans and Britons campaigned against the move but the fundamental issue here is that the political system of representative democracy with elected the leaders had already taken sovereignty away from the people.

Politicians under this arrangement act with impunity without any recourse to the people. When people complain of their politicians not being

sensitive to their plight, they all ignore the fact that it is the political system of representative democracy that is actually insensitive to their plight. The absurdity of the system allows a single representative to usurp the mandate of hundreds of thousands of people and act the way he likes or according to the dictates of his party and sometimes to the detriment of the people who owns the sovereignty. The politician gets away with such act for as long as he has the support of the party, most importantly, the party leaders. Liberal democracy through its representative political arrangement imposes minority candidates on the majority to confirm its status as a recipe for political instability.

Neo-communitarianism insists that the sub-Saharan Africa's political salvation can never come from the present liberal democracy or any other grand paradigm. It therefore maintains a particularistic deviation from the universal assumption of liberal democracy. Democracy is very flexible and it is this flexibility that makes it highly complex. To understand democracy requires understanding its context because the context of any object is very important in the understanding and usage of the object. Context here refers to the human element that brings together and cement the bricks of knowledge of an object which in this wise is democracy. How we decide to put the bricks together defines the usage of the bricks. Every system must be able to manage its context with knowledge. The idea of developing an educated middle class and a framework of civil institutions cannot be taken out of the context. The process of developing this class and its role will be determined by the context which may not necessarily be uniform.

The problem with liberal and socialist democracy lays in their global exchange of best practice ideas to determine the democracy and knowledge relevant to the collective 'us'. That we now live in a world driven by global exchange of knowledge where we crash against one another's does not remove the fact that every community will still need to manage its own context with the acquired knowledge in its own peculiar way. This argument finds a relevant

explanation in the Arab Spring. The uprisings brought about regime changes but in different dimensions. Development of an educated middle class may be relevant in some contexts and it may be irrelevant in others. This is where 'best fit' surpasses the 'best practice' assumption of liberal democracy. It is the best-fit approach that separates the popular uprisings in the sub-Sahara Africa in 1980s and the Arab Spring especially Libya. As explained earlier, Libyans addressed their political problem through their contextual interpretation of reality to arrive at a decision that is presently relevant to their community and needs. The Libyans in the spirit of communitarian democracy developed their own context for the pragmatic conception of political truth to transform their political and moral notions into workable arrangement through the reflective consensus of the citizens. Their pragmatic conception though still requires further deliberation, compromises an empathetic understanding and accommodation of all the indigenous groups in order to achieve a neo-communitarian democratic level that will serve as the foundation for the construction of an autochthonous Libyan state.

The 1980s protests in places such as Benin Republic and Cameroon left the infrastructure of the old regimes in place while the Arab Spring is about the state-rebirth with different ideological postures. This is contrary to the "intellectual interlocutors" that mid-wifed the popular protests in 1980s in sub-Saharan Africa.

Neo-communitarian philosophy endorses the communitarian rejection of liberalism as an ontologically and epistemologically incoherent ideology that fails to recognise the deep identity divide amongst nations. Divisions by identity within nations cannot be overlooked in any democratic discourse. In liberal-democracy discourse, such divisions are regarded as non-issues because liberalism as an ideology calls for equality of all persons with no regard for race, ethnicity, religion or language. The Quebec issue in the Canadian politics has proved wrong the naive assumption of liberalism on the cultural identity and sovereignty. Though there is an increased diversity in Canada due to changed patterns of

immigration, with many more people immigrating to Canada as pointed out by Kymlicka in '*Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*' (1995), this does not prevent ethno cultural conflicts between the Quebec and the state of Canada. Ethnocultural conflicts are prominent global political violence that has been witnessed in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Middle East and Rwanda. It is a conflict underpinned by political and social action from individuals or ethnic groups who feel that they have not been equitably and fairly treated by the state. Kymlicka explains these actions as raising the issue of rights for such groups and individuals such as the first nations that occupy Quebec in Canada. Liberalism opines that any claim by those bearing distinctive identity for the protection of their culture or religion is in some way, a violation of the individual rights or equality of all persons. This assumption remains the tension between the protection of group identity and individual rights in a multicultural society as witnessed in Canada and currently in the northern parts of Nigeria.

The ability of the state to manage this tension without resulting in crisis requires the invention of a unique strategy that may not necessarily be uniform to all states. It is this variance that poses a defining question for liberal democracy and to which it is yet to respond. At the risk of repetition, one of the fault-lines of liberal democracy is its failure to accept that equal treatment for all results in unequal condition for some people. This view becomes more pronounced when we factor in the generally accepted definition of democracy as summarised by Lipset, a leading figure of the theory of liberal democracy. Lipset, in his book "*Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* " (Lipset, 1981), describes democracy as:

"a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office" (Lipset, *ibid*: 27).

This is a majoritarian posture that may deprive the minority groups a fair chance to influence decision-making process including those affecting them as a group. It is a posture that is being threatened by the clash of self and group interests. This clash will ultimately, if no solution is proffered, encourage the development of self-help strategy that such deprived groups may find suitable for the protection of their group interest. Liberal democracy appears to be handicapped in providing a workable solution that could prevent the inevitable clash between individuals' rights and group protection in multi-cultural societies. This handicap is illustrated by Quebec in Canada and the emerging scenario in post-Gaddafi Libya.

The liberal argument of providing the state with a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office is yet to provide answer to the presence of strong separatist and autonomous movements in Quebec region of Canada. Quebec, a Francophone region, does not only command a strong economic standing in Canada, it also enjoys a respectable social position and influence political power in the country. Quebec still nurses the feeling of being exploited and dominated by the Anglophone Canadian region. These feelings dated back to the origins of Canada as a nation. It is germane to posit that no matter how theoretically sound an ideology or the constitutional efforts of a multicultural state like Canada to invent a liberal state, the tension between the group identity and individual equality will remain. Ethnic groups who felt oppressed are bound to demand for recognition of identity rights, fair treatment and equality to other groups.

This type of demand was exemplified by African-American recognition through the Civil Rights Movement in the US and Quiet Revolution launched by the French in Canada for the protection of French language and culture in Quebec. Both the Civil Rights Movement and the Quiet Revolution



resulted in changing the term Negro to African-American in order to connect to their ancestral identity in Africa while in Canada, French-Canadian was changed to Quebecois in an effort to define themselves more of the province of their forebears colonists rather than that of the country of Canada. The Quebec issue poses a defining question for the Canadian Liberal state and liberal democracy in general. The feeling of being a dominated, exploited, and disrespected minority by many Quebecers is similar to the feelings nursed by the Amazigh of Libya in the post-Gaddafi Libya liberal state.

After playing a central role in the revolt that toppled Muammar Gaddafi, members of Libya's long-oppressed Berber minority, known in Libya as Amazigh, felt aggrieved for not being considered for any cabinet seat in the interim government of national unity. This neglect was immediately interpreted by the Amazigh people that they may, as witnessed under Gaddafi regime, be banished to the side lines of public life. In Ali Mohammed Shetwi's words, a senior member of the Council of Jadu, an Amazigh town of roughly 20,000 people in Libya's west, "We do not disagree with the new government, but we want to be represented and included with ministerial positions. We feel we are not included". The Amazigh see themselves as Libyans and Amazigh at the same time. Omar Saeed, in his complimentary remarks to Shetwi's, emphasised "First of all we are Libyan, but we are also Amazigh. Therefore the government should be Arab and Amazigh together." "The Amazigh must be represented according to their percentage of Libya's population and their share of the fighting". The tension between Amazigh and Arabs is one of the deepest of the many fault-lines inside Libya's assumed unified society that still stands as a challenge to a united and cohesive liberal state after Gaddafi's 42-year-rule. The Amazigh's request serves as a testament to the reality that membership in group plays important role for the indigenous peoples.

The experience of the indigenous peoples in Chile provides another veritable example of the weakness in liberal democracy. The liberal assumption

based on individual equality fails to appreciate that non-recognition of the roles of the indigenous groups and non-provision of constitutional space for such groups can lead to a frustration and marks a fatal flaw in the implementation of a constitutional government in a multi-cultural society. The basic issue arising from these scenarios is the deep divide by identity which liberal democracy tries to ignore. This remains a challenge to the universal assumption of liberal democracy in every society. The reality in the plural society as shown in Canada, Spain, Chile, Libya etc. is that the deep divide by identity compels every group to make demands for the protection of its values and identity irrespective of its economic status within the state. This is the essence of multiculturalism. Failure to accept this reality reduces the universal assumption of liberal democracy or socialist democracy to a theoretical naivety. Any political arrangement that fails to take this fact of life into consideration by accommodating indigenous groups as positive semi-autonomous entities within the state is bound to encounter ethno cultural conflict.

Liberal democracy could therefore be regarded as an ideology destined to flounder in multi-ethnic non-European societies. The failure of its constitutional system to consider how the laws could be shaped to accommodate the indigenous groups, not just individuals belonging to such groups but the groups themselves, with the legal space they need to act as mediating structures between the state and the individual is one of the fault lines of liberal democracy in the sub-Saharan Africa.

Managing this type of challenge in a plural society where each group is free to make demands for the protection of its values and identity, is at the heart of neo-communitarian philosophy. It is the failure of liberal democracy in providing a workable solution to this tension that in the first instance draws communitarianism into the domain of political philosophy. The argument of the liberal communitarians which emphasised the survival of liberal and neo-liberal state using the civil societies as the collective voices of the people and turning the

state into a baby-sitter for individuals, left no room for state or economy reconfiguration. Their arguments expose liberal communitarianism as an invented strategy meant to protect the state against the backlash of the market.

Neo-communitarianism, departing from both the communitarianism and liberalism, maintains that individuals and state cannot be separated from each other. Neo-communitarian philosophy emphasises the sustenance of the relationship between individuals and the state, and that any attempt at separating them will produce a separatist and individualised system that is peculiar to liberal capitalist system.

Concern about the society in the West, took the form of rational analysis that promotes continuous commitment to rational world view. To understand western thinking about society requires the understanding of its rational or scientific orientation. The West adherence to liberal democracy as the only genuine form of democracy is a product of this orientation. This is an orientation that assumes thinking to be an autonomous mental activity explicable only in terms of rationality or reason. This view has been radically challenged and hampered by the non-rational forces inherent in the cultural and historical values of the people both in the Western (as seen in Canada) and non-Western states.

One of the main weaknesses of the European rationalists is the conceit that thinking is an ahistorical, asocial natural process, when in reality human thought is a 'natural process evolving from time-bound, sociocultural ingredients and forces' (Rossides, 1978: 1). Neo-communitarian philosophy stresses that we cannot understand the symbolic culture independent of its social contexts. Every social theory must of necessity reflect the needs, circumstance and time of their contexts.

Fukuyama's and Huntington's assumptions of liberal democracy as the terminus of the needs, circumstance and time, borders on lack of cultural sensitivity and care for the evolutionary trends of human beings and their society. After all, it was the rise of capitalism in the West that produced its own distinctive mode of thought called liberalism, which according to Rossides (1978) has helped, in various forms, to legitimise and direct the development and sustenance of liberal capitalist society. Liberalism essentially refers to the acceptance of private property, private economic motives and actions, and political and legal equality as central social institutions. This is why there is not much ideological differences between the major political parties in the West especially United Kingdom and the USA, as they all subscribe to the core values of liberalism that is, the validity and superiority of liberal capitalist society, while only disagreeing on how to run it.

Neo-communitarian philosophy represents a non-rationalist school with the assumption that developmental path of the society must be related to the type of society in which people live, rather than piloting such developments along the path of a particular theory that follows the capitalist or socialists path of development within given national and international contexts. It holds that human activity takes place under determinate social and cultural conditions that are vital to the understanding of the socio-political and economic processes including crisis in the given society. It is a philosophy which takes into account that the term liberalism as used conventionally in the field of political science refers to the symbols of capitalism, or more precisely to the political, legal, economic and social values and doctrines of the middle class. While on the theoretical spectrum of complex social systems, it sees liberalism as occupying a position between feudalism and feudal-absolutism, on the one hand, and socialism on the other which in sociology means a positive, industrial, Gesellschaft, rational-legal, urban, or associational society.

Neo-communitarianism regards the logic underlying liberal society that human beings, functioning in large part individually, can achieve both a theoretical and practical mastery of the natural and social universes as sweeping aside the pre-existing traditional institutions regardless of their ability to contribute positively to the emergence of modern state. This posture shows liberalism as lacking the focus of 'working with the grain' (Booth, 2011) by its failure to treat and accept these institutions in the host societies as potential resources for democratisation and development.

#### **5.4 Neo-communitarian Community**

Neo-communitarianism holds that the global community is an aggregate of communities with each having its unique context. A simple illustration of this uniqueness goes thus: while there may be global human rights in all the communities, the fundamental rights are not necessarily global in all ramifications. For example, the right to live is a global human right but right to live in a community is a unique fundamental right that differs from state to state. Different visas for different categories of people from different countries suitably explain this right.

##### **5.4.1 Neo-communitarian democracy**

Democracy, Hindess claims as far back in 1983, is 'a medium and form of political struggle, accepting not only the dominance of parliamentary democracy, but also the role of popular democratic forms' (Hindess, 1983). Later, in 1989, he puts forward a more succinct definition that upholds democracy as a special form of self-government where the people as a whole exercise power and have equal political standing in the republic. This accounts for why there are many versions or revisions of democracy of which liberal democracy is one. The reason for these revisions was encapsulated by David Held in "*Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World*" (Archibugi and Held (eds), 1995) that since the contemporary conditions have changed, theories and concepts of democracy must change accordingly.

The process of conceptual stretch of democracy made it to lose its original meaning (Baogang He, 2011). Neo-communitarianism maintains its theoretical depth by sticking to Lincolnian meaning of democracy in order to avoid ideological narcissism that characterises most of the democratic revisions. Sticking to this meaning of democracy leads us to identifying the significance of 'self-governing community of citizens' (Hindess, 1992) in the democratisation process.

As elaborated by Baogang (2011), there are two important features attached to the self-governing community of citizens. These features are vital for our understanding and usage of community. First, the features presuppose identification in terms of a clear political demarcation of territory and of population. Secondly, government is conceived as deriving its authority from the community. In line with this argument, the theme of a self-governing community of citizens could be understood in two perspectives. It could be understood in Hobbesian contract terms, as a correlative sphere of autonomy within which citizens should be free to act within the framework of rules for which they are collectively responsible. It may also be understood as that by which important matters of public concerns are decided by some appropriate democratic process within the control of the demos or its delegated agencies.

The idea of delegation as an authorisation has been used to bring representative government into the model of a self-governing community. It is from this idea of delegation that liberal democracy derives its claim to democracy as government of the people. What is of particular interest in this thesis is to distinguish between the self-governing community that liberal democracy is laying claim to and the community of citizens that bedrocks the interpretation of community in a neo-communitarian democracy. Community of citizens in the thesis refers to a community in which independent persons participate in the

government of people with equal rights and capacity to action that is not at the beck and call or mercy of the state (Hindess, 1992) or political parties.

Though all the theories lay emphasis on the autonomy of the citizen but the application of the rule of law is often at the expense of the claimed autonomy as citizens 'are effectively alienated from any control or say in the final process' (Baogang He, 2011). For example socialism tries to assure the individual autonomy by bringing capital within the responsibility of an active self government (Hindess, 1992) while republicanism on the other, though gives sufficient room for individual to participate in the political life of the state as independent agents, but allows the state to rightfully interfere in the interests of all citizens (Hindess, 1995). The idea of self-governing community remains one of the greatest challenges to the universal assumption of liberal democracy and all other universal political paradigms.

The parting line of neo-communitarianism and these universal paradigms is the issue of who is more significant in the political process within a community. While neo-communitarianism holds the view that the most significant political actors in a community are the individuals due to the mechanical relationship between them and their communities. All other political paradigms including communitarianism and liberal democracy, deriving their strengths from the universal grand theory lay emphasis on the 'concept of corporate actors' (Hindess, 1995) such as political parties, state agencies, economic enterprises, interests groups, and civil society; They opine that these corporate actors are more important than the individuals in the community. These corporate actors are regarded in neo-communitarianism as artificial partners of the state whose primary goal is to feather the nests of their founders or serve the parochial goals for which they are purposely established. This is one of the connecting points of communitarianism to liberal democracy. It shares the perspective of corporate actors with liberal democracy. It assumes that involvement of the people in the administration of the public institutions could only be efficiently done through the

institutions of civil societies. This assumption when transferred into the democratic terrain simply implies that the civil societies as corporate actors are more important than the individuals in the operation of democracy.

Dahl, a leading advocate of pluralist democracy, was very emphatic on how significant the corporate actors are to democracy. In "*Pluralist Model of Democracy*" (Dahl, 1982), Dahl explicates that organisations are necessary to the operation of democracy on a large scale and that democracy is mutually controlled by a variety of organisations (Dahl, 1982). Dahl, like any other pluralist advocates, fails to realise that these corporate actors may not be as efficient or effective as assumed for democratic tasks. The assumptions of the pluralists that problems pose for democracy by one organisation could be resolved by constitutional arrangements involving particular organizations and the relations between them, as some of the pluralist writings of G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski appear to suggest (Dahl, *ibid*) appear to be weak assumptions in African politics. There are instances where the Election Tribunals could not solve electoral problems pose to democracy by the political parties, electoral agencies and state security agencies.

The chapter takes into consideration the liberal arguments that idea of a self-governing community is inherently problematic because it is very unlikely for the complex society to return to a concept of citizen-based democracy as propounded in the communitarian democracy. The argument fails to consider that complex society is an aggregate of communities, villages and towns with their administrative systems that could provide the necessary grain upon which democratic institutions could be constructed. Neo-communitarian democracy emphasises commitment to 'working with the grain' that is, the indigenous values of the host community which Booth (2011) clarifies as building on existing institutional arrangements that have recognisable benefits rather than imposing the best practise approach on every community. The political truth about democracy is its flexibility with best-fit institutional innovations built constructively on what



already exists. Pre-existing traditional political institutions of colonial Africa needed to be treated as a potential resource for democratisation process rather than been swept aside regardless of their ability to contribute.

What is actually ‘inherently problematic’ in self-governing community as argued by the liberals is the failure of such community to mimic what works in advanced capitalist democracies. After-all, as Booth explains in “*Governance for the development in Africa: Building on what works*” (Booth, 2011), millions of dollars have been spent on programmes to make private enterprise work in Africa as it does in the US, elections work as they do in Sweden, audit authorities as in Germany and civil society campaigns as in the Netherlands – with results that have been mixed at best.

Also it is assumed by liberal democracy that there are limits to what a community can do or control due to the influence of the external effects on the activities and changes within the communities and of which the communities cannot control or manipulate. Events like global economy are easily referred to as one of those factors that are not within the orbit of the community control (Hindess, 1995) and yet they have significant consequences on the politics within the community. There are also some internal forces such as the forces of the market which the community cannot control without violating the rights of the individuals. These internal elements invariably undermine the community control. In short, they are of the view that democratic self-government and the life of the community depend on conditions that cannot be entirely within political control (Hindess, *ibid*). These arguments fail to take into consideration that the dependence of supposedly self-governing communities on the activities of the corporate actors and the influence of the external factors do persistently generate tension between the idea of democracy and the institutions of both the corporate actors and the external forces.

While democracy inclines towards the autonomy of individuals within the community, the democratisation institutions and the external forces always incline toward the supremacy of the corporate actors. When institutional arrangements fall short of greater democratic ideals, a crisis of the idea of democracy becomes imminent leading democracy to further abstraction and becomes something unattainable. It is therefore not surprising that other rounds of conflict may erupt in Libya and Egypt if their new institutional arrangements fall short of the envisaged democratic ideals. A salient feature of liberal democracy which the governments emerging from the ruinations of the old regimes are adopting as the best practice is its provision for the multi-party periodic succession of leaders and which does not come that far very often. The attempt at combining democracy with capitalism in an unrestrained manner as currently being exported into the two countries by the 'global capitalist leaders in the name of liberty' (Chua, 2003) will still retain the context that promotes personalisation of power and politics by the ousted leaders but this time through the emergence of dominant political parties in each country.

Democracy can hardly be exported to any society. Rather it has to grow from the local grains nurtured by people's cultural values. Grand political theorists perceive the development of political culture as a simplistic change of mentality or values. They fail to realise that both morals and values depend on structures of economic production and distribution, and on the modes to guarantee societal security and reproduction functions as well (Linder, 2004: 4). The promotion, practice and vicissitudes of democracy in different parts of the world have exposed the concept of democracy to some definitional haze and diverse forms of interpretations (Adediran, 1996). The concept of democracy has become pervasive in the modern values and political system and elusive in definition. By the same word, different theories and ideologies mean many different things. The multi-dimensional nature of the meaning of democracy is not unconnected with its various typologies which include liberal, socialist, popular, direct, indirect or participatory, non-party, consensus and deliberative democracies.

In view of this pool of democracies, it is no surprise that, it is elusive in providing a clear-cut definition that will cover all typologies. However, the attempts by scholars at encapsulating some set of principles and elements of democracy are more instructive in overcoming the various problems of explaining and understanding the concept of democracy. These elements appear to be central to these typologies of democracy but on a closer look they are not. The elements include free and fair elections, open, accountable and responsible government, civil and political and human liberties, and democratic society (Beetham and Boyle, 1995). Unfortunately, what makes society democratic remains a contentious element. A society can only be democratic in accordance with its peculiar principles which can be found in its polity. It is these principles that determine the mode of the elections, the process of accountability and nature of government responsibility. This is an important analytical tool for an understanding of differences in cultures within or between societies.

Neo-communitarian democracy incorporates such central political values as liberty, equality, community, economic democracy, popular participation, cohesiveness and solidarity of all ethnic groups within the larger state. Implicitly, neo-communitarian democracy endorses a constitutional relationship between the nationality groups and the larger state where each groups has a semi-autonomous power to sustain their indigenous values and determine affairs that are peculiar to their ethnic group. Any form of democracy that ignores the connection between the human nature and the state in governance may lead to a frustrating failure in the implementation of its policies. Central to this belief is that neo-communitarianism values the liberty of equal citizens interacting with one another to produce an appropriate community.

Consequently, neo-communitarianism and democracy are conceptually connected. It is a thick conception of democracy that favours the presentation of arguments in terms of reasons internal to the constitutional culture of the community. It is through this presentation, that reason(s) which are internal to both the actual and idealised political and constitutional practices, principles, standards and rules that have conceptual ties to the basic values of the community

could be tested in a deliberative debate and finally embraced by a reflective consensus of the community. This view does not advocate the rejection of external views but rather emphasises the subjection of such views to the deliberative process of the democratic community which embraces the reflective consensus of the citizenry.

Neo-communitarian democracy does not support the idea of using the state to impose such reasons in a coercive manner on every indigenous group or those that reject certain brand of external reason. In a neo-communitarian democracy, the citizenry will be more committed to a broader conception of democracy in their economic and political activities within the community. It entails, as argued by Lipkin in "Progressivism as Communitarian Democracy" (Lipkin, 1999: 229) thus:

- a. citizen's *stake* in democratic self-government;
- b. democratic conception as a viable public philosophy;
- c. integration of the interests of individuals (*qua* individual communitarian democrats, not necessarily individuals *per se*) with the interests of (the) community (communities);
- d. a theory of citizenship according to which integration of interests through the establishment of pan-nationality institutions is achieved;
- e. communitarian democracy as a theory of the good or a theory of the meaning of life;
- f. the comprehensiveness of the conception, that is, how public policy is formulated not as a zero-sum game, but as also taking the loser's concerns into account;
- g. the stability in preserving the communitarian democratic institutions, and

- h.* the vibrancy in imaginatively changing these institutions in the appropriate circumstances

With clear description of the above roles, neo-communitarian democracy will be able to create a platform where the people as a collective, constitutes the government, retain and exercise the initiative for policy-making and governing authority without being subjected to such authority. The values of the state are determined by the people and not vice versa. . Government listens and complies with the demands of the people. This is made possible because the neo-communitarian social order is characterised by popular mobilisation for grassroots development and self- activity of the people. In essence it is an idea having its roots in political philosophy of populism which embraces the following values:

1. Liberty
2. Direct democracy
3. Economic democracy
4. Equality
5. Community
6. Solidarity

This form of democracy stands a chance to correct the identified flaws associated with either liberal or socialist democracy that inaugurated political crisis in post-colonial sub-Saharan African states with their narrow base for participation, representative democracy, zero-sum politics and centralised elites command structure. For these flaws to be corrected there is need according to McConnachie (2002), for the reform of the political system where powers can be meaningfully exercised by the sovereigns instead of representatives, the political parties and other vested corporate interests.

## 5.5 Neo-communitarian democracy as a way forward

The section addresses the question of whether, or under what conditions, socialist and liberal democratic institutions contribute to 'developmental governance' in sub-Saharan Africa. When judged against liberal or socialist democracy, democracy in the sub-Saharan African not only has many shortcomings but has also sparked many controversies. This is well established in both the academic and policy literature including this thesis. While few dispute the desirability of democracy and good governance for Africa in theory, many remain sceptical about whether in practice the two necessarily go together.

In an elaborate study titled "Democracy and Governance" Richard Jeffries (1993) points out that the 'indiscriminate promotion of multi-party democracy' in Africa through multi-lateral agreements between the agents of liberal institutions and African governments, undermines some of the Africa's most 'promising experiments in effective governance' (Jeffries, 1993). He cites the non-democratic governments of Jerry Rawlings in Ghana (before the 1992 presidential election) and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda as illustrations (Alence, 2004: 164).

Some sceptics have gone further to question whether multi-party democracy in Africa is likely to alter the neo-patrimonial governance widely blamed for African states' failure as agents of development. 'Neo-patrimonial' illustrates African states as in spite of possessing the formal structures of modern bureaucracies, still operate on patrimonial principles – characterised by personalised political authority, weak checks on the private appropriation of public resources, and pervasive clientelism (Callaghy 1987; Jackson & Rosberg 1982; Me'dard 1982). Enhancing such states' developmental performance as argued by Alence (*ibid*: 165) requires the insulation of policymaking and implementation from arbitrary political interference.

Thinking of subjecting the African politicians to greater societal pressures through democratisation within a neo-patrimonial context may seem at

best to miss the point (Bienen & Herbst 1996; Callaghy and Ravenhill eds; 1993). Indeed, some analysts such as Chabal concluded that democratisation in Africa has mainly served to erect a facade of institutional respectability, behind which deeply rooted patterns of neo-patrimonial elite governance continue to dominate (Bratton & van de Walle 1997; Chabal 2002; Joseph 1997). Fixing the gap of democratic deficits created by the 'big man' governance constitutes the major focus of this section.

It has been established in this study that there is nothing that makes Africa intrinsically undemocratic or makes democracy impossible in Africa. The failure associated with sub-Saharan African states, politics and economy emanate from their integration into templates of grand theories that failed to take the indigenous African political-economy into consideration. This integration left a challenge of whether these grand templates can or should be rejected wholesomely or whether they should be modified to accommodate the specificity of the political, cultural and historical circumstances of African states. The challenge left fundamental questions regarding which form of democracy is suitable for Africa and sub-Saharan Africa in particular unresolved. Does liberal democratic contestation or socialist democratic centralisation enhance African governments' responsiveness and accountability to their populations' needs and interests? Are stronger political and institutional restraints on discretionary executive authority the key to eradicating neo-patrimonial governance? And, if so, can the restraints imposed within democratic regimes – namely, those grounded in the institutional separation of powers and political pluralism – be the foundation for improved governance in Africa?

In response to above questions, sub-Saharan Africa has shown demonstrable evidence of sophistication in their pre-colonial political institutions with defined separation of powers before colonialism. These institutions were propelled by the values of traditional social life that was nurturing a system of government suitable for indigenous African states. More importantly, these pre-colonial institutions shared some salient features such as legislative council, dialogue and representative principles of modern government with British

democratic government. In other words, the parliamentary principle of decision-making, debate and discussion of different points of views expressed by duly accredited representatives of the people were prominent features of African traditional politics (see thesis, Chapters Two and Three).

Juxtaposing these features with the principles of neo-communitarian democracy reveals a conceptual connection between neo-communitarian democracy and features of sub-Saharan pre-colonial democracy. At the risk of repetition, neo-communitarian democracy and pre-colonial African political systems are thick conceptions of democracy that favour the presentation of arguments in terms of reason internal to the constitutional cultures. Through these presentations, reasons which are internal to both the actual and idealised political and constitutional practices, principles, standards and rules that have conceptual ties to the basic values of the community are tested in a deliberative debate and finally embraced by a reflective consensus of the community.



## Chapter 6

### NEO-COMMUNITARIAN STATE, GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT

#### 6.0 Introduction

The chapter among other things sets out to examine the post-colonial state-building process, essence of governance, the processes and relationships that produce governance and how neo-communitarian state, governance and government can help sub-Saharan Africa cope with the dynamics of multi-polar global politics. The processes of state-building and democratisation remain the greatest challenge to political stability in Africa.

Colonial authorities only remodelled African territories for their own purposes, establishing plantations, inducing population movements, and creating the beginnings of modern urban life. The reflexes, habits, and methods of governance of the post-colonial leaders remain a product of continuity of colonial administration. The centralised authoritarian state, which emerged from colonial structures, exemplifies this continuity. Like their colonisers, post-colonial African leaders further the state-building project at the expense of political pluralism. They unilaterally formulated and implemented public policy with little or no regards for the pluralistic nature of their countries. The state-building dynamics completely rests on state unilateralism. As Nnoli expresses (2008: viii), in pursuit of state-building, the state relies on power and not influence, extends its power, authority and laws throughout the length and breadth of the country. In doing so, Nnoli asserts, 'it runs into conflict with pre-existing power, authority and laws in the society' (Nnoli, *ibid*).

The neglect of the pluralistic nature of the countries produces a dialogue deficit between the majority and minority ethnic groups on the one hand, and between state leaders and the people in general, on the other. This also results in a lack of regime legitimacy and inability to accommodate discontent or minority views despite the adoption of multi-party elections. It also produces a

situation in which genuine democratic reform is stunted. The consequent frustrations account for explosions of violence in a pattern akin to the independence struggles. The need to re-fix the plural nature of African societies into the state-building and democratisation process constitutes the major focus of this chapter.

The Neo-communitarian state, based on the recognition of group identity that can help in the understanding of how cultural, social and political alienation can lubricate social movements is recommended for consideration in this chapter. It is emphasised that this understanding will create allowance for a political space that permits the cultural groups to converge within a context where each group has an equal footing and where identity and power will aid in the construction of our cultural selves within a state. The chapter also aims at explaining how neo-communitarian governance and state can produce political leaders that will be able to set out development in terms of goals, objectives, directions, and action plans, followed by implementation of the action plans, and finally by the realisation of development.

## 6.1 Leadership and Governance

Conducive environment for human development is an essential goal that needs to be accomplished by every political leader but unfortunately only the political leader that has the knowledge–skills-ability (KSA) psychology (Eze, 2005) can accomplish it. Unless this goal is achieved first, all other development efforts will be a failure. ‘This is a priority essence of governance’ asserts Eze (2005: 1-2). Any society that is of the KSA type<sup>10</sup>, its leadership may sometimes resort to use of force to free the nation and to achieve emancipation-freedom and independence which marks the first step towards national development. This is the argument put forward by Jeffries in the case of Ghana and Uganda whose governments under the leaderships of Jerry Rawlings and Yoweri Museveni ,respectively were considered as non-democratic but representing Africa’s most

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knowledge-skill-ability

‘promising experiments in effective governance’ (Jeffries, 1993). Each of these leaders acquired and applied leadership KSAs, which enabled them to produce innovative revolutionary leaderships that were successful in achieving emancipation for the people (Eze, 2005: 5). Machiavelli focused on these leadership skills and abilities when he theorises that a robust mechanism for the selection of leaders is essential for the success of the state because two competent rulers that succeeded one another can achieve great things (Bynander and Hart, 2006: 707).

In every state it is possible to find people who can not only understand leadership psychology but can also understand and apply managerial psychology for efficient and effective management of the societal resources. People who can not only do things right but also do the right things. Great leaders possess dazzling social intelligence, a zest for change, and above all, vision that allows them to set their sights on the "things" that truly merit attention. This rests on the understanding that among the essences of governance is the ability of the state to reproduce among the citizenry, leaders that can in succession, apply knowledge-skills-ability psychology for effective and efficient management of both the human and natural resources. This ability requires the political will of the leaders to organise planned change, transformation, and total breakaway from any obstacle to a free and progressive future. Unfortunately in the history of human existence, no state has ever been able to achieve this without passing through a cycle of resistance and counter-resistance due to the presence of forces that work to suppress and thwart any transformation plan for selfish gains. The mechanical relationship between individuals and the state in speconomy will reduce the resistance of the people to any planned change and transformation.

The mechanical relationship requires the two (individuals and state) to combine and interrelate with the economy (consumption, investment, savings, primary industry, secondary industry, tertiary industry, trade, etc.) in a unique and specific manner suitable for the two partners. The same principles and unique

application of knowledge-skills-abilities apply to governance and government of the state. No state can mechanically copy another state's mode of governance though they can learn from each other. This is where the congruence between politics, economy and culture becomes relevant in governance and government. Though their relationship may not be linear, but it plays a vital role in government and governance, sufficient enough not to be ignored in any mode of governance. Unfortunately the neo-liberal governance template designed for the sub-Saharan African governments can hardly allow the nourishment of this vital relationship between individuals and the state

The collapse of the Soviet Union as explained by Fukuyama removed the superpower rivalry that previously discouraged Western governments from linking bilateral aid to democracy (Whitehead, 2003). African governments eager to attract financial assistance became vulnerable to pressures to move towards more open and competitive political regimes (Clapham, 1996:187–207; Harbeson, 2000). The pressures for openness include the requests for broader approaches to governance by moving the state from the narrow focus on public service reforms to include the 'more ambitious goals of fostering political responsiveness and accountability' (Diamond, 2001; Healey & Robinson, 1992; Hyden, 1992). This conception of governance continues to exert profound influence on Africa's development agenda and aids. It features prominently in a collaborative report by the World Bank and several African research bodies (World Bank, 2001).

Similarly, the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) endorses multi-party liberal democracy and good governance as essential 'conditions for sustainable development' (African Union 2001; Hope, 2002) without taking stock of the genesis of the states' fragility. As discussed earlier, state in the true sense of its formation and meaning hardly exists in Africa, rather what is being referred to as states in Africa are post-colonial 'trading posts' that share similar features with their colonial trading-post progenitors. Considerable context analysis has been made by African scholars and

Africanists in order to draw attention to the dependency-virus inherent in Africa's political economy occasioned by the colonial administrations during the state building process. International public and private donor organisations have also commissioned studies to increase and disseminate knowledge on the twin issue.

A critical examination of these studies will reveal that most of them are often carried out with the mission of improving governance structures or democratisation process, reducing poverty, improving or reducing aids, stimulating or sustaining economic development projects etc. within a neo-colonial framework. This chapter underlines one important point, namely, that most of these studies hardly engage in critical analysis of Africa's states' fragility arising from the dependency-virus that plaques its political economy

Elsewhere, it is argued that the effects of amalgamation, imposed constitutionalism, economic liberalism and liberal democratisation process on the structures of the African local politics are not only a challenge to the forms of political transformation of the traditional political structures from colonial to post-colonial periods but one that also places a special burden on the advocates of universalism of state and democratisation process to appreciate the effects of such universal framework on the sovereignty of the evolving African empires and kingdoms and the subsequent psychic dislocation on Africans as first tracked by Fanon (1967). For Africa to overcome these challenges there is need to reconstruct African states culturally using their traditional nations as the starting blocks.

## **6.2 The need for neo-communitarian state**

The need for the reconfiguration of states and economy in sub-Saharan Africa is further prompted by the threats posed by the culture-mix that is now being facilitated by globalisation. Globalisation, which stresses interdependence of peoples, markets and cultures, is not an even process. Access

to the technology that facilitates globalisation is restricted to certain nations, individuals and groups being dependent on certain means and resources.

Globalisation which, according to Momoh (2006: 1), has been variously described as the new found trans-historical recipe for economic, social and technological problems of the modern world is not a new economic development strategy but a reincarnation of the structural adjustment programme meant to provide new rationalisation for the crisis and contradictions of neo-liberal capitalism. Being a new form of SAP does not mean that globalisation is not accompanied by some developments, though these are not necessarily positive developments, hence the need for the Afro centric intervention for the purpose of preventing the marginalisation of sub-Sahara African states in the global order.

The Neo-communitarian state seeks to facilitate the understanding of how culturally-constructed political process can inspire and motivate people to participate within the context of social, political, and cultural frameworks to improve on the problem-solving capacity of the state and its politics. This is progressive politics which as stressed by Tony Blair, serves not the purpose to provide solutions from above, but to facilitate citizens in search for their own solutions. Politics in this sense is not exercising the 'directive hand' of government, but about bringing together 'dynamic markets' and 'strong communities' (Blair, 2001).

In view of these features, neo-communitarian state takes into accounts the need to firstly stabilise the various ethnic nationalities within the state before stressing the need of integration into the state-building project. This is done within the framework where the cultural identity of each group will be maintained and some degrees of autonomy guaranteed. Doing this, allows the sustenance of historical account of each ethnic group which the pluralists, policy analysts, and the structural-legalists took for granted in their analyses of the state. This

communitarian state-building approach is a constructivist model<sup>11</sup> that takes into consideration the historical genesis of territoriality and sovereignty of the pre-colonial societies. The adoption of the realist view by the pluralists, policy analysts and structural-legalists, that all states are conceptually the same and that each state seeks to maintain sovereign territoriality against others in a systematic balance of power failed to consider the key elements of the state, that is territoriality and sovereignty are products of history of each nationality that makes up the state.

The underlying principle of the neo-communitarian state is that though states are domestically autonomous (Ashley, 1984: 225-86)) but they are not institutionally separated from their economies and societies or from the global system as averred by Ashley (*ibid*). Sub-Saharan African Kingdoms and empires were institutionally related to their societies, nations and economies through their ‘family pots’, ‘ubuntu’<sup>12</sup> and communal partnership between the individuals and

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<sup>11</sup>In the 1980s and 1990s constructivist theories contributed to a more thoroughly historical account of the state (Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, et al., 1996) These theories have explored how aspects of the state that pluralist and statist theories largely take for granted and do not explain historically are themselves historical constructs, especially the two primary aspects of the modern state: territoriality and sovereignty. Constructivist theories have also shown how war and violence constitute the state, and cannot be analyzed simply as resources or tools used by states, as well as how the distinction between the domestic “inside” of the state (a presumed sphere of order and law) and the international “outside” (a sphere of presumed anarchy and war) are not given ontological categories but are historically constituted of and by states.

<sup>12</sup>According to Ramose (1999), ubuntu is a multi-faceted philosophical system that involves logic, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics; it is a philosophy of life that is concerned with the reinforcement of unity, oneness and solidarity among the Bantu people. It is the distinctive elasticity and practical nature that makes ubuntu applicable in almost all facets of human life. As such, the concept has been wisely exported as an underlying philosophy or code of conduct in business, legal system, education, theology/religion, health and disciplines such as African philosophy and ethics. Historically, the concept of Ubuntu, the philosophy of ubuntu is passed on from one generation to the other mainly through oral tradition. This is echoed by Ramose (1999) who notes that African law based on Ubuntu is a living law, based on the recognition of the continuous oneness and wholeness of the living, the living-dead and the unborn. It is generally believed that in pre-colonial African societies, the concept of ubuntu was instrumental in maintaining social cohesion, administering peace and order for the good life of everyone in the

the state. The traditional institutions of the various communities and the economy are historically constituted by the communities for the sustenance of its members and the communities in general.

The combination of domestic economic crisis and the rise of neo-liberal ideology collectively rendered many African states vulnerable to IMF-World Bank SAPs with their neo-liberal monetarist policies such as liberalisation of the markets, balancing of budgets, removal of subsidies, cost-sharing strategies in the provision of social services etc. None of the African states was strong enough to resist and this further weakened the already fragile economies, states and had serious impact on the 'welfare of the most disadvantaged of their people' (Mwanza ed.; 1992). Shivji argues:

Import-substitution industrialization, which had been one of the developmental planks of the nationalist period, was virtually wiped out, as industry after industry was bankrupted, unable to withstand the imports of cheap goods. Agriculture stagnated. There was little the governments could do beyond exhorting the peasants to work harder. Social indicators such as education, health, water and electricity began to decline (Shivji, 1989).

In short, SAPs sapped whatever vitality there was in the fragile African economies (Gibbon ed, 1993, Mongula 1994, Mamdani, 1994). The moderate social achievements of the nationalist period in education, health, and water were swept away. As argued in Chapter Five that part of the objectives of this thesis is to firstly deconstruct the universal notion of free market liberal economy as the provider of freedom, its assumed triumph as the terminus of all ideologies and also to open an intellectual 'space' within the genre of 'histories of economic thought' (Knowles, 2004) and through the deconstruction, demonstrate, the existence of positive discourse of socialised partnership economic system (speconomy) within the domain of histories of economic systems. These

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society and even strangers. See Munyaradzi Mawere in (title of article???) *Afro Asian Journal of Social Sciences* Volume 3, No. 3.2 Quarter II 2012 ISSN: 2229 – 5313



objectives are pursued with the intention of proving that the matter of social change and transformation is not simply of one discourse but complex and many discourses.

The struggle for democracy is ultimately rooted in the life-conditions of the people accompanied by radical political economy, with its concepts of class and modes of production placed on the centre stage of the popular struggles for change (Shivji, 1989). It is primarily a political struggle on the form of governance, thus involving the reconstitution of the state. The analytical question is not why or how is Africa poor, but how long will it take to remove poverty and political crisis from Africa. Addressing this question will lead us to understand that the neo-liberal discourse is not only blind to history but utterly oblivious of agency of change. It is an ideology, the propaganda tool of, for and by the vested interests of the status quo. It is against this ahistorical and asocial terrain that the neo-communitarian governance emerges as an alternative model for sub Saharan Africa.

### **6.3 Neo-communitarian Governance**

The need to expand the frontiers of the concept of failed state beyond the popular security debate in the academic and policy-making circles since the end of the Cold War, to include 'good governance' will further illuminate the genesis of the failed state. Even though the concept of governance is not new, it is as old as human civilization if we accepted that it is primarily constructed on the terrain of power. However, the terminology became popular and fashionable and formed part of the global interest in the 1990s (Weiss, 2005). Conceptually, governance has brought a new dimension to administration and policy studies and planning for most countries, globally. It became one of the important strategies, processes, methods and mechanisms for governing countries and achieving public demand and interest. Nonetheless, the idea of governance is still widely debatable due to the various definitions and understandings of the term. For example, in various places, good governance has been associated with democracy and good civil rights, with transparency, with the rule of law, and with efficient public

services. Typically, it is defined as being synonymous with 'government' (Weiss, 2005), although in many descriptions, especially the Weberian notion it is a much broader notion than government. It involves the interaction between formal institutions publicly and privately and those of civil society.

Governance remains a major issue that is subjected to vigorous interrogation by the social scientists especially where the focus of interrogation is development or poverty. While some did not go beyond emphasising the need for good governance as a necessity for socio economic development, others go further by designing templates for 'better governance', 'good governance', 'effective governance', 'humane governance' or 'participatory governance' which they used to judge the performance of governments especially in the third world. The latter development has increasingly turned governance into a crucial concern for Africanist scholars and Aids agencies in Africa.

Though societal complexity has further brought to the fore the question of social control or governance but this does not diminish our understanding that governance is not a new phenomenon; rather governance has been underbelly of the society's cohesion since time immemorial. For instance, Bob Jessop writes,

So-called 'governance' mechanisms [as contrasted to markets or hierarchy] have long been widely used in coordinating complex organizations and systems. They are especially appropriate for systems that are resistant to top-down internal management and/or direct external control and that also co-evolve with other [complex] sets of social relations with which their various decisions, operations, and aims are reciprocally interdependent. (Jessop, 2001)

The increasing complexity of industrial society challenges our understanding of the processes of governance that were barely adequate in this age of post-industrial society but the same increasing complexity are clearly and manifestly inadequate in an age of identity. As Scharpf notes:

... the advantages of hierarchical coordination are lost in a world that is characterized by increasingly dense, extended, and rapidly changing patterns of reciprocal interdependence, and by increasingly frequent, but ephemeral, interactions across all types of pre-established boundaries, intra- and inter-organizational, intra- and inter-sectoral, intra- and international (Scharpf, 1993: 37).

After an extensive review of problems of modern governance, Kooiman concludes:

The existence of '[functional] interdependence' between formally and/or relatively autonomous [non-hierarchically ordered] political and social actors is of the essence. By interdependence we mean that no single actor has the possibility of 'doing the job' [solving a problem or grasping an opportunity] unilaterally. No actor is so dominant as to be able to enforce a certain line of behaviour, or to place the costs of social problem-solving on others and take the revenues himself. And all actors can be severely hindered in reaching their own objectives by other actors. 'Interdependence' in itself is not enough. The realization of the opportunities within interdependence is the central assignment of social-political governance (Kooiman, 1993: 251).

Governance cannot be judged solely on outcomes but must also on the processes, which is political, and relationships that produce them. Politics is about "who gets what" and this often involves conflict due to "political competitiveness". Political competitiveness is seen as an "essential attribute of a democracy" (Apter, 1968: 544.). African politicians, largely urban and westernised minority, in the late 1950s and early 1960s were primarily interested in the issues of "independence", "national integration", and "modernisation" (Skinner, 1989). Their major preoccupation was to homogenise and lead their largely rural societies who were predominantly governed by their traditional authorities and values, within the context of modern nation-state. Their major mission was to seek the political kingdom after which everything else will automatically fall in line.

However, deriving from knowledge of the economic, political, and social realities of the colonial world, Geertz, like other anthropologists, feared a difficult decolonization process. Geertz argues "the persistence of "primordial bonds" (based on kinship, blood, language, and religion) could frustrate the emergence of a new "political society" (Geertz, 1963: 109). He went on to hypothesise that the creation of "new states" bent on "modernisation" and "national integration" might initially increase conflicts in African societies (*ibid*). To resolve the envisaged problem, Geertz recommends a "macro-sociological" methodology to gain a "holistic or comprehensive" view of the problems facing those societies (Geertz, *ibid*: 119; 535).

This is where neo-communitarian state and governance become vital. Without understanding the various groups in their local contexts and accord them the necessary space within the state structure and some degree. . The government of the state needs to be built on the existing traditional structures in order to create the sense of belonging for every group. It is this recognition that forms the bedrock of the neo-communitarian government.

#### **6.4 Neo-communitarian Government: Government without political parties**

The question whether a state needs government and why the need, have been an on-going debate between the anarchists and others. Government is considered necessary in neo-communitarian state for the sake of putting some moral limits on people's tendencies towards selfishness. The likeliness of every individual following the rules and principles guiding every social relationship is almost non-existent but with the presence of government, violation of these rules and incidence of crime and prejudice will be reduced. Government being the means for the formulation of state policy, as well as the mechanism for determining the policies of the state generates some fears that compel the people to follow the established rules and principles of social relationship.

States are served by a continuous succession of different governments (Flint, & Taylor, 2007). Each successive government is composed of a body of individuals who control and exercise control over political decision-making. Governments in pre-colonial African kingdoms and empires were like God-ordained institutions that serve as a form of restraint on the office holders against any form of abuse of office or misuse of power and regulate their social interactions as required by established rules and principles. There are various theories justifying the need for government in a state but the major ones are; greed and oppression, order and tradition, natural rights, and social contract. Neo-communitarian government is based on social contract<sup>13</sup> for the sustenance of order and tradition<sup>14</sup> within a democratic setting.

Neo-communitarian government represents a system of government in which the people rule rather than the political representatives and their political parties. Abraham Lincoln captures the fundamental element of democracy being government of the people, by the people and for the people. This key to democracy lies in the people having the ultimate power as against surrendering such to the political parties. Though there is need to elect representatives but the elections are to be directly conducted without the interference of the political

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<sup>13</sup>The social contract has been one of the most influential theories on which modern democracy and many forms of socialism are established. The social contract theory holds that governments are created by the people in order to meet their needs that cannot be appropriately fulfilled using individual means. Governments exist for the purpose of serving the needs and desires of the people, and the relationship of government with the people is explicitly stipulated in a social contract (a constitution and a set of laws). Both the government and the people are expected to abide by this contract.

<sup>14</sup>Various conservative perspectives view the government as a positive power that conveys order out of chaos, establishes laws to end the war against all, punishes vice while encouraging moral virtue, and respects tradition. At times, in this view, the government is seen as something ordained by a higher power, such as a king, which human beings have a duty to obey.

parties. The argument here is that African traditional political institutions had in the past organised consent in the choice of their chiefs and community leaders and avoided violent dissent, without political parties.

Political parties deepen ethnic rivalry in Africa where democracy is hybridised within the frame-work of Western multi-party liberal design. They promote ethnic hatred, violence, disunity, demagoguery, political centralism, neo-liberal patrimonial elitism, hybridised governments of national unity and rule of the minority. This argument rests on the assumption that every democracy is an outgrowth of a certain kind of culture and social system. In view of this, the argument draws strength from the views of John Stuart Mill, John Dewy and De Tocqueville to express doubts over the possibility of the political parties finding nourishing roots in Africa with different cultural grains.

Adoption of selective audition and selective alliances that sometimes border on selfish desires of the party leaders are strategies for securing votes by the political parties. These strategies however further push majority of the population out of decision making process, lubricate spectator democracy and sharpen ethnic divisions that breed violence.

Sources of violent dissent have been severally traced to the intolerance of the state leaders, undemocratic methods of the ruling parties, shrinking of the political space against the opposition, divide and rule tactics by the party leaders, marginalisation of the minority groups, imposition of candidates on the party members by the party leaders, corruption among the state elites, poor governance etc. The outcome of these 'illiberal' practises is the outburst of pent-up angers from the aggrieved that see such reactions as the last hope of getting justice or as the appropriate measure to cope with the situation.

Sight is not lost of the positive roles ascribed to political parties in a multi-party democracy, but there is need to remove political parties from the

democratisation processes in Africa due to doubts on the centrality of political parties in deepening Africa's democracy. To be sure, not all political parties undermine democracy, but there is need to draw attention to the nature of political parties in Africa as a new cartel and how politicians use them to undermine democracy through hate campaigns, ethnicisation and personalisation of the party machineries. 1995 and 2000 campaigns and elections in Zanzibar, a semi-autonomous archipelago that forms part of the United Republic of Tanzania were reflections of this brand of democracy. The National Democratic Institute Report (2005) reveals the violence following the 2000 election resulted in more than 30 fatalities and hundreds of Zanzibaris who fled from the Isles for the safety of Mombassa, Kenya. Tensions between the main two political parties, Chama Cha Mapinduzi/Party of the Revolution (CCM) and Civic United Front or Chama cha Wananchi/Party of the People (CUF), traces its roots back to the pre-independence era and reflects both geographic (Pemba verse Unguja) and ethnic (African verses Arab) divisions.

This leaves a questionable mark on the viability of political parties in the promotion of democracy in Africa's multi-cultural societies where national state in form of modern sovereign nation-state is yet to develop.

For political parties to effectively carry out their ascribed functions of augmenting citizen participation in the political processes, widening aggregation of diverse political interests, facilitating orderly and democratic transfer of political power, promoting government accountability, and imparting legitimacy to the political system (Matlosa 2003), it will require a reform process that includes internal internal democracy (NIMD 2004). Presently there is a wide gap between the rules stated in the party books and constitutions and actual practice of internal democracy. Most political parties in Africa are characterised by autocratic organisational structure where power and decision making are not only centralised but highly personalised. This among other factors contributes majorly to lack of cohesion, internal disunity, disintegration, decampment, factionalisation, diminishing popularity and increase in electoral violence (Meinhardt and Patel, 2003: 33). There is always a little room for inclusive participation in decision

making processes involving party membership (Maiyo, 2008). This rigid organisational structure is akin to the inherited style of leadership of colonial administrators and political elites who used to dictate and make decisions on behalf of the native populations without consultation (Malyamkono and Kanyongolo, 2003: 273). Political parties in Africa therefore tend to be autocratic in their organisational structures where conformity is preferable to critical debate of issues, and is enforced through covert and overt pressure, and illegal sanctions including suspension and even expulsion from the party Maiyo, *ibid*).

There have been steady decline in the party membership, general public disaffection and the rise of partisan identification (Hopkins, 2012), yet crises are on the rise in Africa. Unfortunately there has been little scholarly works devoted to the study of contributions of political parties to these developments. Some hold multiculturalism as responsible for the violence and apathy that characterised political participation in Africa. Ethnic violence by ethnic groups such as Tutsi, Zulus, Hausa-Fulani, Biroms, and Niger Delta militants, ethnic militias of the Eastern and Western Nigeria, Boko Haram of the Northern Nigeria etc have lent credence to this assumption. This therefore mirrored ethnic violence as the bane of multi-cultural democracy especially when we factor into the picture, the posture of Quebec to the Canadian constitution or the violent breaking away of Ireland from the Great Britain etc.

Ethnic violence and desire for independence are weapons employed by the political parties to perpetuate their own interest for political control and freedom. The interests of political parties remain a major factor that shapes the internal democratic processes including violent political eruptions. The party system, notes Powell (1980), shapes citizen participation through the electoral activities. Their dynamics either inhibit or exacerbate turmoil and violence (Powell, *ibid*). The strategies and commitments of their leaders to democracy are crucial elements in any democratic order. However, scholarly writings tend to anoint political parties as the harbingers for deepening democracy.



Advance democracies may claim to be functioning well and stable because they are able to form stable governments; their citizens are free to participate in elections; discontents are expressed through competitive elections and leaders are held accountable through electoral processes. This does not obviate the fact that there are instances where regional parties hold sway in a region due to its ability to make use of ethnic sentiments of the people in the region. King Mangosuthu Buthelezi and the Inkatha Freedom party in South Africa stand out in this regard.

The perception of political party as essential and desirable institution for democracy (Edna; Jorge; et al eds. 2005: 75; Paloma, 2002: 167) has led to crude generalisation of political party as a 'must' for every democracy. This perception is evident in the roles allocated by various African governments to political parties in every democratic experiment in spite of the decline in party membership when compared with the colonial periods. To compensate for the decline in party membership subscriptions, Richard Katz and Peter Meir (1995) report that mainstream political parties, most of which have experienced government, abandoned their declining base in civil society and legislated to provide themselves with state subventions.

Party adherents assume that survival of government depends on strong and sustainable political parties. These parties are assumed to have the capacity to represent citizens and provide policy choices that demonstrate their ability to govern for the public good (Almond, 1960; Huntington, 1968; NDI, 2005). This assumption according to National Democratic Institute (2005), has been witnessing an increasing disconnect between citizens and their elected leaders on the one hand, between party members and their leaders on the other. There has also been a decline in political activism, a growing sophistication of anti-democratic forces and continuous challenge of political parties by individuals and groups in countries like Nigeria. Citizens are engaged in the political activities but

they are no better than spectators because the party structures and practices give them limited outlets to communicate with national decision makers.

Attempts at rectifying the above deficiency elicited critical challenge about the centrality of political parties in the democratisation process by the advocates of direct or deliberative democracy. These advocates view political parties as biased contaminators of people's views and contributions to democratic processes (Budge, 2001; Elster, ed. 1998; Fiskin, 2011; Ross, 2011). Though Clark opines that giving consideration to local parties may create the necessary platform for the amendment of 'broken linkages' between the citizens and national policy makers, he completely made an oversight on the cartel nature of the party leadership. As articulated by Schmitter (2001), political parties are not what they once were. More specifically, their perceived failure has given rise to a debate on the 'decline' of parties, underlining the argument that they are losing relevance everywhere as vehicles of representation, instruments of mobilization, and channels of interest articulation and aggregation.

The argument that "elite party" or "cartel party" (Hopkin, 2012: 3; Meir, 2005) led by cartel leaders has replaced "mass" party (Hopkin, *ibid*) in Africa cannot be overlooked in any party discourse of Africa's democracy. This development is responsible for apathy towards politics, democracy and government among the populace. The "apathy notion" which Meir refers to as the notion of non-sovereignty (Meir, 2005) develops out of the failure of the political parties in fulfilling their electoral promises. This directly contradicts Meir's expression of isolating the 'problem of indifference' (*ibid*) from the problem of mistrust of politicians, their political parties and governments. As he rightly argues, apathy or indifference is one of the under-studied elements in the study of the relationship between citizens and politics, and its importance seems to be under-theorised by much of the literature on political trust and mistrust that emerged in the late 1990 (Pharr and Putnam eds; 2000; Norris Pipa, 1999)

The main issue that leads to apathy is the failure of the political parties and their betrayal of the people's trust; but the party leaders hardly see anything wrong in these failures by re-presenting the same set of politicians for another term of electoral privileges. On noticing this sense of delivery failure and loss of function by the political parties, de Tocqueville avers that the reason for apathy is that the loss of function easily breeds contempt for those who continue to base their privileges on its exercise (Meir, 2005; p.2). This contempt underlies the apathy of the citizens towards political parties as many have come to see politicians as having no meaningful contributions to their live conditions except their surrogates.

The perception of the political parties by the people as not relevant to their live conditions contributed immensely to the dwindling electoral fortunes and voter turn-out except in countries that had just overthrown the old authoritarian regimes by *mobocracy* (being used here as an uncoordinated mass protests of the people against the state leaders, where leaders of such protests emerge from the spot of action) as witnessed in the Arab spring or violent opposition as the case of South Africa in 1994. This development gradually denigrates or devalues the political process (Meir, *ibid*).

The dwindling voter-turnout that was noticed in the established democracies since the 1960s (Niemi and Weisberg, 2001: 31) which are attributed to a wide array of economic, demographic, cultural, technological and institutional factors are not the same as in Africa. Political apathy in Africa cannot be exempted from disenchantment, indifference and discontentment among the civil populace, which followed the failures of post independent leaders and the post-second wave of democracy leaders that rode to power on popular votes.

The nose diving of voters in elections arose principally from lack of trust in government and politicians in many African nations due to corruption,

poor governance, insecurity, electoral violence and fraud, unpopular tenure elongation, violent ethno-religious insurgence etc; Different countries in Africa have very different voter turnout but as designed several decades ago by Riker and Ordeshook in "*A Theory of the Calculus of Voting*."<sup>15</sup> the basic formula for determining whether someone will vote is:

$$PB + D > C$$

*P* is the probability that an individual's vote will affect the outcome of an election, and *B* is the perceived benefit that would be received if that person's favoured political party or candidate were elected. Some scholars have expanded *B* to include group interests (Jankowski, 2002; Edling, Gelman, and Kaplan, 2007). *D* originally stood for democracy or civic duty, but now represents social or personal gratification an individual gets from voting. *C* is the time, effort, and financial cost involved in voting. *D* is thus the most important element in motivating people to vote. For a person to vote, *P*, *B* and *D* factors must outweigh *C*.

Five motivating *D*s that determine voters' turn-out as listed by Riker and Ordeshook (*ibid*) include compliance with the social obligation to vote; affirming one's allegiance to the political system; affirming a partisan preference (also known as expressive voting, or voting for a candidate to express support, not to achieve any outcome); affirming one's importance to the political system; and, for those who find politics interesting and entertaining, researching and making a decision (*ibid*). The major *D* that determines voters turn out in Africa is affirming partisan preference due to ethnic allegiance as witnessed with Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa, KADU in independent elections Kenya, AG in Western Nigeria's first Republic, Congress for Progressive Change in Northern Nigeria in 2011 presidential elections. This allegiance confirms African preference for semi autonomy arrangement in the political process while *P* is a strong factor that prevents voters from voting. The first question that every voter asks is "will my

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<sup>15</sup>The basic idea behind this formula was developed by Anthony Downs in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* published in 1957. The formula itself was developed by William H. Riker and Peter Ordeshook published in *American Political Science Review*. 1968. 62:25-42

vote count or change the result”? This question is borne out of past experiences where election results were not true reflections of the voting patterns but a pre-arranged design by the powerful elites.

Though it is not sufficient to label one factor as responsible for elections apathy, in Africa we can hardly accept reasons identified by Fukuyama, Schlove and Putnam taking the levels of social and technological development, and literacy of most African states into consideration. For example Francis Fukuyama in an effort at justifying the supremacy of the liberal market democracy castigates the welfare state policies as the major contributing factor to voter apathy. Fukuyama in “*Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*”(1995) argues that the decrease in turnout has come shortly after the government became far more involved in people's lives through actions that dissipate the social capital which is essential to higher voter turnout. This is an issue for contestation, however most states in Africa have no welfare policy; hence the argument of government's too much involvement in people's lives becomes untenable in Africa.

Richard Schlove in “*Democracy and Technology*”, (1995) asserts that technological development in society such as "auto mobilisation," suburban living, and "an explosive proliferation of home entertainment devices" has contributed to a loss of community, which in turn has weakened participation in civic life (Schlove, 1995: 62). Poor technology is a major factor that Africa needs to overcome in order to effectively and efficiently participate in the global economic order. Moreover a large percentage of African population lives in the rural areas with subsistence economy. Putnam's argument that the collapse in civil engagement is due to the introduction of television, definitely does not have Africa in mind, if we consider that the first television station in Africa was Western Nigeria Television established in 1954 at Ibadan. Putnam himself made a clarification of this African reality by noting that:

In the 1950s and 1960s television quickly became the main leisure activity in developed nations (emphasis mine). It

replaced earlier more social entertainments such as bridge clubs, church groups, and bowling leagues... as people retreated within their homes and general social participation declined so too did voting (Putnam, 1995; p.61).

Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993: 73)\_view that the decline in voter turnout is the product of a change in campaigning strategies appears to be valid but when applied to the African situation; it will not be as a result of the so-called new media as they claimed. In Africa, the change in campaign strategy is due to the empowerment of a local neo-patrimonial leadership by the party. The empowered leaders in turn ensure vote-deals and allocation with their financial resources to 'settle'<sup>16</sup> the electoral officers and state agents. Where 'settlement' fails, ballot stuffing and ballot snatching prevail with impunity. Instead of directing the entire party's resources towards intensive local campaign to secure the votes, political parties divert such to sustain the local neo-patrimonial leaders, concentrate their campaigns in the cities and use the media to reach where they cannot physically attend just to register their involvement in the elections. Moreover where ethnic passion is involved, unpopular incumbents do record high turnout in their ethnic zones irrespective of the media hypes and mudslinging.

The theology of political party competition is an unnatural idea to Africans because African societies relish their religious and ethnic affiliations that are anti-liberal, therefore there was no cultural base for party democracy to flourish in the post-independent African states. As a result, the basis for the emergence of a system that allows multi-party competition for political power or a single dominant party with an overriding sense of national community was glaringly absent in the traditional African political space either during or after independence. Due to the inappropriateness of political parties in African politics, it becomes compelling to put in place an alternative model that will improve the quality of peoples' involvement in government and governance.

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<sup>16</sup> Monetary bribe and/or assurance of elevation through promotion or appointment

The combination of the party deficiencies and the critical challenge posed by advocates of direct democracy necessitate a re-consideration of the pre-colonial Africa system of citizens directly deliberating on issues that affect their lives and governance within their communities. This idea is not novel. Rousseau over two centuries ago in “*General Will*” (Foisneau, 2010) brought this idea to attention. He described political parties as sinister interests that are prone to undermining, perverting or usurping the will of the people. Rousseau’s idea may be regarded as impracticable in modern democracies but failures of the political parties to consolidate democracy in Africa are pointers to wisdom in his argument. Switzerland’s elections have every element of democracy beyond political parties (Kobach. 1993).

In Africa, post-election crises further underline the doubts cast on the desirability of political parties as means of communicating politics. If local parties could be seen as the bed-rock of legitimacy for modern democracy as Clark wants us to believe, then community town hall meetings should also be regarded as the foundation block for legitimate decisions by the people. *Kgtola* in pre-independent Botswana has proved this to be a viable option. The direct deliberation provides the opportunity for the people to address the various issues connected with democratic control of the social process. The representatives are charged with the responsibility of carrying out the administration of the government according to the wishes of the people as against the wishes of the party leaders and the political parties.

Neo-communitarian government has a political structure that links to the traditional political structures and formally allocates roles other than voting to the people, their nations, regions and state as a whole. It rests on the recognition of nations in their various special territories as the foundation for the larger government structure. It has a social order that links political structure with the socioeconomic system through speconomy along its four tier-political structures: the community – town – region – national tiers.

Every multi-ethnic state is comprised of communities and towns within specific regions around which an indigenous administrative framework could be identified and used for the mobilisation of local resources. This indigenous administrative framework if properly harnessed and incorporated into the government administrative structure will allow the community being the smallest political unit to function as the grassroots tier of government with elected representatives directly elected by the people.

The strong bond which is the essence of a community is found mainly in relatively smaller communities where people know one another to a great extent. As a system of government, neo-communitarianism allows the emergence of government of, by and for the homogenous people which can reduce ethnic acrimonies; restore political and cultural rights of the people, promote accountability, increase democratic participation, and pave the way for the restoration of genuine democracy and autochthonous state building.

Devolution of power is designed on the basis of Exclusive list for the federal, Exclusive Residual list for the region, Residual Exclusive list for the town and Residual list for the community while the Concurrent list applies to all tiers, with the higher tier having superior power over the lower tier. The national government holds the power in the Exclusive List comprising issues such as defence, foreign affairs, banking, currency, external trade, company taxes and registration, Supreme Court, health policies, education policies, electoral policies etc. The regional governments hold those on the Exclusive Residual List comprising issues such as natural resources, drivers licence, arbitration, urban planning, health, education especially secondary and primary education, trade, commerce, bankruptcy, insurance, prisons, evidence, labour relations, water resources, pensions, taxes, municipal police, electric power, income security, judicial powers and Court systems among others. Towns and communities hold those on Residual Exclusive and Residual Lists concurrently. Residual Exclusive



List comprises issue such as motor parks, cemeteries, trunk c roads, drainages and street lighting, urban and town-planning, housing, public library, parks, chieftaincy matters, licensing of cooperative groups etc. Residual List takes care of issues like land matters, customary courts, primary education, community chieftaincy matters, community buildings/centres, primary health services, community and recreation parks, registration of community cooperative groups, markets, etc. The Concurrent List takes care of issues like health, education, labour relations, economic partnerships, elections, etc.

The issue of extractive minerals business should be a partnership involving the town, region and national governments. Willing cooperative groups or foreign companies are to participate only as partners with the concerned tiers of government. Revenue should be allocated strictly on the basis of derivation, that is to say, after the national government has deducted tax, own services, the rest should be allocated to the regions with such resource endowment . Each region should have and control its own police service to guarantee proper policing of each region and reduce the politicisation in the police recruitment, promotion, posting and reaction to emergencies.

1. Significant features of the Neo-communitarian government is the absence of political parties in the election of state leaders, basis, fusion of the lower tier of government with the upper tier through the office of the Leader of each tier executive council right from the community to the national level, recognition and inclusion of the traditional authorities in government, using the traditional demarcating lines of communities/villages, towns and regions as jurisdictional territory of each tiers, unicameral legislatures at the community and national levels and bi-cameral legislatures at the town and regional levels.

## **6.5 Political structure of Neo-communitarian Government**

### **NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

Unicameral legislature comprising equal number Senators from each Region to be headed by the Senate president elected by and among the Senators.

The Executive is made up of the President/Prime Minister, the cabinet of

Ministers and the Regional Governors.
<b>REGIONAL GOVERNMENT (UNIT OF THE NATIONAL AL GOVERNMENT)</b> Bicameral legislature comprising of directly elected Town Representatives constituting the Lower House headed by a Speaker elected by and among the members and two most senior Traditional rulers from town and one nominee of each community traditional council ratified by the town's upper chamber, constituting the Upper Chamber. The Chamber is headed by President appointed in the same vein as the Town's Upper Chamber  The Executive Council is made up of the Governor/Regional Premier, cabinet of Commissioners and the Town Councils' Chairmen.
<b>TOWN COUNCIL GOVERNMENT</b> Bicameral Legislature comprising of directly elected Town Assembly Members constituting the Lower House and three most Senior Traditional Rulers from each community constituting the Upper House. The Lower House is headed by a Speaker elected by and among the members while the Upper House is headed by a President who is the chairman of the Town Council of Chiefs or the most senior traditional ruler in the absence of the chairman Seniority of the traditional rulers is determined by the existing norms of determining such and where there is no clarity, the first to ascend the throne stands as the most senior. Where there is a tie, older age takes precedence.  The Town Executive Council is made up of the Council Chairman and Cabinet of Secretaries. Community Council Leader is an automatic member of the Executive Council of the Town Council Government
<b>COMMUNITY AREA DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL</b> Executive Council headed by the Council Leader and the appointed Supervisors and Councillors. Unicameral Legislature comprising of directly elected Councillors who will in turn elect the Council Leader.

## 6.6 Justifications for Traditional Institutions in Neo-Communitarian Government

As discussed elsewhere, African states are made of nationality groups hence the stability of the nationality groups is the stability of state. The main argument of the thesis is that since the stability of the state is linked to the stability of the local communities, the onus is on the state to ensure the economic empowerment of those at the grassroots who are closer to such communities. To achieve political stability and economic empowerment, two structures are

essential. These are the political structure that is constitutionally responsible for electing leaders into the community government, town councils, the regional parliament and the federal government; and the structure for traditional institution to make allowance for the traditional rulers to be involved in policy-making on distribution of resources, security and the general well-being of their communities. The law makers at each level elect the Executive Head of government who in turn forms the cabinet with approval of the concerned parliament. The executive heads at the community and town levels are to ensure the protection of common interests of their communities and towns and also encourage the continued survival of the cultural values and traditional association of the communities.

The practical demonstration of this will be the constitutional provision of the synergy between the elected governments and the traditional rulers on the one hand and between the local areas and the centre on the other. This synergy is developed to integrate the energy and roles of the traditional institutions at the local communities into the administration of the state. This according to Oyeweso (2012) will breed proper administration of local levels to improve political integration of ethnic groups into the larger interest of the nation. This inclusive administration, Oyeweso avers, will place premium on the relevance of traditional rulers to modern governance (*ibid*).

The colonial project tremendously destroyed the influences and powers of the African traditional institutions and that ethnic identities were also to a large extent created, widened, and shaped under colonial rule. Villages, towns and communities were incorporated into larger administrative units and a wider political space (Forrest, 1998: 20). In spite of all these manipulations and erosion of traditional authorities, Oyeweso reports that Nigerian traditional chieftaincy institution managed to survive both the constricting forces of colonialism and the so-called modernisation programmes of the post-independence era. This reveals that these indigenous institutions are capable of redoubling their capacities in the

face of emerging challenges. Traditional institutions are agencies and custodians of traditional practices, which include the customary regulatory bodies that moderate the ordinary daily life of a particular community.

In the context of emerging political instability in Africa, there is the need to re-engage grassroots structures to confront the extraordinary and complex challenges facing the African continent. Vaughan in *“Nigerian Chiefs: Traditional Power in Modern Politics, 1890s-1990s”* (2000: 1) adumbrates the need for this inclusiveness “...the post-colonial state project requires- indeed, cannot avoid- an imaginative integration of antecedent structures with the agencies of the modern state”. The Yoruba experience exemplifies the dynamism of chieftaincy structures in modern Nigerian politics. Since the imposition of colonial rule in the late nineteenth century, these structures have demonstrated remarkable adaptability as important institutions of governance. Chieftaincy structures are continuously regenerated in rapidly shifting socio-political and economic contexts.

The resilience and importance of these chieftaincy structures have thus permitted some fundamental conclusions. First, there is a need to advance and promote the status and significance of traditional rulers as veritable expressions of communal and national aspirations. Second, that this institution should become central to the development of imaginative strategies to combat the problems of political instability. Third, that the chieftaincy structure must be empowered and retained as tools and critical mediums of national development, inter-group relations and communal aspirations.

## **Conclusion**

Individual's assumptions and beliefs govern political behaviour and each to examine the society and determine what he or she perceives to be justice, freedom or rights. Every ideology claims to recognise the importance of individual, rights and opportunities and that such rights and opportunities remain

useless if not transformed into concrete realities for the people. But unfortunately the assumptions of African party leaders, judging from the character of their political parties, are at variance with the assumptions of the people. Rather than serving as vehicles for the transformation of the assumptions into concrete realities, political parties in Africa, through their characters have turned out to be instruments of political decay, hatred and violence. The submission of Awosika before the Political Bureau in Nigeria (1987) is akin to Rousseau's view of political parties as organisations with sinister's interests. Awosika submits that...

Party politics is poisonous. It is the politics of war not of peace; of acrimony and hatred and mudslinging not of love and brotherhood, of anarchy and discord not of orderliness and concord; it is politics of cleavages, divisions and disunity and not of cooperation, consensus and unity; it is the politics of hypocrisy and charlatanism, not of integrity and patriotism; it is the politics of rascality, not maturity, of blackmail and near gangsterism not of constructive and honest contribution (Political Bureau, 1987).

In spite of evidence in Cote D'voire, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Algeria, Uganda, Nigeria etc to buttress Awosika's observations, political elites and party scholars still religiously hold on to the belief that a no-party political arrangement could lead to some form of fascism or pave way for the emergence of political factions that will be very difficult to manage for the state than a party system government (Oyediran, 1999). The arguments of the party scholars failed to accept as emphasised by Obasanjo and Mabogunje (1992, eds) that democracy must always take due cognisance of our lived reality and whatever structures and institutions that would sustain democratic practice must also reflect the peculiarities of our environment. Both socialist and liberal adherents fail to take into considerable account the peculiarities of the non-western nations in Africa before integrating them into the world of liberal or socialist variant that gives prominence to party politics to produce government.

Neo-communitarian democracy holds the view that the interests of Africa multi-ethnic groups will be best served in reconstituted and reconstructed states along the line of neo-communitarian government structure as illustrated above. States so reconstituted and reconstructed will make it impossible for any

ethnic group to lord it over any other ethnic groups, or to be in a position to effectively incite division and disaffection among the members of the other national groups. Indeed, a state so reconstituted and reconstructed provides an equal platform for every citizen to be involved in the community, town and regional politics, and have the opportunity to play an equal role in the affairs of the country.

## Chapter 7

# SPECONOMY AS AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR SUB-SAHARAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

### 7.0 Introduction

The chapter maps out speconomy as an economic democracy in response to free market capitalism and centralised socialist market that stultified Africa's economic growth from independence. It exposes the two diametrically opposed economic visions in Africa. These are the 'internal' and 'external' visions. Though the two visions were eventually collapsed into New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development where the external vision was internalised, the pre-NEPAD internal visions possessed some elements of pulling the economic sector into the terrain of democracy. The thesis written in line with Heilbroner (1979) and Khalil (1995) criticisms of the historiography of economic thought as inevitably leading to the dominant paradigm of neo-classical economics, presents socialised partnership economic system as a paradigm that can pull the economic domain away from the grip of the power monopolists and hand same to the people through their involvement in reality in the economic structure, decisions and direction of the state. While the chapter upholds the historical and anthropological contexts within which ideas are formulated or altered (Knowles, 2004 ) it also shares Knowles' concern that it is only by listening to the voices of the past within the people's social and political contexts, and by giving respect to their intentions and to the 'truths' as they perceived them – regardless of whether or not we like to hear what they said or believed – that we can approach an understanding of 'what actually happened'(Samuel, 1992).

The chapter shows the contradictions in the universal notion of free market economy as the provider of freedom and liberty on the one hand, and it's assumed triumph as the terminus of all ideologies. It then opens up an intellectual 'space' within the genre of 'histories of economic thought' (Knowles, *ibid*) through deconstruction to firstly demonstrate the existence of positive discourse of socialised partnership economic system (speconomy) within the domain of

histories of economic systems, and secondly, the under treatment of freedom in both the socialist and capitalist economic paradigms (Olateju, 2012b:14). These objectives collectively justify the need for speconomy to stand alongside other discourses that compete with the hegemonic liberal and other neo-classical paradigms. The deconstruction lays bare liberalism's grand posture of considering only the critiques of capitalism or proposals for the civilising of capitalism as worthy of entry into the 'voyager's log' of the course to the 'Promised Land' (ibid). Speconomy holds history of economies as being the same for ideologies<sup>17</sup>. It provides a response to the problems of poverty, discrimination and increased individualism generated by the free liberal market economy.

The chapter draws primarily on the neo-communitarian values to articulate Socialised Partnership Economic system (speconomy) as an appropriate economic path for the economies of the African states away from the assumptions of classical and contemporary economic theories that perceive society as mere lump of individuals with shared values. This is done by juxtaposing speconomy with the 'decentralised free market economy' (Jack Birner and Rudy Van Zijp, 1994: 94) being the economic engine of liberal democracy whose rejection constitutes the major plank of this thesis . The rejection arises from the fact that market economy and liberal democracy are two sides of the same coin that could hardly be separated. Any attempt at isolating the two concepts in any political economy discourse will render such argument as incomplete. Although many liberals tend to treat liberalism as a theory of government, what is increasingly apparent, is the glaring connection between liberal democracy and the market.

The main concern of this chapter arises from the Doyle's fourth assumption as highlighted in Chapter Two, which presents capitalism as the most effective market exchange system. The thesis differs with this assumption by taking the effects of the capitalist market system on African social structures into consideration. The persistence of ruptures and crises in Africa's polity cannot easily be explained within the rubric of liberalism. Any attempt at ignoring the

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<sup>17</sup>Schumpeter (1972: 34) asked half a century ago, 'Is the History of Economics a History of ideologies?'



effects of liberal values on the social structures of post-colonial Africa will miss out a lot. These structures were reconstructed in anticipation of their expected roles in the global economy. For instance Heilbroner writes:

... most contemporary texts on the history of economic "doctrines" judge and grade the works of the past by the degree to which they anticipate the present...From this widely shared point of view, the history of economic thought becomes a chronicle of mistakes and near-misses, a kind of voyager's log as the profession gradually makes its way to the Promised Land (Heilbroner, 1979: 192).

Walter Rodney while tracing back the genesis of the effects of liberal values on the post-colonial social structures submits that

...colonial Africa fell within that part of international capitalist economy from which surplus was drawn to feed the metropolitan sector.... Colonialism was not merely a system of exploitation but one whose essential purpose was to repatriate the surplus to the so called 'mother-country'. From an African viewpoint, that amounted to consistent expatriation of surplus produced by African labour out of African resources. It meant the development of Europe as part of some dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped (Rodney, 1972: 162-3)

Colonialism therefore serves as the conveyor belt for the incorporation of Africa's economies and politics into the global political economy. This integration subsequently undermines pre-colonial Africa's traditional political institutions to yield way for its underdevelopment and marginalisation. Understanding the historical context of these processes is essential for our candid appreciation of Africa's protracted socio-political crisis and also very critical for the articulation of an appropriate response to the crisis. The thesis rejects Afro-

pessimism<sup>18</sup> which sees Africa as politically doomed forever and considers the Afro-optimism<sup>19</sup> which, like Ake, provides alternative developmental path for Africa. The 'third wave' (Huntington, 1992) of democratisation in Africa in the 80s and the current political upheavals in the North Africa are all indicators of fault-lines in post-colonial Africa's political structures. The faulty impression of the genesis of Africa's tragedy, (ibid) needs to be corrected and this requires deconstructing the contexts of Africa's political praxis, which constitutes the next section of the paper.

### **7.1 Deconstructing capitalism, socialism and communitarianism**

Over the course of history, two main economic models with different variations dominated the history of contemporary western economic systems. These are capitalism and socialism. Capitalism involves private means of production or work, with the revenue derived from the worker's labour appropriated by the capitalist owner, the oft-called exploitation by the capitalist of the wage earner. In most variations of socialism, the state owns the means of production and all the businesses, with a social class of bureaucrats that serve as managers. Though there are variations, some of which allow both the workers and the state to hold the ownership of public industries through shares. In either the socialist or capitalist model, worker remains a wage earner selling his labour for wages based on the law of demand and supply. The revenue generated by the worker is either kept by the private business owner or the state, and in other

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<sup>18</sup>The decade of the 1980s which marked the third vision of the OAU was regarded as the Africa's lost decade due to the ascending political and social crises with negative growth, collapsing state structures, poor economic performances, etc. This was the period the international community, especially the liberal capitalist west developed 'Afro-pessimistic' belief based on the assumptions of the modernisation theorists' that the African people – their societies, cultures, mindset and structures – are incapable of running their states and their economies and, therefore, were listed to remain in a permanent state of crisis –stagnation and negative growth (Bujra, ibid). However African scholars rejected the pessimistic view of the African crisis and traced the genesis and persistence of the African crisis back to the exogenous factors.

<sup>19</sup>With the deconstruction of the liberal-pessimistic view, the African scholars and policy analysts developed an 'Afro-optimistic' view that could guide the continent out of the political and economic precipice. The alternative view rests squarely on autochthonous initiatives that aimed at changing the unequal relationship between Africa and the western nations.

situations, dividends are paid to the shareholders. The partnership arrangement, like both the socialist and capitalist models, does not solve the problem of inequality and absence of freedom.

Bolivia made an attempt at addressing this problem by creating an opportunity for the farmers to keep their revenues after paying tax to the state. A communitarian version of an alternative economic model (Paco, 2011), though on a small scale, was constructed in the 36 cultural and linguistic groups that make up the majority of Bolivia's population. This form of communitarian economy was limited to rural areas, primarily to agricultural activities and is neither based on private nor state property.

The Bolivian communitarian attempt was not the first attempt at grappling with the problems of inequality associated with either capitalism or socialism. Keynesianism, Monetarism, Classical communitarianism, Liberal communitarianism, etc; equally wrestle with these problems but they are unable to fix the problem of 'broken linkages' identified by Andersen and Torpe (2000). They, in addition to sharing the fault-lines of free market capitalism that assumes society as a group of people with only defined territory and shared culture, left the issue of freedom and liberty unaddressed. This perception of society runs through the normative principles of the various economic paradigms starting from the classical to contemporary. Speconomy goes a little further. It takes Robert Merton's argument of several decades (Merton, 1938: 672-682) into consideration to emphasise society as though, having a defined territory and shared culture but its discourse must include the social structures, integration and interactions of the people. Robert Merton declares these social structures as the relatively enduring patterns of behaviour and relationships within a society. It is therefore misleading as assumed in liberalism, that society is a mere aggregate of people without taking into consideration the relationships between them, the integration and institutions that guide such integration and relationships. The consequence of this assumption is the faulty separation of the individual from his or her group.

In both socialist and free market capitalist economic models, the citizens appear to be engaged in economic activities. In reality the economic structure gives them little opportunities to be involved in the economic decisions and direction of the state. This separation firmly bedrocks the normative principles and structures of liberal society to create the broken linkages pointed out by Andersen and Torpe (2000) between the society and the state. In this instance, the society is reduced to a mere spectator in the economic arena. The impacts of these principles could hardly be ignored in the creation of inequality within the state characterised by 'survival of the fittest' values. A view that liberal states such as United Kingdom or United States of America are unequal because they are separate and are separate because they are unequal can hardly be removed from any explanation of the impacts of the broken linkage between people and the state. The traditional bonds that bind people together are eroded by the individualistic values of liberalism thereby making the liberal societies to be less integrated.

The decentralised free market economy principles like political liberalism which advocates strict adherence to analysing human economic actions from the perspective of an individual agent, a method referred to by the Austrian School as 'praxeology'<sup>20</sup> fails to give attention to the significance of our social fabric in the integration of the society. This failure which arises from its strict enforcement of voluntary contractual agreements between the economic agents with minimal government intervention or limited imposition of coercive forces is in itself rooted in the laissez-faire economic theory that claims that market has the ability to operate well on its own, without state intervention. Friedman in his philosophical work stressed this view four decades ago. In a veiled reference to socialism, he argued that the greatest threat to man's freedom and liberty is the

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<sup>20</sup>The Austrian School of economics is a school of economic thought which advocates methodological individualism and a deductive approach to economics called praxeology. It is critical of econometrics and the application of empirical research in economic theory, which are commonly used in mainstream economics

concentration of power (1962). He used this work to expose the socialist lapses in economic democracy. According to Friedman,

...Government is necessary to preserve our freedom, it is an instrument through which we can exercise our freedom; yet by concentrating power in political hands, it is also a threat to freedom... By relying primarily on voluntary co-operation and private enterprise, in both economic and other activities, we can insure that the private sector is a check on the powers of the governmental sector and an effective protection of freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought... Fundamentally, there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion – the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals – the technique of the market place. The possibility of co-ordination through voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary -yet frequently denied- proposition that both parties to an economic transaction benefit from it, *provided the transaction is bilaterally voluntary and informed*. Exchange can therefore bring about co-ordination without coercion. A working model of a society organized through voluntary exchange is a *free private enterprise exchange economy*- what we have been calling competitive capitalism (Friedman, 1962).

In essence the doctrine of economic liberalism is based on the assumption that economic actions of individuals are largely based on self-interest and that allowing them to act without any restriction is better for the state. Protection of private property and contractual relationships between the people form the basis for this assumption while the state as according to Friedman, serves as a witness and guard for individuals in the pursuit of their economic activities. This view is in line with the liberal doctrine of the state which is sometimes referred to as the “night watchman state”. The state in liberal doctrine is not expected to engage in production or determine what is to be produced by the private capitalists.

The individuals owe the state no obligation except to pay for the services rendered by the state in pursuit of their selfish economic interests and in fulfilment of the contractual agreement with the state. For Friedman, it is only the

free market capitalism that can decentralise, disperse and devolve economic power through the independent utilisation of man's talents, exercising his initiatives as a free agent in the market place where all transactions are bilaterally, voluntarily and fully informed to determine what is produced. Pro-labour legislations and workers unions are considered as hindrances and monopolies respectively that prevent free competition in the labour market by the economic liberals. The economic liberals such as Friedman wrongly assume that the private sector of the economy is completely free and democratic.

Ian Adams (2001) came four decades after Friedman with a counter-claim that it will be socially naive to assume that if everybody is left to pursue his or her economic interest without control from the state, such arrangement will lead to a harmonious and more equal society of ever-increasing prosperity. John Maynard Keynes was a prominent voice in the defence of free market capitalism. He however deferred from Friedman's position on non-interference of the state in the salvation of Depression of the 1930s. Keynes, in his famous book '*The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*'<sup>21</sup> published in response to the Great Depression of the 1930s pointed out the dangers inherent in leaving the economy completely free without control from the state. Keynes was very much of the opinion that government must run a sufficiently large deficit to make up for any shortfall in spending by the private sector. If these were done according to Keynes, unemployment will give way to full employment. A proponent of free market liberalism, Keynes shared a commonality of vision with the Fabians especially on the view of how systematic state action might allow industrial society to be run successfully from the top down without engendering perpetual crisis. Keynes' assertion on state intervention in economic activities was primarily to underline the aggregate demands of goods as the driving force of the economy,

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<sup>21</sup>The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money was written by the English economist John Maynard Keynes. The book, generally considered to be his masterpiece, is largely credited with creating the terminology and shape of modern macroeconomics. Published in February 1936 it sought to bring about a revolution, commonly referred to as the "Keynesian Revolution",

especially in down-turn period, of which government policies could be used to promote demand at a macro level, to fight unemployment and deflation.

While Keynes presented a robust argument for state intervention, he successfully puts in place, a capitalist reconstruction strategy that uses government increased expenditure to jump-start productive sectors and create jobs. Bill Clinton, as the President of the United States, adopted Keynesian strategy to initially address unemployment problems in USA only to renege on this due to negative effects of such strategy on the economy. One of such effects was the artificial creation of jobs. This strategy also constitutes a major plank of the campaign message of Francois Hollande in the 2012 French presidential election but yet to yield the desired results.

There is a need to point out that Keynes with his robust argument for state intervention was unable to see government's survival on deficits will on the long run have dire consequences for the economy. In the process of paying back the debts, series of austerity measures will be put in place which will invariably take away jobs that were initially created artificially. Monetarism of Milton Friedman<sup>22</sup> that assumes modification of Keynesian theory could not save the Great Britain during the 80s, the EU and US in the 2010s. Though it shares the same definition of recession with Keynesianism but rejects Keynesian solution and opts for non-state intervention in the business of expanding or contracting the

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<sup>22</sup>Monetarism today is mainly associated with the work of Milton Friedman, who was among the generation of economists to accept Keynesian economics and later criticised it. Monetarism is a tendency in economic thought that emphasizes the role of governments in controlling the amount of money in circulation. It is the view within monetary economics that variation in the money supply has major influences on national output in the short run and the price level over longer periods and those objectives of monetary policy are best met by targeting the growth rate of the money supply.

supply of money as suggested by Keynes. This policy of non-state intervention was initially celebrated by both the Conservatives and the New Labour as the mainspring of Britain's economic reinvention later turned the people against the administration of Margaret Thatcher to usher in the Labour party. The argument that government should keep the money supply steady, expanding it each year only to allow for the growth of the economy and a few other basic factors such as inflation, unemployment and output to adjust themselves according to market demands failed to materialise.

Despite the claims of free market capitalism of the capability to regenerate wealth and create better opportunities for the people to live a better life, most people in the capitalist or peripheral capitalist countries still express anxiety about the future due to high level of poverty, soaring unemployment, economic depression, galloping inflation, lack of integration and unabated separation and inequality. Moreover, the picture of the contemporary free market capitalism contradicts the free market view of Adam Smith and Friedman. Lazonick refers to this contradiction as 'the myth of the market economy' (1991). The idea of thinking of free market capitalism as free, anarchistic economic democracy, unplanned, spontaneous economic system etc; is negated firstly by Keynesian economy and secondly by the recent state intervention in the global financial sector to plan, control and protect the sector from the disaster necessitated by deregulation and marketisation of the sector. It is therefore a misconception to associate capitalism with freedom, anarchistic economic democracy where no one holds an illegitimate or coercive power over anyone, or everyone is free to choose whatever s/he desires.

Liberalism in its contemporary form - neo-liberalism seeks to reject the minimal state intervention in the regulations of the economy and supports the full transfer of the control of the economy from the public to private sector with the believe that zero-level intervention by the state in the economic activity will



produce a more efficient government and improve the economic health of the state. This view is associated with John Williamson's 1990 'Washington Consensus' policy proposals<sup>23</sup> that enjoyed wide range approval among the Washington based international economic organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank. It is germane to point out that in spite of wide range approval enjoyed by the Washington Consensus policies; nearly all the neo-liberal states and institutions had by the 1990s officially abandoned the Consensus policies. By this time it had become obvious to them that the policies could not address the issues of poverty and unemployment. The intervention of the European Union and the United States of America governments in their respective economies further confirms the abandonment and that free market economy is not as free as being theoretically expressed by the liberals. Free market ideology is an ideology with a focus on keeping capital in the political control of the state. The intervention to salvage the global financial crisis has proved the non-intervention principle to be a facade. Capitalism in any guise is actually a controlled, well managed and planned economic system, it is far from being an anarchistic democracy and completely moves away from the principles of free market economy as presented by Friedman and other economic liberals. Cambridge economist, Ha-Joon Chang, also demonstrates the deception of the free market capitalism. He argues that economic development depends not on the free market, but rather, on the state intervention in the economy including the development of IT, the internet and biotechnology (2002). The world still awaits the capitalists in any garb to provide a response to the moral credibility of this [in] consistency.

Michael Reagan rightly avers in 1963 that:

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<sup>23</sup>The term Washington consensus was coined by John Williamson (1990) to encapsulate the set of policy reforms advocated with a reasonable degree of consensus by international financial institutions, the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve Board, and the leading think tanks based in Washington. Those policies were deemed necessary to achieve growth, low inflation, a viable balance of payments, and equitable income distribution in the developing world at large, and especially in Latin America, which was still recovering from the debt crisis that erupted in 1982. The policies that defined the Washington consensus included (1) fiscal discipline, (2) increased public expenditure on social services and infrastructure, (3) tax reform to broaden tax bases and reduce marginal tax rates, (4) market-determined interest rates, (5) unified and competitive exchange rates, (6) import liberalization, (7) openness to foreign direct investment, (8) privatization, (9) deregulation, and (10) secure property rights

...from a market-regulated economy we have shifted to one directed by the personal, visible hands of governmental and corporate managers... the dominant and dynamic part of our economy is "free enterprise" only in that firms are privately owned... The automatic economy is dead. "The managed economy" is the phrase that applies to both the public and the private sectors, and it also indicates the specific quality of the mixed economy: that both elements are managed. Once we begin to look at our system as one that is consciously planned rather than impersonally directed by market forces, some essentially political questions come to the fore. Who will do the managing? For whose benefit? What will be the goals? Who will set them? How? (Reagan, 1963)

Socialism in any guise has not fared better. The goal of socialism can be summarised as the state control of the economy under the dictatorship of the working class. The commonality of this goal runs through all forms of socialism. The left is yet to show any tangible evidence that the working class shares the same statist goal with socialism; hence the foundation upon which socialism rests appears shaky. If there is any factor that points to the departure between the left and working class, it is the continued adherence by the left to undemocratic principles of statism, and perhaps the top-down anti-working class method. One crucial issue which the left is yet to address is whether there is justifiable reason for the right to sweepingly associate socialism with coercion and dictatorship taking Roberts Dahl's 1947 distinction of left wing economic thought into consideration. Dahl avers that there are two, potentially contradictory, schools of left wing economic thought: one advocating central control of the economy in the hands of the state, and the other advocating workers' control, where "workers will no longer be merely passive victims of the productive process, but direct participants in the control of productive enterprises" (Dahl, 1947), - a Fabian<sup>24</sup> tradition of socialism.

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<sup>24</sup>The Fabians were an intellectual grouping/think tank formed in 1884 which advocated the 'gradualist' road to state socialism, and whose key members, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, founded the London School of Economics in 1895

Attempts by the left at sustaining socialism in any variation as the dominant ideology after the World War II, further prove the ideology as non-defender of freedom and democracy. Socialism also failed to extend democracy to the economic arena where mass of the people are involved. Rather than democratising the economic space, the left justified statism, ignoring the issue of freedom and liberty. This failure paved the way for the right to formulate a defence of free market capitalism and present such as a form of economic democracy even though only the capitalists control the economy.

While socialism primarily concerns itself with equality and fairness in the society, its adherence to a 'teleological vision of historical progress; and its attachment to command and control systems'(Giddens, 1994) makes it practically impossible for the ideology to address the deficiency of freedom especially in an 'increasingly individualised and de-traditionalised' (Giddens, *ibid*) liberal world.

The communitarians believe in the free market, though they strive to strike a balance between free market and the social good, between the marketplace and the society, between economic freedom and society's broader needs. The main argument of the communitarians supports the free market as a remarkable engine of prosperity, economic growth and increased productivity. One fundamental element that separates communitarianism from liberalism is a kind of anthropological claim about the relation between individual and society. Typically liberal tradition employs a methodological individualism, assuming that the basic elements in the social world are individual human beings, each with the capacity to form their own beliefs and life-plans. Society, from this angle, is a kind of by-product of the practices and decisions of these individuals. Liberals also subscribe to a sort of 'atomism': the idea that each individual is a discrete monad, only contingently related to others. For the liberals the individual is unattached or unsituated. Every individual finds its identity through the ordering of its own desires and preferences. Communitarian philosophy, as presented by Michael J.

Sandel (1982), MacIntyre (1985), and Michael Walzer (1983), tends to argue against both liberalism's methodological individualism and the priority it places on individual rights over public goods. These theorists insist that we cannot understand the individual apart from the particular social contexts in which he or she is inevitably embedded - the identities and attributes with which he or she finds himself/herself encumbered, his/her language, heritage, ethnicity and locality. These individuals are far from being contingent 'baggage' which individuals just happen to carry around with them. Our social circumstances are an integral part of the meanings of our lives, and the preferences we hold.

The major trouble with the liberal approach is that its concomitant assumptions now permeate contemporary western civil society. It has led to an erosion of our communal sense that we might have unchosen responsibilities as well as chosen ones; that we might 'owe' something to the community whose traditions and resources have helped make us what we are. This communal sense according to the communitarians constitutes an indispensable foundation for a stable community. However the assumptions of liberalism if not checked, they assert, may disrupt other crucial dimensions of life. For example industrialisation as explained earlier, was noticed in the United States to have weakened the traditional family system and replaced such with industrial family where both parents need to work in order to cope with the demands and lifestyles of the new economy. The transformation of the family institution means that one of the society's most critical tasks – child rearing and moral formation has been compromised. The urge for profit now shapes our relationship, which the communitarians see as unsuitable value for socialisation. The profit urge, has crept into the state politics, making the political process a money-driven process, leaving the privilege to contest election for the rich or their choice candidates thereby pulling active participation out of the reach of the less privileged with the exception of the right to vote

Karl Polanyi's works (1957a, 1957b, 1957c and 1977) offer valid entry point into the communitarian economy. It predominantly carves a respectable space for Kropotkin's communitarian anarchism<sup>25</sup> to command a focus of attention within the histories of classical economic thoughts. Kropotkin's work like other social thinkers was centred on the failings of the capitalist system and through this work made an implicit and explicit call for a return to an essentially humanist perspective in production and distribution of our basic means of subsistence. Polanyi made strenuous efforts to isolate the ideological from the ethnographic dimensions of an essential human 'economy' (Knowles, 2004). Polanyi's 'vision' was of a 'free, co-operative, democratic and just society based on social ownership and control of economic resources' and was 'not grounded in technological or economic determinism' (Polanyi-Levitt 1994: 130). His, was entirely a humanist vision aimed towards democratic stability of the society.

Two aspects of Polanyi's work that opened up the concept of 'economic thought' are his 'substantive' definition of the economy, and his demonstration of the social embeddedness of all economies (Knowles, *ibid*). He demonstrated this by the consideration of the word 'economic' from two independent meanings. These are the 'substantive' and the 'formal' meanings (Polanyi, 1957a: 243-4). By formal meaning, Polanyi refers to a definite situation of choice, mainly, that between the different uses of means induced by an insufficiency of those means'. This is 'logic of rational action'. It is this 'formal' definition which underpins the neo-classical paradigm (Knowles, *ibid*).

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<sup>25</sup>Peter Kropotkin a Russian anarcho-communist. Author of "Mutual Aid and Fields", "Factories and workshops" - two books which have been influential on the development of egalitarian communities. Kropotkin has been credited with the founding of Communitarian anarchism a cultural movement rather than a class interest movement, but not outside the struggle for freedom and self-determination and against exploitation and repression. Communitarian anarchists are unwilling to wait for a revolution based on the overthrow of patriarchal capitalist states. They prefer the pragmatic approach of attempting to create cells of the new society and new culture parallel to the current state institutions and social systems.

Though speconomy is in accord with Polanyi's formal meaning of the economic; his submission on the substantive definition appears to be insufficient for the resolution of the problem of inequality created by capitalism. By 'substantive' definition, Polanyi refers to man's dependence for his survival upon nature and his fellows. 'It refers to the interchange with his natural and social environment, in so far as these results in supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction' (ibid). Polanyi's substantive definition of the economy makes no commitment to any notions of choice or scarcity or insufficiency in the way in which they are basic postulates of the neo-classical economics paradigm. To Polanyi, choice does not connote insufficiency of means or insufficiency of means implying choice or scarcity (Polanyi, 1977). The second aspect of Polanyi's work that is relevant to speconomy is his conclusion that the economy is embedded in society. He avers that

...the outstanding discovery of recent historical and anthropological research is that man's economy, as a rule, is submerged in his social relationships. He does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, and his social assets. He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end (1957b: 46).

Polanyi's assertion on the relationship between individuals' economic activities and their groups is fundamental to speconomy. There can be no distinction between the economy and the rest of society, except that which has been artificially created by the development of abstract economic theory based on the idea of a self-regulating market.

The goal of communitarianism is how a humane society could be attained. The Liberal communitarians however still strive to protect the liberal capitalist state from being consumed by the fire of resistance it has ignited globally. Liberal Communitarianism and economic liberalism share the philosophical illusion of market being firmly kept in the private sector with little or no involvement of the public sector. A run-through of the liberal communitarian arguments reveals the spiritual accord between their economic

doctrines. Though the liberal communarians share with Keynes the doctrine of state intervention, but not in the manner Keynes prescribes. While Keynes wants the government to run sufficiently large deficits in order to create employment opportunities, the communarians are more concerned with government giving helping hands directly to the people in terms of benefits.

The left communarians, while fixing the broken linkages created by the free market liberalism, rightly allege that neo-liberalism rests on an atomistic platform of individual as an isolated, competitive profit maximiser. They proclaim human beings as social creatures that warrant recognition of their interdependency. They reiterate the compelling need of a social vision that emphasises solidarity and mutuality. This is the "good society". Unfortunately the social processes within the good society are left unaltered, even though they emphasise economic equality and collective action, albeit with a stronger role for civil society than in the past, the market must however be kept firmly in the private sector and never in the public sector.

For the new society to emerge, the right communarians are very emphatic on the complete removal of the state. They want the welfare state dismantled but the moral vacuum and lifestyle created in the society by the combination of liberalism and neo-liberalism must be filled. This task requires the rebuilding of a moral civil society to meet social needs that neither the free market nor the conventional welfare state can meet. To this end, a new political and economic localism must be put in place while the poor must be recapitalised in order to empower them to crawl out from under the welfare state, and the welfare state itself must be cut back (Polanyi, 1957).

Communitarianism is purely an attempt at filling the moral gulf created in the society by the free market capitalism since the period of Enlightenment. The reality of the effects of the gulf on the sustenance of the market democracy paved the way for communitarianism to emerge as an SOS philosophy to firstly, save capital from the barrage of attacks directed at it by the

impoverished democratic majority. Secondly, to protect our souls from the rapacious market and discrimination that is threatening to overwhelm all crucial aspects of our lives. Both left and right communitarians successfully drew politics and the state back into the domain of religion where we need to be morally conscious of our actions towards others having realised the effects of individualistic value on the moral bond that binds people together in their various communities

Democracy represents the establishment of an open, public realm where every citizen is free to contribute to the well-being of the community without any form of intimidation using their wealth of experience to make their contributions. In this wise to discuss democracy will mean to discuss people of a political community or a self-governing society. Communitarianism fails in this regard as it does not go beyond explaining the significance of society to individual's life. Speconomy and neo communitarianism canvass perspectives that could not agree less with Kooiman (2002) who states that:

...no single actor has the possibility of 'doing the job' [solving a problem or grasping an opportunity] unilaterally. No actor is so dominant as to be able to enforce a certain line of behaviour, or to place the costs of social problem-solving on others and take the revenues himself. And all actors can be severely hindered in reaching their own objectives by other actors. 'Interdependence' in itself is not enough. The realization of the opportunities within interdependence is the central assignment of social-political governance (Kooiman, 2002)

Kooiman's observations about governance and community have since time immemorial been at the centre of societal cohesion especially in Africa where every adult irrespective of gender freely participate in the village or community development and decision making. As Bob Jessop observes,

...so-called 'governance' mechanisms [as contrasted to markets or hierarchy] have long been widely used in coordinating complex organizations and systems. They are especially appropriate for systems that are resistant to top-down internal management and/or direct external control and that also co-



evolve with other [complex] sets of social relations with which their various decisions, operations, and aims are reciprocally interdependent (Jessop, 1997).

## 7.2 Rectifying Sub-Saharan Africa's economic crisis with Speconomy

Speconomy shares Polanyi's 'vision' of a 'free, co-operative, democratic and just society based on social ownership and control of economic resources' (Polanyi-Levitt, *ibid*). While agreeing with Polanyi's formal classification of economic, speconomy however departs from his substantive's classification which he sees as the interchange of an individual "with his natural and social environment, in so far as this results to supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction". Polanyi avers: "the substantive definition of economic derives from man's dependence for his living upon nature and his fellow men" (Polanyi, 1977).

Though Polanyi provides a leeway for deconstructing 'economic thought' from the strictures of the neo-classical economics paradigm, speconomy however provides a deeper critique of communitarian anarchism to deconstruct the expression of individuals as dependants of nature and their fellows for consumption required for their survival. An individual becomes a parasite when s/he only consumes what others produce, that is, develops consumption as a philosophy. A state that measures and sustains the quality of its people's lives by consumption rather than the productive worth is only developing and sharpening acquisitive tendencies of the citizenry and suppressing their productive instincts. Such a nation will always judge the achievement of its people through materialism and property. . The net effect of this is a culture of dependence. This is the nucleus of Africa's economic backwardness.

Man<sup>26</sup> consumes for his survival and self-development if he consumes what he produces with his labour, technical skills and invariably his technology. This simply means man is self-reliant. The quality of man's production

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<sup>26</sup> Man refers to individuals with no bias against female gender

automatically reflects on the quality and quantity of his consumption such as the clothes he wears, the cars he drives, the house he lives, his communication system etc. Addressing the parasitic assumption of Polanyi's substantive definition, necessitates rectification of the 'broken linkages' by speconomy as they potentially play vital role in the invocation of the new economic vision that goes beyond individual's equality and fairness but one that is concerned more about our social fabric (Olateju, 2012b: 32).

As demonstrated by the African Charter of 1990, speconomy serves to elevate us beyond ideologies and *isms*. Its values are characterised by integration of man and state in a manner that will halt the increasing individualism associated with liberal market democracy. It is purely a concept of 'economic' which is not averse to the dependence of man on nature and his fellows but this should not be for purely improving the quality of life through consumption that could lead to a culture of dependence but for self-sustenance.

In speconomy, man and the state are co-partners in the quest for survival. The organic relationship between man and state has been variously described by some as patriotism or nationalism. These are just descriptive nomenclatures of the relationship. We unconsciously jubilate when our state records success. This happens because a part of our person is making progress to the delight of the whole body and the whole body goes into sorrow when the same part is being afflicted by calamity.

Speconomy stresses that detachment of individuals from the state as unsituated or as an idealised shopper is bound to result in the alienation of the individual from the community which provides the very conditions of her individuality in the first place. The state in neo-communitarian arrangement is an aggregate of the nationality groups with their network of relationships. The parts constitute the whole as the whole gives meaning to the parts. The nationality

groups of individuals and the state remain the two sides of the same coin and whose separation renders both worthless and ineffective.

Picking from Dewey's argument (1992), speconomy also sees man as a being who naturally responds to the stimuli of his environment, therefore an agency of novel reconstruction, reorganising human experiences by making new things and reshaping old ones through arts and technology. Following this argument, Olateju (2002) submits man as a natural technologist who needs to establish and maintain an active relationship with his environment and not just to depend on it for his survival as submitted by Polanyi.

Man is daily confronted with hierarchy of needs, whose realisation naturally compels him to see life as a struggle of which he cannot be passive (Olateju, *ibid*). Nyerere (1968) once expressed the view that through active transformation of the environment, man becomes an architect of his destiny and self-fulfilled. In essence, man is not just a mere spectator of his environment or indolent but a creative and intelligent being whose collective efforts design a suitable society based on the collective experiences of man and his fellows.

The social processes of speconomy transcend the social atomism of individuals, and it views the task of neo-communitarianism as that of creating a form of politics and state that are appropriate to it. This entails creating a society where integration is central to the economic policy through equal opportunity for the integration and participation of all citizens in the production and distribution of economic goods and services. This underscores its emphasis on the reconfiguration of the relationship between the state, market and individuals; and diverting such relationship from the direction of predatory capitalism relished by liberal democracy. Speconomy uses participatory decision making and control mechanism to guide production and distribution of goods and services within the state. It does this to seek an economic order that ensures partnership between the individuals (sole proprietor, cooperatives, local or international companies) and

the state through the various tiers of government in the production and distribution of goods and services. Speconomic philosophy does not oppose public ownership of the means of production and distribution neither does it prevent private ownership of some property.

The two partners are entitled to ownership of property but such ownership must derive from the partnership. In essence speconomy does not support sole public or total private ownership of property. The reason for this is simple. Public ownership where state dominates the economic activities or ownership does not give room for individual ingenuity and freedom of choice. Private ownership where individuals acquire property as much as they can, promotes unequal economic relationship and poverty. Poverty turns economic relationships into power relationships.

The mandatory collaborative partnership arrangement between the state and individuals serves as speconomy's contrast to other forms of economic systems. A major deficiency of other economic models, apart from deprivation of freedom and liberty, is the separation of individuals and the state. Claims of absence of freedom constitute a major plank that both socialism and capitalism rest their opposition to each other. They both, in their variants, claim to stand for freedom. Every political party claims to be for it as well. If they are both for freedom, then why do they oppose each other? How can they oppose and yet be united in favour of the same goal? None of them appears to actually provide freedom within their discourses. They both treat the issue of freedom half-heartedly leaving out its vital aspects. Firstly, they ignore the absence of freedom in its natural form and secondly they treat freedom theoretically or as a mental construct in isolation of its material base.

Speconomy holds that freedom needs to be addressed holistically using a three-fold template before we can appreciate its provision or denial in any

ideology. These three folds are natural freedom, theoretical freedom and material freedom. In its theoretical form, freedom exists in the will-power to choose from alternatives. The choice of an alternative is done through our mental construct. Every individual is naturally endowed with this will-power to make a decision in any material situation. This will-power is an ideal form of freedom that could be applied in every situation by every individual irrespective of age. Day-old baby can apply this if he or she desires. The baby may decide not to accept the mother's breast or reject feed from the feeding bottle even if he or she is coerced. The baby applies the will-power to make a choice out of the available alternatives. The baby may decide to smile at some people and choose not to do same to others. It is the will-power that is applied by every individual as to 'what to do' but 'where to do it' or 'how to do it' does not belong to the realm of ideal freedom but the material freedom. In its material form, freedom cannot be taken in isolation of the rules and regulations that guide the situation. This is where speconomy differs from both socialism and capitalism. The main concern of speconomy is the material freedom where every individual has equal access to freedom.

Every situation has norms and relations that produce a set of shared values to guide its processes and relationships. These norms include knowledge of the relations, mutual understanding and forms of reciprocity from every member. Once an individual uses his or her will-power to enter into a situation, the norms and values of such situation becomes a moral compass for the individual in his relationship with others. Where his or her desires become unaccomplishable within the situation due to the requirements of the norms, the same will power could be applied to detach himself or herself from the situation or to effect a modification of the obstructing norm. What we have been witnessing in the discourses of freedom in most ideologies is the search for ideal or theoretical freedom in a material situation. Material freedom can only exist in a material or physical situation. Most of the fundamental human rights are ideal or theoretical forms of freedom which once transferred into physical situation will transform into material forms. In this wise they will be guided by the rules and regulations

guiding the processes within such situation. The same principles apply to a country in a committee of an international organisation such as European Union.

A state has the will-power to join an international body and to withdraw if the rules and regulations guiding the social processes within the organisation are not favourable to its own vision. You do not talk of denial of ideal freedom of movement if you got to the train station late and found that the train had left or sue the state for not allowing you to be part of a sport team if you did not partake in the selection trials. An intending student cannot talk of denial of university admission if he or she fails the entrance examination. Material freedom becomes applicable when you meet all the required conditions and rules.

Material freedom is lacking in both capitalism and socialism as the same social or economic opportunities are not applicable to people in the same situation. For example, under capitalism the relations of production allocate individuals into different social classes defined by their access to and possession of the means of production. Individuals within these social classes have different political and juridical powers. Socialism on the other hand embraces between centralisation of the means of production and dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship as used by Marx means a social system where one social class dominates others. By class dominance, Marx referred to the general and pervasive powers exercised by one social class to maintain and defend its dominance in a social formation. This is the class struggle that Marx and Engel defined as the locomotive of history. Any ideology that embraces dictatorship cannot at the same time claim to be a promoter of freedom.

Speconomy distinguishes itself from Ordoliberalism<sup>27</sup> and Social market<sup>28</sup> economy which premised the operation of the economy on mixed economy that combines private enterprise with state intervention through regulations. The main element of the social market economy contains free market economy such as private property, free foreign trade, exchange of goods and free formation of prices. Collective bargaining is often done on national level not between one corporation and one union, but national employers organisations and national unions. The point of departure here is that the two models also ignore the relationship between the individuals and the state where each are allowed operating independent of each other.

Speconomy sets to address Reagan's questions of who will do the managing and for whose benefit? What will be the goals? Who will set them and how?" (Reagan, 1963) It sets to address these questions by putting in place a mechanism for profit sharing between the partners while cooperative groups will be the basis for the management of the partnership with the state. The partnership allows the partner that initiates the business, the entrepreneurial move, to own one-third of the net profit while the remaining two-thirds is shared according to the contributions of the each partners.

Speconomy seeks to increase the production base of the state in order to ensure political stability and sustainable growth. The state will seek to generate funds and minimise leakages and waste. A large quantum of African financial resources is committed to recurrent expenditure which has negative implication for sustainable development. To correct this, there is need for cooperative partnership for prosecution of capital projects and social provisioning.

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<sup>27</sup> Ordoliberalism is a German variant of neo-liberalism that emphasises the need for the state to ensure that the free market produces results close to its theoretical potentials

<sup>28</sup> Social market economy remains the main economic model adopted in Germany since after the World War II. It is a philosophy that descends from Ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School.

Commencing Speconomy involves creation of three agencies. These are Research Institutes Coordinating Agency, (RICA), Employment Generation Cooperatives Agency (EGCA), and Employment Stabilisation Funds Agency (ESFA). RICA creates a unifying platform for all the produce, products and technology research institutes to synthesise their activities in a complimentary manner, prepare the feasibility studies for the production of each item, at least at the cottage level, highlights the person's and location's specifications for the production of the item and provides technical support for each project. The EGCA concerns itself with registration of the cooperative groups, receives the research outputs from RICA and makes such outputs available to the cooperative groups, organises necessary training programmes for selected cooperative groups and liaises with ESFA for take-off grants and loans. ESFA provides take-off grants or loans at minimum interest rate, sells bond to raise funds, liaises with, and receives funds from international agencies. It is germane to stress that cooperative groups can also initiate independent business proposals without necessarily taking from Rica's. However such proposal will still need to be subjected to RICA's investigation.

The initial funds will come from the government through budgetary allocation, special levies on certain categories of businesses, political appointees and senior civil servants and loans and grants from the international Agencies. All the three Agencies under supervision of the Ministry of Labour and Employment Generations, will nominate at least one project monitoring officer for every project to ensure compliance with the standards and procedures stated in the project's portfolio and guide the business operators towards targets delivery and the repayment of loans. It is the responsibility of ESFA to encourage the project hosting tiers of government to, as a form of investment, make contributions to the business take-off in order to reduce the amount of loans or grants to be granted by ESFA. In addition, small and medium scale development banks become vital to offer soft and long term loans to the cooperative groups with ESFA serving as guarantor.



Marketing of product should be handled by both the state and the cooperative groups. Some products may warrant state purchasing from the groups and re-selling to larger markets including foreign markets while some may require direct sale to departmental stores and local markets. The role of the Marketing Boards will include ensuring fair price for goods and subsidy for market vagaries.

The existing private companies are to be left to continue with their operations but may enter into cooperative pact with their host communities and towns to reflect the new governance architecture. State will no longer register private companies that do not conform to the new regulations and will divert the initial support given to private companies to the cooperative companies. Multinational companies are by rules of speconomy, expected to enter into cooperative pact with their host communities, towns and regions. Each state will determine the category of business that the federal government will handle in partnerships with the concerned cooperative groups. However, financial, shipping or air businesses are to enter into cooperative pact with the federal government with no involvement of the communities, towns or regions. For example, a radio or television station with regional coverage will need to be in partnership with the region concerned and not the town or community. Derivation and value added tax strategies will be applied to take care of such communities in the budget allocation.

In Africa, speconomy needs to take along with it, reconfiguration of the state in a neo-communitarian arrangement where the indigenous communities will have both political and economic capacities to develop. Autochthonous state building is an essential foundation for speconomy. African multi-ethnic outlook needs to be reconfigured to become source of strength instead of being harbinger of division and disunity. All tendencies for destructive competition for control of power at the centre which exacerbate the primordial instinct in the people to fan the flame of the religious and ethnic differences need to be curtailed before

speconomy can thrive. The state at the regional level determines the minimum wage for each region in conjunction with workers associations. This is quite different from Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel's participatory economy<sup>29</sup> where workers solely own the means of production. Speconomy emphasises the need for both the state and individuals to collaborate in the production and distribution of goods and services without allowing each to function separately or for any to impose hegemony or domination. Two features that distinguish speconomy from economic liberalism are the determination of minimum wage by the state and involvement of workers' associations in such determination. While the economic liberals see these as causes of unemployment, speconomy stresses their involvement in the control and management of the economic relationships in line with the partnership doctrines.

## Conclusion

Speconomy states that no political economy could set itself above social reality; it is a part of the society which it inhabits. Studies have affirmed the resiliency, legitimacy and relevance of African traditional institutions in the socio-cultural, economic and political lives of Africans. There is therefore the need for these traditional institutions to be accorded the due recognition in the state-building and democratisation processes of the post-colonial African states.

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<sup>29</sup> Participatory economy, often abbreviated as parecon, is an economic system proposed primarily by activist and political theorist Michael Albert and radical economist Robin Hahnel, among others. It uses participatory decision making as an economic mechanism to guide the production, consumption and allocation of resources in a given society. Proposed as an alternative to contemporary capitalist market economies and also an alternative to centrally planned socialism, it is described as a form of socialism, since in a parecon the means of production are owned in common.

The underlying values that parecon seeks to implement are equity, solidarity, diversity, workers self-management and efficiency. (Efficiency here means accomplishing goals without wasting valued assets.) It proposes to attain these ends mainly through the following principles and institutions:

- Workers and consumers' councils utilizing self-managerial methods for making decisions,
- Balanced job complexes,
- Remuneration according to effort and sacrifice, and
- Participatory planning.

Though African states may not have been colonised in the same form but they were all the same colonised and colonisation had the same effect on all the pre-colonial African societies and peoples.

The dislocation of the political economies of all the pre-colonial systems and the subsequent integration of these economies into the global capitalist economy in an unequal relationship bind the African states together as victims of colonisation and neo-colonisation. As Africa collectively desires through the pan African vision and later Lagos Plan of Action, to build and strengthen democratic states and economies, there is need for the 'externalists' to allow such visions to be uninterruptedly grounded in the indigenous values as canvassed in neo-communitarianism and speconomy. It is through this break from the grips of the external visions that Africa can move away from the currently imposed 'spectator democracy' at home and 'spectator participant' in the global political economy.

## Chapter 8

### SPECONOMY AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

#### 8.0 Introduction

The central objective of this chapter is to explore the possibility of using speconomy as an alternative pathway into the world economy. This is to place the partnership between cooperatives of individuals and the state at the centre of political, economic and social discourses, and see such partnership as not only necessary, but as the driving force of politics and economy. One justification for this is the global division of labour, inequality, unemployment and unequal trade in the world economy, as part of the consequences of globalisation. While advancing argument for global economic restructuring, the chapter aligns with the submission of Otto Holman, Marianne Marchand et al in their series editors' preface to "*Global Unions? Theory and Strategies of Organised Labour in Global Political Economy*" (2002: xv – xvi). They assert, '...we must stop focusing on global firms as 'black boxes' and analyse them as 'sites of contest' instead' (Holman; Marchand et al; 2002: xvi). Speconomy advances the possibility of providing a domestic production pathway through joint partnership economic model between human cooperatives and the state in a manner that will reflect the unique characteristics and comparative advantage of each country.

Globalisation, in addition to creating new identities and divisions in the world economy, fundamentally alters the perception of governments of the developing economies in terms of economic development strategies. This process of global economic integration also altered the perception of most sub-Saharan African governments in their formulation of economic development policies. The dictates of globalisation now loom larger and crowds out the original economic vision of the OAU of adopting backward integration strategy, replacing such with the global integration, especially in the extractive primary and agricultural produce. African governments in succumbing to these dictates have successfully widened the gap between individuals and state. The states that are supposed to

serve the interest of the citizenry, now serve the interest of the capital. The harsh effects of capital accumulation further distanced the people and the state away from each other. Just when the people need the state as a protector from the harsh effects of domineering global capitalist economy such as inequality, unemployment and endemic poverty, the systemic pressures are handicapping the states to respond appropriately. This situation can only be rectified if the state is re-energised and re-focused by the people. This is where speconomy becomes significant for the state and the people to re-focus the state towards productivity.

### **8.1 Principles of speconomy**

The partnership arrangement between the state and the cooperative of individuals serves as speconomy's contrasts with other forms of economic systems. The state is a product of the relationships among the nationality groups of individuals. Without the individuals in their various nationalities and groups, the state remains an empty space. While the state gives the individuals an identity, the individuals on the other hand, not only provide the state with its unique identity but also preserve the identity for the state.

The logic of shifting risks from government and corporations unto the individuals through social, cultural, political and economic policies and practices that stress individual autonomy as emphasised in free market capitalism is a logic of exploiting one partner to sustain the other and to entrench totalitarian rule as against democratic system. In either socialist or capitalist economy, there is a distinction between the state's owners and state workers. The workers earn much less than the value they create thereby providing space for excess profit that is always appropriated by the business owners which could be either state, corporate organisations or individuals.

Following Parenti's analysis of how wealth and want in the United States are getting more extreme, (Parenti, 2001) corporations in all the

contemporary models of economy, are 'organisational devices' to exploit labour and accumulate capital with the working people being society's real producers. Public corporations as the contemporary dominant institutions exist for one purpose supported by law. This is to maximise the value of share holders' equity size and dominance or be left behind. Their success is measured by their concentrated, virtual-monopoly size. Noam Chomsky calls them 'private tyrannies'. According to Chomsky,

As state capitalism developed into the modern era, economic, political and ideological systems have increasingly been taken over by vast institutions of private tyranny that are about as close to the totalitarian ideal as any that humans have so far constructed (Chomsky, 2005: 191).

Chomsky is not alone in this perception. Chomsky's view only echoes Robert Brady who had before Chomsky alerted us to the inverse democratic control associated with free market capitalism. In his submission, Brady argues that,

...within the corporation all policies emanate from the control above. In the union of this power to determine policy with the execution thereof, all authority necessarily proceeds from the top to the bottom and all responsibility from the bottom to the top. This is, of course, the inverse of "democratic" control; *it follows the structural conditions of dictatorial power* (Brady (1943) cited in Chomsky, 2005: 191)

Governments are constantly responsive to the needs of the corporations through benefits such as subsidies, bailouts and protections by taxing the public. For example, Stephen Lendman reveals in review of Parenti's "*Democracy for the Few*" (2001) that immediately after World War 11 and with the emergence of the US as the dominant state left standing, President Eisenhower gave the private organisations the equivalent (in today's dollars) of \$300 billion worth of offshore oil reserves, public lands and utilities, atomic installations and much more in what Parenti and others later referred to as "*socialism for the rich*" (Lendman, 2007). The situation has not changed in the contemporary free-market economies as the big corporate organisations remain beneficiaries of multi-billion pounds and dollars support paid for by the public taxes.

This support comes in forms of tax breaks, price supports, loan guarantees, bailouts, marketing services, exports subsidies, R&D grants, free use of the public broadcasting spectrum and other government-directed benefits. Production costs are socialised but profits are privatised in an enormous redistribution of income from the working populace to the corporate rich. The tax system is skewed in favour of the corporate capitalists with the corporations paying an insignificant percentage of their revenues, with many not paying income taxes and many getting tax rebates. From this explanation it is apparent that the worker is being exploited to sustain the corporate organisations and the state. This is exactly what is being referred to in speconomy as exploiting one partner to sustain the other.

A the risk of repetition, speconomy is not a brand of 'Ordoliberalism' or 'Social market economy' which premises the operation of the economy on a mixed economic system that combines private enterprise with state intervention through regulations. This is a major point of departure of speconomy where there is a mandatory partnership between the state and the individuals in their cooperative forms.

The mandatory partnership of speconomy rests on understanding that the fundamental structural elements of an economy comprising consumption and production are natural and vital for the sustenance of both the state and the people. They are universal as well. However the particular way in which these elements combine and interrelate in any economy is unique and specific both in place and time. This is why no country can copy another's economic policy, though as Ross advises, "it can learn from other economies" (Ross, 2011).

For this reason, it is emphasised in speconomy that these elements, in very different forms and combinations, are of major importance for economic development strategies. The specific forms and combinations in which elements

are applied are entirely unique in each state and at different points in time. In essence the combination and form of partnership will be applied uniquely to each state without jeopardising the partnership relationship between individuals and state.

Speconomy emphasises the need for both the state and the individuals to collaborate, not necessarily cooperation, in the production and distribution of goods and services as partners. It represents a model of welfare state based on equality and equitable distribution of wealth but with emphasis on the state sharpening the productive aspect of the citizenry through collaborative backward integration strategies. In doing this, the state will tackle six giants instead of Beveridge's five; the sixth is, 'Less jobs'. The five giants identified by Beveridge<sup>30</sup> are, being Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. Less jobs with soaring unemployment rate is identified as a major problem synonymous with other models especially the free market economy. Some of the after-effects of fewer jobs are being want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness.

As with every other welfare state, in speconomy, state plays a vital role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social well-being of the citizens but the protection of the state's life is also vital. Without life, the state cannot protect and promote the well-being of the individual members. The state needs to be economically active like its individual members, rather than being used by the individuals just for the provision of social protections. While the individuals cannot just use the state for their own protection, the state too cannot just use the individuals for its own protection. The state needs to protect the individuals just as individuals need to embrace and legitimise the state. They both

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<sup>30</sup> In December 1942, the Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services was published, known commonly as the Beveridge Report after its chairman, Sir William Beveridge, proposing a series of measures to aid those who were in need of help, or in poverty. Beveridge recommended to the government that they should find ways of tackling the five giants, being Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness. He argued to cure these problems; the government should provide adequate income to people, adequate health care, adequate education, adequate housing and adequate employment. It proposed that 'All people of working age should pay a weekly National Insurance contribution. In return, benefits would be paid to people who were sick, unemployed, retired or widowed.'



need to collaborate for the protection of each and to jointly solve the problem of 'fewer jobs associated with other economic models.

## 8.2 Speconomic Welfare state

There are varieties of welfare states with different economic and social organisations ranging from 'Nordic model', which operates in Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland with the Swedish model being referred to as 'Folkhemmet' which literally stands for 'folk home'. Others are 'social state' ('sozialstaat' in Germany or 'stato sociale' in Italy), 'state of well-being' or 'state of social well-being' ('estado del bienestar' in Spain or 'estado de providencia' in Portugal), 'providing state' ('previdencia social' in Brazil) to Britain's welfare state. Saudi Arabia<sup>31</sup>, (Pawel Zaleski, 2006 ), Brunei, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates are all welfare states but exclusively meant for their citizens with no concern for non-citizens, including legal residents and legal long term employees who are prohibited from partaking in the benefits of the welfare state.

In all these varieties, the only aspect of man that is addressed is the consumption aspect leaving out the productive aspect. The consumption aspect is well sharpened by the state through the provision of subsidised services or social benefits, while the productive aspect is either not sufficiently addressed or completely ignored. While the state is expected to provide some social protection for individual members, the protection of the life of the state through the required responsibilities and duties of individuals are significantly lacking.

For example in the Nordic model the state only transfers funds to the services provided for the citizens such as education and health care and also

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<sup>31</sup>The Social Security section of the Ministry of Labour provides assistance to Saudi citizens in the following categories; the unemployed, widows and widowers, females who have no living family members to support them, orphans, the disabled, families of those serving custodial sentences, and victims of natural disasters.

provide direct benefits to the people. These provisions are funded through redistributionist taxation<sup>32</sup> that is often referred to as mixed economy<sup>33</sup> but how the individual can ensure that the state continues deriving energies for the provision of these services is completely lacking in this model. Also the Swedish welfare state which dates back to 1936 is a compromise between the trade unions and the big companies to provide a sort of mixed economy built on strong unions and a strong system of social security and universal health care.

The German welfare state that started during the period of Otto von Bismarck especially in the 1880s reveals that the welfare policies only covered the consumption aspect of the citizens such as old age pensions, accident insurance, medical care and unemployment insurance. The policies were specifically designed to win the support of the working class for the Empire and reduce the emigration of workers to America where wages were higher but welfare did not exist (Megginson, and Jeffry, 2001; Hennock, 2007). Bismarck also extended his policies to protect the domestic industries by high tariffs policies which protected profits and wages from American competition.

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<sup>32</sup>Redistribution of wealth is the transfer of income, wealth or property from some individuals to others caused by a social mechanism such as taxation, monetary policies, welfare, nationalisation, charity, divorce or tort law. Most often it refers to progressive redistribution, from the rich to the poor, although it may also refer to regressive redistribution, from the poor to the rich. The desirability and effects of redistribution are actively debated on ethical and economic grounds

<sup>33</sup> The underlying premise behind the mixed economy is straightforward. Keynes and like-minded reformers were not willing to give up on capitalism, in particular two of its basic features: that ownership and control of the economy's means of production would remain primarily in the hands of private capitalists; and that most economic activity would be guided by 'market forces', that is, the dynamic combination of material self-seeking and competition. More specifically, the driving force of the mixed economy, as with free-market capitalism, should continue to be capitalists trying to make as much profit as they can. At the same time, Keynes was clear that in maintaining a profit-driven marketplace, it was also imperative to introduce policy interventions to counteract capitalism's inherent tendencies—demonstrated to devastating effect during the 1930s calamity—toward financial breakdowns, depressions and mass unemployment. Keynes's framework also showed how full employment and social welfare interventions could be justified not simply on grounds of social uplift, but could also promote the stability of capitalism.

Generally, the schemes of present-day welfare states concentrate more on the provision of both cash-welfare benefits (such as old-age pensions or unemployment benefits) and kind- welfare services (such as health or childcare services). Through these provisions, welfare states affect the distribution of wellbeing among their citizens, as well as influencing how their citizens consume and how they spend their time (O'Hara, (ed); 1999: 1245; Esping-Andersen, 1999). The emphasis on consumption in the welfare states stems from the notion of seeing the welfare schemes as a poverty relief strategy to cushion the effects of markets from 'cradle to grave' services from the state; and also to swing the interest of the working class away from socialism.

It has been argued elsewhere in this study that both state and individuals are inseparable partners. The rules of conduct of the state are to reflect the desired rules of the conduct by individuals that constitute the state and vice versa. Any unequal variation of the rules of conduct of or by either side will render both sides weak. The individuals who constitute the supreme authority or the sovereignty in the state have the powers to make rules of conduct to be executed on their behalf by the state and ensuring that such execution is binding on all. The state has the supervisory power to compel the individuals to conduct themselves within the confines of the rules of conduct set by individuals for the state to act upon. This is a working covenant between individuals and the state to provide a robust body politic for the benefit of one and all. As one of its fundamental principles, capitalism defends the logic of private property and as a corollary to this it defends the logic of consumption.

Democracy on the other hand defends the logic of collective construction of the extension of rights to all individuals. The two logics therefore make appeal to separate world views. For us to assume that market coexists with democracy remains an illusion sustained by manipulation of semantic. What we have in a free market democracy is democracy where market oligarchies combine the political system and the capitalist market to produce what Michael Parenti describes as "*Democracy for the Few*" (Parenti, 2001). For us to have a situation

where the political and economic systems speak the same language there is need to reconfigure the body politic. Rousseau's analogy will be used to illustrate the meaning of inseparable partnership between the individuals and state. . Rousseau explains:

The body politic<sup>34</sup>, taken individually, may be considered as an organised, living body, resembling that of man. The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are the brain, the source of the nerves and seat of the understanding, will and senses, of which the Judges and Magistrates are the organs: commerce, industry, and agriculture are the mouth and stomach which prepare the common subsistence; the public income is the blood, which a prudent *economy*, in performing the functions of the heart, causes to distribute through the whole body nutriment and life: the citizens are the body and the members, which make the machine live, move and work; and no part of this machine can be damaged without the painful impression being at once conveyed to the brain, if the animal is in a state of health. (Rousseau, 1913)

It must be emphasised that Rousseau's body-politic is akin to state that also has a common will that must not fail to preserve the life and the welfare of each, and the whole, their unity and relationship, through reciprocal responsibilities and duties. The state, through its reciprocal responsibilities and duties to the individual members, gives life and identity to the citizens. Individuals through their duties and responsibilities to the state also give life and identity to the state. Without the individuals there will be no society which by implication means, without the individuals there will be no state. State is, in essence the summation of all the societies recognisably occupying an organised geopolitical space with their members living and relating to each other, guided by

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<sup>34</sup> The metaphor linking the human anatomy to the system of government can be found in Plato's 'Republic'. In Jean-Jacques Rousseau's 'Discourse on Political Economy,' the metaphoric use was extended: 'The body politic, taken individually may be considered as an organised, living body, resembling that of a man. The sovereign power represents the head; the laws and customs are the brain. commerce, industry and agriculture are the mouth and stomach. the public income is the blood. the citizens are the body and the members, which make the machine live, move and work.'" See Safire's New Political Dictionary by William Safire (Random House, New York, 1993) for further reading

some norms, values, legal and extra-legal rules and regulations maintained and supervised by the established institutions and authorities. These institutions and authorities derive their legitimacy from the duties and responsibilities of individuals as agreed upon by the individuals at the onset of the state. The fountain of life and legitimacy of the state are therefore derived from the legitimacy, duties and responsibilities of the various institutions and authorities created by the state with a legitimate authority derived from the sovereigns.

Before the state can protect individual members, it must be in a position to render such responsibility. Its effectiveness requires some mandatory duties and responsibilities from the individual members which must not diminish. These responsibilities are classified in this study as political, economic, social, cultural and biological responsibilities. They are not by choice but required for the energy and life of the state for it to provide the protective duties and responsibilities. This is the basis for the partnership between individuals and the state.

The absence of these mandatory responsibilities underlies the separation of individuals from the state in other models. For example, in socialism, the state is the sole employer of labour. It is also through the profits acquired from the employees, provides some forms of social protection to all. Both the state and individuals are not partners, they only maintain employer-employee relationship with the state having a commanding say. In economic liberalism, the state assumes the position of “night watchman”, as it is not allowed to engage in production itself or attempt to determine what is produced by the private capitalists.

In a mixed economy, both the state and the private individuals are allowed to direct the economy, reflecting the characteristics of both planned and market economies (Stilwell, 2006). Private individuals own the means of

production while the government uses some fiscal and monetary policies to counteract the market's tendency towards financial crises and unemployment. The state in capitalist or mixed economy collects sums from the private individuals in form of taxes for the services rendered. Tax evasion or tax underpayment is considered by the state as a serious fraud meant to incapacitate state, and therefore attracts serious penalty from the state. In socialism, workers pay the state for the protective services rendered to them through their labour and taxes.

In speconomy, political responsibility does not require every individual to be a member of a political group, but voting at state elections to determine the legitimacy of the state's institutions and authority. It is mandatory for every voting-age individual to be on the electoral register. In the same vein, economic responsibility, allows voluntariness in the decision to be an employer or employee but the idea of an individual member not working at all without any disability becomes an attempt at diminishing the energy and life of the state. Work is therefore a required responsibility of every individual member of the state. Becoming an employer requires a process, such as development viable feasibility studies, possession of relevant skills, belonging to a cooperative group of individuals whose skills are complimentary to the survival of the business etc.

The socialisation and integration of a child into society is a parental responsibility by obligation. The required responsibilities of the parents towards the child include provision of parental care, clothing, feeding, supporting the child to access the educational, health, and other social facilities provided by the state for the child development. The state still has the responsibility of taking care of genuinely sick and honest job seekers. Unemployment support in speconomy is not restricted to monetary allowance only, but also includes the encouragement of voluntary self-development towards self-employment. However where the job seeker opts for employee status, such beneficiary is made to do community service or voluntary work around job searching and interviews for a specific period.

Derelection of any of the required responsibilities by an individual becomes an attempt at taking the life of the state and which of course the state must prevent as part of its responsibilities and duties to itself and others. The state has a responsibility of providing minimum provision of good life to those who could not avail themselves with the opportunities for the equitable distribution of wealth due to some disabilities. State's responsibility to those who try to take its life by abandoning their required responsibilities is to firstly protect such life from being taken away. It is through this protection that it will be able to perform its own responsibilities. For instance, the idea of the Universal Child Benefit<sup>35</sup> – a scheme that gives benefits to parents, encouraging families to have children, supporting them to feed and support the family, may encourage the abandonment of required economic responsibility by the freeloaders in the state if not applied with rules and regulations. Child benefit in speconomy will only be adopted when there is need for 'baby boom' or in a situation of multiple births by in a single delivery. In either situation, it will be for a limited period and not necessarily monetary allowance in all cases.

The goal of speconomy is to produce a welfare economy that uses welfare policies as developmental strategies to develop the productive aspect of man rather than restricting such policies to the improvement of the consumption

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<sup>35</sup>Universal benefits paid to rich and poor such as child benefit were particularly beneficial after the Second World War when the birth rate was low. Universal Child Benefit may have helped drive the baby boom.

aspect. It encourages the development of what Spencer<sup>36</sup> refers to as “*voluntary self-improvement*” which is the basis for the productive aspect in every individual. It is the neglect of this aspect that in the first instance opens the welfare schemes to abuse and harsh criticisms from critics like Herbert Spencer who opine that coddling the poor and unfit would simply allow them to reproduce and delay social progress.

### 8.3 Speconomy and poverty eradication

The extent to which an economic model affects poverty depends upon many factors, but particularly on its structure and policies. The underbelly of speconomy’s emphasis is the that productive growth is more likely to lead directly to a reduction in poverty when the economic assets of the state are distributed relatively equally or when based on the intensive employment of factors of production, especially labour and capital. For example, in largely rural economies based on small-scale farming, as in many African countries, most of the poor are engaged in agriculture. When such a country grows through agricultural exports, or when growth in manufacturing increases the demand for food and materials supplied by the rural sector, growth benefits both poor farmers and the even poorer labourers they employ. In land-poor but labour-abundant economies, such as those of East Asia, rapid growth of manufactured or service exports creates a large pool of new jobs, absorbs the supply of low-productivity workers, and eventually causes a rise in real wages that further reduces poverty.

The comparative advantage of the countries is vital for the development of their cooperative groups. This does not foreclose the need for

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<sup>36</sup> Herbert Spencer in his ‘*The Man versus the State*’ (1884), attacked the Liberal Party for not defending personal property but promoting paternalist social legislation that provides compulsory education, laws to regulate safety at work, prohibition and temperance laws, tax funded libraries, and welfare reforms. His main objections were threefold: the use of the coercive powers of the government, the discouragement given to voluntary self-improvement, and the disregard of the “laws of life.” The reforms, he said, were tantamount to “socialism”, which he said was about the same as “slavery” in terms of limiting human freedom.



cooperatives in secondary industries but the primary cooperative groups should be predominantly base on the resource advantage of the country to pave the way for the emergence of secondary activities.

Speconomy as a unique welfare model modifies the 'need right' to include the productive aspect to fortify the economic partnership for the protection and benefit of both state and citizens. The essence of this, using the required economic responsibilities of the two partners to stimulate growth, is to sharpen the productive aspect of every individual, energise the state by boosting its productive base, create more employment opportunities, provide alternative way of re-focusing the state to tackle the effects of the market on the citizenry, and reduce the incidence of poverty.

There have been arguments about the capability of welfare policies to considerably reduce poverty in countries whose welfare policies commonly constitute at least a fifth of their GDPs (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011: 597; Kenworthy, 1999). Do these welfare policies actually work? The major weakness in these policies is the sapping of the productive aspect of the beneficiaries, mostly the poor which invariably weakens the economy. Some studies that focused on the relationship between welfare policies and poverty reduction could not but conclude that though the state generosity improves the absolute material well-being of the poor but no evidence suggests that relatively more generous unemployment benefits systematically reduce poverty. It rather reduces economic growth and offsetting in the long run any poverty reduction it might have achieved in the short run (Kenworthy, 1999: 1119-39).

From the foregoing it could be argued that welfare policies though intended to improve the well-being of those at or near the bottom of income distribution, but the policies rather than reduce poverty only put in place poverty trap as averred by Kenworthy (*ibid*). The reason for this is not far-fetched. Economic growth remains the key to poverty reduction, excessive redistribution of state income through welfare policies without commensurate production, will automatically cripple growth. .

Most of the welfare states stated below have considerably lower poverty rates than they had before the implementation of welfare programs but they all record reduction in their GDPs, as will be revealed later, when compared with China.

Country	Absolute poverty rate (1960–1991) (threshold set at 40% of U.S. median household income)		Relative poverty rate (1970–1997)	
	Pre-welfare	Post-welfare	Re-welfare	Post-welfare
Sweden	23.7	5.8	44.8	4.8
Norway	9.2	1.7	12.4	4.0
Netherlands	22.1	7.3	18.5	11.5
Finland	11.9	3.7	12.4	3.1
Denmark	26.4	5.9	17.4	4.8
Germany	15.2	4.3	9.7	5.1
Switzerland	12.5	3.8	10.9	9.1
Canada	22.5	6.5	17.1	11.9
France	36.1	9.8	21.8	6.1
Belgium	26.8	6.0	19.5	4.1
Australia	23.3	11.9	16.2	9.2
United Kingdom	16.8	8.7	16.4	8.2
United States	21.0	11.7	17.2	15.1
Italy	30.7	14.3	19.7	9.1

Figures from the OECD 2001 and the UNDP (2003)

#### 8.4 Dynamics of Speconomy in the Global Economy

The richness of community-centred life in the rural areas of Africa may tempt one to query if it is really necessary for the African nations to take part in the global economy that is driven by fierce competition. Historically, Africa has for centuries been and will remain part of the global economy. Most of rural Africa is as closely connected to the world economy as their urban cities do through the manufacturing sector. Most of the agricultural produce such as coffee, cotton, cocoa, etc. produced in the rural areas are mainly for exportation to feed

the industries in the developed countries. Many of the textile firms, assembly plants, and large trading companies in Africa are owned by foreign investors.

The ‘second-hand’<sup>37</sup> clothes, household equipment, and furniture, etc. which compete with the domestic industries, come from the developed countries. Most governments in the Sub Saharan Africa are World Trade Organisation (WTO) members or are WTO observers<sup>38</sup>. Thirty-eight members, four have established accession working parties and two others have requested accession working parties<sup>39</sup>. In addition, three governments have typically been granted observer status during ministerial conferences<sup>40</sup>. ‘These are pointers as argued by Taylor that ‘Africa is increasingly important in international relations and is more and more attracting interest from a variety of actors at a scale perhaps not witnessed since the original Scramble for Africa’ (Taylor 2010: 22). Unfortunately, “on many fronts” argues Brown (2012), “African states remain at best minor powers” still “hemmed in” (Callaghy and Ravenhill, 1993) by the “seemingly immovable structures of international inequality, by high levels of poverty and underdevelopment, often fragile economies and weak political and military capacity” (Brown, *ibid*). It is apparent that Africa will remain an integral part of the global economy. However, being part of the global economy needs to be accomplished by proceeding from Africa’s special characteristics through which the African states can blaze their own paths.

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<sup>37</sup> These are used items sometimes given to charity organisations in the developed nations but most of them are now shipped to African cities for direct sales

<sup>38</sup> The following 10 SSA governments are not WTO members: Cape Verde, Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan.

<sup>39</sup> WTO accession working parties have been established for the following SSA countries: Cape Verde (July 2000), Ethiopia (Feb. 2003), Seychelles (May 1995), and Sudan (Oct. 1994). Equatorial Guinea (Apr. 2002) and São Tomé and Príncipe (Jan. 2001) have requested that accession working parties be established for their countries.

<sup>40</sup> The Comoros, Eritrea, and Liberia

This historical pattern of Africa's involvement in the contemporary global economy provides us with an insight to understand the current economic situation and the impact of such patterns on Africa's economic growth. SSA countries' efforts to increase integration into the global trading economy continued to be hampered by numerous obstacles. In addition to social and political conflict arising mostly from the incapability of the states to provide the necessary protections for the citizens, inadequate infrastructure, such as dilapidated road networks, congested ports, inefficient customs services, and prohibitively expensive air transport, due to bad governance and weak states etc. hampered the national and international transport of merchandise. Many SSA countries continue to depend heavily on extractive primary commodity products, such as petroleum, minerals, and agricultural products (for example, cocoa, coffee, cotton, and tea). These primary products are subjected to erratic and declining international prices (USITC, 2012: 6-2).

The vicissitudes of African economic visions from Manchester, 1945 to NEPAD, 2002 had been discussed elsewhere and the need to reconfigure the economic architecture also explained. This reconfiguration was also explained to require refocusing the state in order to reduce the over-dependence on the industrialised countries' extractive economic relationship. African states are grappling with the new dilemmas of openness to trade and capital flows inherent in the global trade economy. As queried by Dani Rodrik (1999), what role if any, remains for the state in promoting industrialisation? Does openness worsen inequality, and if so, what can be done about it? What is the best way to handle turbulence from the world economy, especially the fickleness of international capital flows? In wrestling with these posers, Dani Rodrik (*ibid*: 1) argues that successful integration into the world economy requires a complementary set of policies and institutions at home. States must reinforce their external strategy of liberalisation with an appropriate internal strategy that gives the state substantial responsibility in building physical and human capital and mediating social conflicts.

There is the importance of openness for economic growth but not at the expense of local growth. A necessary condition to participate in and benefit from the opportunities available in the global environment is a policy framework that facilitates domestic production and growth.

The UK Government's White Paper on International Development (Secretary of State, 2000) provides a particularly useful and balanced view of the role of market-opening and other developmental policies in the promotion of development. The Paper while recognising the importance of governance, human, physical and capital investment policies, it also recognises the central role of trade policies of the state in harnessing the forces of globalisation for the benefit of the poor. The document explains:

Everywhere it is clear that openness is a necessary – though not sufficient – condition for national prosperity. No developed country is closed. The initially poor countries that have been most successful in catching up in recent decades – the newly industrialising Easter Asian countries and China – seized the opportunity offered by more open world markets to build strong export sectors and to attract inward investment. This contributed, along with massive investment in education, to the largest reduction in abject poverty that the world has ever seen (Secretary of State 2000: 17).

The emphasis of the document is that openness is never a sufficient condition for national prosperity but inward investment with massive investment in education. This emphasis serves as a confirmation to speconomy that what needs to be improved upon by the state is the productive aspect of individuals. One of the most vexing questions revealed by the document is why, if global trade economy is so good for development, why have so many countries, especially in Africa, fallen further behind during the final decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, during the height of the recent globalization experience? A large part of the answer lies in poor domestic development strategies of the African countries which depend more on foreign extractive economic relationship.

With respect of the industrialised western nations, they are afflicted with outsource production. Outsourced production is a form of consumption that weakens domestic production growth. The corporate organisations move out of high production cost to low product cost zones where they utilise more of production factors to maximise profits. The corporate organisations derive excess profits from the host state due to cheap production cost. The host state provides free trade zones, tax reliefs and other infrastructural instruments to aid free flow of capitals and profits. The industry provides employment opportunities to the locales but it hardly contributes to the domestic production growth of the state. It in addition appropriates surplus labour<sup>41</sup>. The finished products are not essentially meant for the local markets, they are to be repatriated to the countries of origins of the corporate organisations and other developed countries with high currency values. This repatriation expands the need-based consumption of the populace while the domestic growth shrinks due to the outsourcing policy.

With the fall in the domestic growth, fewer jobs become available for the people in the manufacturing sector and which invariably means less income tax for the state. Loss of jobs also means reduction in the prospective buyers of the repatriated goods. Supply of goods will increase while the demand diminishes. This leads to further job loss in the trade industry and also loss of revenue for the state. The loss of revenue by the state automatically affects the state in performing its social responsibilities towards the citizens and of which the state must fill the gaps created by the revenue loss. The effects are more pronounced in welfare states due to their welfare generosities which increase domestic consumption while production diminishes.

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<sup>41</sup> Surplus labour is a concept used by Karl Marx in his critique of political economy. It means labour performed in excess of necessary labour to produce the means of livelihood of the worker. It is usually an "unpaid labour" which Marxian economics regards as the ultimate source of capitalist profits. The historical emergence of surplus labour is, according to Marx, closely associated with the growth of trade, that is, the economic exchange of goods and services; and with the emergence of a society divided into social classes where the strong after defeating the weak can live off the labour of the weak.

For the state to fill the gap it employs series of austerity measures to prevent dwindling revenues and conserve funds. The strategies always include reduction in public spending, withdrawal of subsidies, total withdrawal or partial provision of some social services, 'right sizing' of labour, increment in service fees or product prices, expanding the scope of taxable items, high tariffs on foreign goods, monetisation of some benefits and privileges, adjustment of pension schemes and retiring ages etc. All these measures are taken by the state in order to ensure that banks – the driving force of corporate organisations stay afloat. How and why? Banks are sustained by deposits from the state, corporate organisations and individuals.

Loss of jobs means reduced taxes and less deposit for the banks, loss of prospective buyers for the finished goods and reduced profit for the corporate organisations and more expenditure for the welfare states in form of support. With fewer deposits, banks are unable to provide financial support for the corporate organisations and this will in the long run affect the production scales in the 'comfort zones' with deeper consequences for the home countries in terms of mass unemployment. This is what is generally referred to as recession<sup>42</sup>. Recession is characterised by contraction<sup>43</sup> in the GDP for a maximum period of six months to one year, high unemployment, stagnant wages and fall in retail sales. Any contraction lasting more than one year becomes a depression. There is a need to expand the frontiers of the consumption theory for the purpose of clarity

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<sup>42</sup> A recession generally does not last longer than one year and is much milder than a slump or depression. Some economists consider recession as a normal part of the capitalist economy but its causes are still subject to debates among the economists

<sup>43</sup> Contraction is the lowest point in an economic cycle characterised by reduced purchasing power, mass unemployment, and excess of supply over demand, falling prices or prices rising slower than usual, falling wages or wages rising than usual and general lack of confidence in the future. This becomes a slump or depression if it lasted more than one year and causes a major drop in all economic activity

and to further illustrate the elements involved in speconomy.

Consumption in this chapter refers to a process in which goods and services are completely used up, incorporated or transformed into a new substance. The consumed item may either be goods or services whose consumption means the amount of such items used in a particular time period.

The process of consumption is the sequence of interdependent and linked procedures which at every stage consume one or more resources such as labour time and capital to convert the input to output. The output may either be completely destroyed or serve as inputs for the next stage until a desired goal is achieved. There is a difference between 'need-based consumption' and 'want-based consumption'. An illustration of the two types of consumption is when you feel thirsty, obviously you will need water to quench your thirst and re-hydrate yourself. In this wise water is your need. Therefore, drinking water is need-based consumption. Want-based consumption, on the other hand, is when you give preference for cool drinks like Pepsi, coca cola, apple juice, etc. to quench your thirst. This involves choosing between alternatives for maximum satisfaction.

The argument that the level of consumption is determined among other factors by one's budget constraint may not be a strong factor in globalisation. Globalising activities of the multinational corporations with big wallets and unfettered access to financial resources have proved that profit maximisation is the chief driving force for their consumption of better production matrix provided by most of the states in the developing third world economies. Outsourcing of production is therefore a want-based consumption that provides the best option for the MNCs to derive desired satisfaction of high returns on investments as against low returns that might have been recorded at home due to high cost of production.



Analysing the issue of consumption in this study is primarily to show how the MNCs use consumption to disintegrate production that is, shrink production at home and breeds unemployment globally. It also aims to show how speconomy plans the refocusing of the state economy targeting domestic production for sustainable expansion of the productive base of the state in order to address the sixth giant killer of the economy –Less jobs that characterises periodical global recession/depression.

A further analysis is made by comparing the European Union economy with the Chinese economy and using such to highlight the elements of speconomy that improves the Chinese GDP. The essence of using China as an illustration aims, in particular, to relate China's economic performance to Western free market economic theory which we are more familiar with and whose rejection for African states constitutes one of the cornerstones of the thesis.

The target set of any economic development cannot be isolated from specific situation and goal. Speconomy is not an exemption to this. For example, for a prolonged period after the commencement of China's reform and opening up process in 1978 the goal was the most rapid possible GDP development as explained by John Ross (2011).

Going by Ross submission (ibid), China's rate of growth of total consumption, (household consumption and state spending on items such as education, health etc), has risen at 8.7% a year over the reform period compared to 6.1% for Malaysia, 5.9% for Indonesia, and 5.6% for South Korea. China's 8.7% annual rate of growth of total consumption evidently far exceeds the 3.0% for the US, 2.6% for the UK, 2.5% for Japan, 1.6% for Germany etc.

China also has the fastest annual rate of growth of household consumption of 8.6% when compared to Malaysia's 6.8%, Indonesia's 6.0%,

South Korea's 5.6% etc. China's rate of growth of household consumption is evidently far higher than the US's 3.5%, the UK's 3.0%, Germany's 1.6% etc.


See Table 1 below

Annual % increase 1978-2008			
	GDP	Household Consumption	Total Consumption
China	9.8%	8.6%	8.7%
Malaysia*	6.3%	6.8%	6.1%
Indonesia	5.4%	6.0%	5.9%
Korea, Rep.	6.3%	5.6%	5.6%
Hong Kong SAR, China	5.5%	5.2%	5.1%
Thailand	5.7%	4.9%	5.0%
India	5.7%	4.6%	4.8%
Chile	5.1%	5.0%	4.6%
Ireland*	5.0%	4.5%	3.8%
Philippines	3.2%	3.8%	3.7%
Australia	3.3%	3.2%	3.3%
United States*	2.8%	3.5%	3.0%
United Kingdom	2.4%	3.0%	2.6%
Canada*	2.7%	3.0%	2.5%
Japan*	2.3%	2.7%	2.5%
France	2.1%	2.1%	2.1%
Germany	2.0%	1.6%	1.6%
Switzerland*	1.8%	1.6%	1.5%
* Consumption annual increase 1978-2007			
Source: Calculated from World Bank World Data Tables			

From Table 1 above, it is clear that all countries with the highest rate of growth of consumption – China, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Thailand, and India – have the highest rates of growth of GDP. Countries with low growth rates of GDP – the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany etc – also have low rates of growth of consumption, although they have higher shares of consumption in GDP than China. This is a vital signal of low domestic investment in the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany etc. This illustrates that what is crucial in the economic development of consumption is its rate of growth, in which the determinant is the rate of GDP growth, and not the percentage of consumption in GDP. It is the China's high level of enterprise investment in fixed

assets that creates the basis for its rapid economic growth, raising its GDP from an average of 29 percent between 1978 and 1993 to an average of 36 percent thereafter. This in turn permits its high rate of growth of consumption. The unique characteristics that differentiate China from other economies are that it is enterprise investment rather than the household or government investment.

EU economy on the hand has for the last four years been recording shortfalls in investments with high shares of consumption in GDP. The fundamental trends in Europe's economy are illustrated in Figure 1 below.




Source: Calculated from OECD Quarterly National Accounts

This shows the changes in different components of the European Union (EU)'s GDP since the first quarter of 2008 – the peak of the last business cycle and immediately before the onset of the financial crisis. It may be seen that the negative trend in the EU economy is entirely dominated by its fall in investment.

The EU's trade balance has improved during the financial crisis, government consumption has risen, and the fall in personal consumption is relatively small. But the fall in fixed investment is huge, amounting to 150 per cent of the total decline in GDP. This falls far more than offsets the performance in other economic sectors. The economic situation in Europe is therefore entirely dominated by this investment fall. What could have been responsible for the fall in investment? This is what is referred to in the study as disintegration of production through outsourcing of production and continuous expansion of need-based consumption at home in search of profit maximisation abroad.

The difference in China can be seen in Figure 2, which shows the results of the stimulus program launched by China in 2008 to counter the international financial crisis. This stimulus programme directly targeted raising investment – in particular infrastructure and housing. The results are evident. Rather than falling sharply, as in Europe and the US, China's investment rose with its economy expanding by over 40 per cent in four years compared to growth of 1 per cent in the US and a contraction of 2 per cent in Europe. Majority of China's stimulus programme partially targeted investment at home to expand the production base of the state and increase exports to international markets (see Wen Jiabao' Sustaining Economic Growth in China, March 2007, pp 105-109).

Figure 2



Source: Calculated from China Statistical Yearbook 2011

As stated elsewhere, the essence of using China in this illustration is to juxtapose China's economic growth with the European Union, show its global impact, and the consequences for the improvement of the social conditions of China and the world's population. While the EU's choice is to reinforce the speconomy's assumption that every country is specific and therefore no country can or should mechanically copy another.

The Chinese political leaders led by its economic reformer Deng Xiaoping stress this uniqueness fondly referred to as 'Chinese characteristics' in the Chinese economic reform package. It was this uniqueness that formed the pillar of the reform that was more of backward integration and state-led. Deng Xiaoping asserts that 'to accomplish modernization of a Chinese type, we must proceed from China's special characteristics.' (Deng, 1979), therefore China must 'blaze a path of our own' (Deng, 1985). This view was later reinforced by Justin Yifu Lin, Chinese Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank. He argues:

‘...we can never be too careful when it comes to the application of a foreign theory, because with different preconditions, no matter how trivial they seem, the result can be very different’ (Lin, 2012: 66)

China’s ‘reform and opening up’ process under Deng Xiaoping was, of course, formulated in a modified Marxist economic framework. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms of the 1980s were regarded as a “re-instatement of economics in China” (Lin, 1981). It includes a critique of Soviet economic policy which Deng Xiaoping opined to be an error of confusing the ‘advanced’ stage of socialism/communism, in which the regulation of the economy is ‘for need’, hence not market regulated. Deng felt otherwise by expressing that market regulation must accompany the stages of development in socialism, during which the transition from capitalism to an advanced socialist economy takes place (ibid).

The final formulation arrived at was that China’s was a ‘socialist market economy with ‘Chinese characteristics’. This is a model that gives the state ownership of the large state firms while the citizens own small ones with support from the state. This is a form of socialised agreement between the two partners working towards the same goal of expanding the productive base of the state for the overall benefits of all. In practical terms, such model accommodates the modification of a centrally planned economy to develop a socialist market economy where the state controls certain key macroeconomic parameters. In terms of ownership it is guided by ‘Zhuada Fangxiao’ – state maintaining large state firms and releasing small ones to the non-state/private sector (John Ross, 2012).

China became less vulnerable to the mobile investment funds because the Chinese state’s control of the capitals and less dependence on the foreign investments. This is the melting point between speconomy and the Chinese models. The speconomy partnership model provides the state with the opportunity to direct the usage of the capital more in the domestic investments than reliance

on the Foreign Direct Investments. The departing point with the Chinese model is that speconomy provides the state with the tool of preventing structural imbalance in the economy such imbalance investment in the economic sectors. This is done in order to prevent relocation of labour from low-productivity sector to high productivity sector. Speconomy takes into account many of the technological and scientific advances of our time which the state will play a leading role in harnessing to prevent industrial overcapacity that may lead to high productivity without commensurate consumer spending.

The state provides the technology the business owner(s) could not afford as part of production costs to the business in addition to providing training of specialised professionals through educational policies. These skilled professionals will in turn be providing innovative technology required for business growth.

Though there are instances where land has been divided into parcels with individual or sub-family land titles, but the common practice is that individuals or families work the land together especially in the rural areas where the bulk of the African population resides. This makes cooperative associations more appealing as done in the Western Nigeria between 1954 and 1966 to organise workers into groups that will form partnerships with the state. The state will guide the cooperative groups towards its comparative advantage in agriculture and industrialisation. Once the comparative advantage has been achieved in any sector and the state is self-sufficient, the sector can graduate from subsistence to large-scale that will be more of export driven. Foreign companies will be allowed to participate as partners in mostly the large scale companies.

The responsibilities of the state will include stimulating the creation of domestic cooperative enterprises, establish domestic markets and locate the foreign markets as well; and to develop energy sources and infrastructure to foster these enterprises. Because the domestic enterprises which mostly are at their

cottage levels may not have the capacity to administer the nation's strategic resources, in these cases and in these cases only will state enterprises be created but in partnership with the regions, towns and communities hosting such enterprises. Revenues from these enterprises will contribute to the society's welfare.

In speconomy, the state takes charge of planning the equitable empowerment of domestic enterprises through socialised partnerships and tax policies while it continues to guarantee the nation's security, its monetary policies and, basically, will be in charge of consolidating all productive forces oriented toward national integration.



## Chapter 9

### Summary and Conclusion

The argument of this thesis is that sub-Saharan Africa and indeed the African countries will continue to be dogged by political crisis as long as the post-colonial nation-states retain the status of '*neo-trading outposts*' with no effort to reconfigure the state and ensure the equitable distribution of resources in a way that will tilt the economy towards high level of domestic investment. The emphasis being stressed in *speconomy* is that every country is specific and therefore no country can or should mechanically copy another. Every country needs to blaze their own path in the direction flowered by indigenous grains. Traditional African economy possesses two salient features that serve as key elements in *speconomy*. Firstly, man is never portrayed only as a consumer but also as a producer. Secondly, the development of man's productive aspect is never left for man alone but with the support from his community, of which he shares the proceeds with the community through his contributions to the 'family pot'.

In rural Africa, the extended family and the clan system allows members to assume the responsibility for all services for their members, whether social or economic. People live in closely organised groups and willingly accept communal obligations for mutual support. Individuals satisfy their needs for social and economic security merely by being attached to one of these groups. The sick, the aged and children are all cared for by the extended family. This system as cited by Iliffe, allows the people to be mentally healthy due to lack of insecurity while deviation or abnormal behaviour is almost absent (Iliffe, 1987: 3).

The economic model involves the cooperation between the individuals and the community. These two salient features are general to every society but the communal values of African societies make it more pronounced in traditional African societies. One of the main arguments in *speconomy* is that part of reasons responsible for the contemporary economic crisis is the separation of these two

inseparable partners in all the existing economic models. This is a broken linkage that needs to be fixed. Globalisation as it is now, serves as a process that further widens the separation of man from the state. Globalisation could still be turned around to consolidate the integration of both man and state. The idea of jettisoning capitalism or embracing socialism by the post-colonial leaders was just a reflection of their ideological orientation which has nothing to do with African culture. Africans accumulate wealth just like any other group of people in the capitalist countries. The only difference, however, is the form of accumulation. Clearly, as emphasised by Ayittey (2008), the general absence of economic or pecuniary wealth does not indicate that Africans had no conception of wealth and were uninterested in its accumulation (Ayittey, 2008). There is no African norm or value that forbids Africans to prosper and be wealthy or any custom that indicates Africans as natural socialists. In fact, each king or chief desired prosperity for his people. Ritual incantations, religious sacrifices, and invocation of ancestral spirits were generally performed to seek the assistance of the gods and dead ancestors to protect the tribe and help it prosper (*ibid*)

In spite of wealth accumulation practice, political power or office in traditional Africa was not used as the basis to accumulate wealth. As explained by Carlston (1968), the rich in traditional Africa did not owe their wealth to political office or connections rather strong emphasis was placed on personal achievement, and ways to achievement and leadership were open. The African chief was forbidden to accumulate personal wealth. Any such accumulation or gift to the Akan chief according to Carlston, (*ibid*) was regarded as "stool property." Many social groups, who aided their members as they sought to move upwards in status and influence, encouraged achievement. Achievement and initiative were permitted within many of the social groups and were facilitated by the number of contacts with social groups which were possible. An individual could turn to many different groups for land, political support, and other purposes.

Without a political and economic arrangement that ensures "ethnic

justice” neither "liberal democracy" nor any other imported specie of democracy and government can succeed in Africa (Skinner, 1998: 17). If liberal democracy were to have any chance of survival in Africa, it will have to adapt to local realities, and its contours need to be shaped by indigenous socio-cultural values. It has to be modified to accommodate the historical specificity of the political and cultural circumstances of African states.

Africa is in need of relief from poor governance, misgovernment and economic collapse but this relief may be difficult to achieve if African states fail to have their own unique parades. While reforms to improve governance are essential for sustainable economic growth and political stability, such reforms require inputs from peculiar grains that can enable each state to blaze its own path with its unique characteristics. What has been obtainable in the sub-Saharan African states is the acceptance of the liberal market prescriptions without any effort at using their unique contexts to define their own political and economic paths. The result is the failure that creates the basis for what Skinner (*ibid*) describes as "disemia"<sup>44</sup> but which Geertz (1963, p.109) erroneously debunked with emphasis that new political society may be difficult to attain in the face of persisting primordial bonds such as kinship, blood, language or religion that are ever present to frustrate the emergence of such society. The thesis stresses idea of democracy as not exclusively a Western concept. Similarly, the presumption that democratic values and practices are alien to the African continent, with the West posturing as their cultural bearers and defenders creates the mindset of considering Africans as incapable of democratic thoughts. This [mis]conception gives the impression of Africa in desperate need of democracy therefore there is a need to infuse African with civilised notion of Western democracy. What is ignored in this thought is that democratic values and processes have been as indigenous to Africans as they were to the ancient Greeks. African traditional political cultures and organizations as discussed in Chapter Three would give

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<sup>44</sup> This is a condition among local power seekers who, to please hegemonies, may either disguise those aspects of social life that conflict with the hopes of tutelary powers, or create systems out of phase with local realities, or cynically manipulate local conditions to gain or remain in power

credence to this conclusion. Democratic thought and values have never been an exclusive preserve of any culture or group. The desire for representation, inclusion, and participation in public affairs which are essential elements of democracy, are universal to all humans. The difference rests in the methods of attaining these goals. To what extent a society "democratises" is incontestably dependent on its socio-cultural milieu, whether it is African, European, American, Asian, or even Islamic societies.

The pre-colonial African traditional political systems were able to function not because of their forms, but because they were able to fulfil the needs of their subjects and societies. Those that could not fulfil such needs; not because of any cultural value but failure in moral obligations of the leader towards the subjects and such leader's political authority also received equal measure of resistance from the subjects. What matters in the contemporary context is creative adjustment towards democratic reforms as noted by Whitaker in the case of Northern Nigerian politics. Whitaker concluded as noted in Chapter Two, that "significant elements of the traditional political system of the emirates proved to be compatible in practical terms with significant features of the modern state" (Whitaker, 1970: 467).

As emphasised in the thesis, by the 1980s, regardless of ideology, the political economies of the African states had so deteriorated to provide a veritable opportunity for military coups, political oppression and ethnic strife. While some analysts blamed the African leaders of "pursuing economic policies or creating public institutions that became impediments to their economic progress" (Kitchen, 1988: 21), the military were however laying the blame on incompetence and corruption of the political leaders. The military hardly considered the political economy that subjects the state to being a victim of a changing global economic environment. Because African economies were so heavily dependent on the export of a few primary products, any recession in the West caused them to

collapse (*ibid*: 22). This ignorance contributed to the fatal failure and eventual collapse of nearly all the military regimes in Africa.

The failure of both the civilians and the military administrations informed, as clearly stated in Chapter Seven, the Afro Pessimistic<sup>45</sup> view that was challenged by the Afro Optimistic<sup>46</sup> view. The end of the Cold War actually complicated the Africa's Tragedy with a subsequent disinterest by both East and West in African affairs leading to Afro pessimism. Rather than consider Africa's problems as the precipitate of its turbulent change, the practices of the often embattled (and often corrupt) African leaders were blamed (Skinner, 1998: 20), as revealed in Bates and Berg Reports of 1981.

The IMF/SAP solutions prescribed by the World Bank with the United States as the propelling engine for the African states to adopt democracy and free market only aggravated the situation. The greatest fault line of the liberal market democracy was the assumption of the universality of democracy. The liberal proponents assert that democracy everywhere means not only the right of people to elect their own government, but that only its liberal variant can guarantee the full exercise of fundamental human rights now judged to be universal and applicable to all individuals without distinction as to age, gender, descent, religion, ethnicity, or race (Bohen, 1987).

Coups and corruption are not issues that could be treated in isolation if an end is to be sought. An end to coups and corruption could not be achieved if the meaning and practice of democracy are still restricted to its liberal variant with

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<sup>45</sup> The almost racist notion that Africa and Africans were hopeless

<sup>46</sup> The view that there is nothing about Africa that makes it undemocratic or ungovernable but Africa's problems are precipitate of its turbulent change

no respect for the indigenous institutions. This thesis emphasised in Chapter Two, that western ideas about democracy that are specifically rooted in the notion of political and social rights for individuals are anti-African reality. The reality of Africa as explained by Skinner (*ibid*) is still one in which "collectivities", or "ethnic" groups, rather than individuals are demanding social justice. There were traditional forms of democracy, autocracy, monarchy, and oligarchy in state-organised societies as well as stateless societies in their pre-colonial forms that could have been explored and not condemned. In this context, the thesis calls for respect for African cultures, their traditional institutions and ethnic concerns in the distribution of the state or global resources.

From the above summary and analysis, it is apparent that the assumptions of the modernisation theory that traditional structures would disappear in a smooth process of modernisation quickly evaporated when the assumed success of private and state development proved to be difficult (Ezeala-Harrison, 1996). Civil societies that were dragged in as key actors in the modernisation process could also not stop the dwindling fortunes of the states. The reason for this as argued in the thesis was that a large part of the civil societies depend on foreign donors and they immediately disappeared once the donor money is used up (Holmquist and Ford, 1994; Fagan, 2006). The people although are tired of poor economic and political records of the post-colonial governments during the past thirty years; they are more disillusioned by the modern post-colonial state modelled after western liberal systems. This necessitated the emphasis in the thesis on the need for the reconfiguration of the African states and economies using the traditional organisations and powers as relevant actors in the political economy of Africa.

The integration of traditional authorities into local governance is not only a subject for development agencies but also for governments. For example, Mozambique's Frelimo party once rejected these traditional institutions but now

seeks co-operation with traditional authorities in its decentralisation project in the "Autarcias" (Skinner, 1998). This change in attitude did not come until after the influence of the traditional authorities gave Renamo the main opposition party, electoral victories in 1994 and 1999 general elections in the rural areas threatening Frelimo's hold on power at the centre.

This further confirms how local powers and authorities can and should be integrated into governance, especially local governance. The reason for this integration is clear; bringing traditional powers and modern governance together means trying to avoid a "clash of civilisations" and resolve the potential conflicts of the structural divide on the basis of co-operation and compromise. Traditional powers may appear to differ in fundamental principles with the liberal market democracy and state but the traditional internal structures of decision making are not however less democratic or opposed to fundamental human rights as opined in most literatures of liberal democracy. What needed to be understood by the proponents of either liberal or socialist democracies is that African traditional values are neither optional nor to be relegated in governance, but vital for the traditional way of production, distribution and reproduction. The way the traditional institutions function in the society must be recognised and respected. Recognition and not re-invention of this, marks the first step towards the reconfiguration of the modern African states and economies. For example the non-recognition of the traditional institutions in the post-Taliban Afghanistan process of nation-building has rendered the political regime unstable, the monopoly of the state is contested, state functions are not implemented, state authority not effective in all regions.

Re-invention such as neo-patrimonial leadership is possible within socialist or liberal democracy that initially pretends to ignore the relevance of traditional institutions in governance but was later confronted by the African reality. This is one of the reasons why most of the contemporary micro-economic development projects are now being revolved around communal structures and the

gradual integration of the traditional rulers into government though at the peripheral level in some African states

In neo-communitarian democracy, the state is structured along the traditional and modern governments in an arrangement that allows regional ethnic autonomy in political affairs with competencies of modern statehood but limited in some affairs of national and international nature. From a perspective of institutional development, such arrangement will have at least two advantages:

1. First, if traditional powers are formally accepted as actors of a "mixed" traditional and modern statehood, the fundamental conflict between the two sides can be handled in a contractual way. This means a more peaceful development.
2. Second, if the solution is federalist - i.e. the traditional powers participate in developing and amending a modern constitution - there is a chance of a slow but robust bottom-up nation-building.

The concrete solution of state reconfiguration requires a careful evaluation of the structural divide between traditional and modern governance. As explained in earlier paragraphs, the fundamental condition of successful state building lies in recognition and trust of the traditional institutions as vital partners in the modernisation of the post-colonial states.



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